U.S. v. Lindsay
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
| Writing for the Court | TAMM |
| Citation | U.S. v. Lindsay, 506 F.2d 166, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 105 (D.C. Cir. 1974) |
| Decision Date | 07 October 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-1691,73-1691 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. James LINDSAY, Jr., Appellant. |
Carleton A. Harkrader, Washington, D.C. (appointed by this Court) with whom was Thomas W. Brunner, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Steven R. Schaars, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U.S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry and John E. Drury, III, Asst. U.S. Attys., were on the brief for appellee. Earl J. Silbert, U.S. Atty., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before EDWARDS, * Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, and TAMM and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Appellant James Lindsay, Jr., seeks review of his conviction on one count of robbery (22 D.C.Code 2901) arising out of an April 3, 1972 armed robbery of a McDonald's Restaurant. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred by (1) not suppressing certain evidence alleged to be the fruits of an unconstitutional police entry and (2) not directing a verdict of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. Finding that the police entry violated appellant's fourth amendment rights, we reverse.
Early on the morning of April 3, 1972, two armed men accosted the clean-up crew at the McDonald's Restaurant at 4950 South Dakota Avenue, Northeast, Washington. Each robber wore a ski mask; one was later described as wearing a dark mask and dark clothing, and the other a light colored jacket with gold stripes and a green mask with yellow stripes, through which a protruding mustache could be seen. Tr. 110-11. The two men forced the night manager to open the restaurant safe, herded and then locked all the employees in a bathroom, and escaped with approximately $2700 and the manager's car. Tr. 110, 134-35.
The robbery proceeds included money the night manager had prepared for deposit the following day, $596.22 wrapped in bands stamped with the restaurant's address and then placed with accompanying deposit slips into Suburban Trust Company deposit bags. Tr. 118, 298-99. The robbers also took Raj Malhorta's, the night manager's wallet. Tr. 135.
Approximately ten minutes after the robbery, the employees freed themselves from the barricaded bathroom. Mr. Malhorta immediately discovered his car was missing and called the police. When the police responded shortly thereafter, they were given a description of the robbers and the stolen automobile, including a partial license plate number. Tr. 111-12.
At approximately 4:35 a.m., Metropolitan Police Officers Rufus Jenkins and Gerald Awkard were parked at the corner of New York Avenue and Bladensburg Road, Northeast, when they heard a radio transmission concerning the McDonald's robbery which contained a description of a yellow Dodge Charger with Maryland plates. Almost at the same moment, Officer Jenkins noticed an automobile matching that description stopping for a traffic light at the intersection. The police followed as the car turned onto New York Avenue and subsequently into the parking lot of the Diplomat Motel where two men alighted. Tr. 141-42.
The officers parked, and Officer Jenkins chased the driver who had proceeded around the end of the motel building. He assumed that his partner was chasing the other suspect who was heading away from the motel toward New York Avenue. Tr. 143. However, Officer Awkard, having failed to see the passenger alight from the car, also pursued the driver. Tr. 45-46.
Officer Jenkins ordered the driver, later identified as William J. Smith, to stop, and Smith did so, halting as he stretched toward a partially open motel room door. Smith closed the door, and went toward the officer, where he was apprehended. Tr. 32-34. While patting Smith down, Officer Jenkins felt a bulge in his right jacket pocket and removed $390 in cash with Suburban Trust Company money wrappers stamped with McDonald's address. Tr. 143-45.
The two officers took the suspect back to McDonald's Restaurant where Officer Wayne Stallings recognized Smith and identified him by name and Mr. Malhorta identified him by voice, apparel, and mustache as one of the robbers. Mr. Malhorta was then driven to the motel where he identified and took possession of his car. Tr. 147-49.
At the motel, the police in searching for the other occupant of the car knocked on several of the motel room doors. Tr. 71. When Officer Stallings arrived, he identified a lavender and white Cadillac parked near room six as a car he had seen on prior occasions in the possession of Smith. Tr. 213. Upon checking with the night room clerk, the police discovered that Smith was registered at the motel in room six. Tr. 185-86.
The police entry into room six is the prime issue in this case. It is sufficient to say at this point that once the police entered the room they found appellant. A policeman then noticed some objects under one of the beds. Further search uncovered money in McDonald's deposit bags and wrappers hidden in a wall heating-air conditioning register and ski masks and rolls of coins under the bed; Lindsay was arrested. Tr. 190-94. Police estimated that about forty-five minutes had elapsed from the initial radio transmission to the entry into room six. Tr. 74. Lindsay's fingerprints were found on Smith's Cadillac; the McDonald manager's wallet was found inside the car. Tr. 288, 197.
Lindsay was indicted for armed robbery, robbery, unauthorized use of a vehicle, and assault with a dangerous weapon. Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress all items seized in room six of the Diplomat Motel, alleging that they were the fruits of an unconstitutional police entry. At the suppression hearing, Officer Stallings testified as to the actual entry into room six. Once the police discovered that Smith was registered in that room, they proceeded to the room accompanied by the night clerk who had a passkey. Officer Stallings testified that:
Eventually we knocked on the door two or three times and the door was opened by Lindsay. We identified by our badge and Lindsay just more or less stood there and we just walked into the room.
Once inside, Stallings continued, the officers 'spread around a little.' Someone then spotted clothing under the bed. Tr. 72. As the bed was raised, money came into view. Officer Stallings noticed that a wall heat register had been tampered with and discovered additional money inside. Tr. 73. On the basis of this testimony, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress without making written findings or conclusions.
At trial, Officer John A. Sabella, the arresting officer, gave conflicting testimony as to the manner of entry into room six. Officer Sabella testified that the police, after proceeding to the room with the residential manager, knocked four to six times but received no response. They then asked the manager to unlock the door. When he unlocked the door, it was secured on the inside by a chain lock. officer Sabella then asked the sergeant if he could force the door open. The sergeant stated no, but simply reached in and unlocked the chain lock. Tr. 186-87. Once the door was open, the police observed Mr. Lindsay 'standing by the second bed against the wall.' Tr. 187. After the police entered the room, Lindsay 'stood there very silent, doing nothing, just stood there.' Tr. 190.
Officer Stallings also testified at trial. In response to the question, 'Who opened the door?', he replied: 'I am not certain, I thought it had been Mr. Lindsay.' Tr. at 220.
Appellant testified in his own behalf at trial. He stated that he had registered at the Diplomat Motel that night, in the company of a young woman. About 1:00 a.m., he walked her to Bladensburg Road where she hailed a taxicab. Tr. 353-55. Upon returning to the motel, he noticed the car of his friend Smith. After calling out Smith's name, Lindsay was invited into room six, where he chatted for awhile with Smith and an unknown male companion. Lindsay testified that eventually Smith and his friend left, while Lindsay fell asleep on the bed, hearing nothing until the police opened the door with a passkey. Tr. 355-57.
At trial, appellant renewed his motion to suppress which was again denied. Tr. 301. The trial judge granted appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of unauthorized use of a vehicle. Tr. 348. The jury found Lindsay guilty of one count of robbery. Tr. 431. On appeal, appellant urges two grounds for reversal: (1) that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence seized in the motel room and (2) that the evidence against him was insufficient as a matter of law. Since we conclude that appellant's conviction must be reversed because the trial court failed to suppress unconstitutionally seized evidence, we do not reach the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence.
We must determine whether the police's entry was justified by the 'exigencies of the situation' or was constitutionally impermissible because of their failure to obtain prior judicial endorsement. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). If, while denying appellant's motion to suppress on this issue, the trial judge had made written findings, our function would have been to determine only if those findings were clearly erroneous. See United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215, 219 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022, 90 S.Ct. 1262, 25 L.Ed.2d 532 (1970). Since findings were not made, we should uphold the rulings of the trial court if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it. See Scarbeck v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 317 F.2d 546, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856, 83 S.Ct. 1897, 10 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1963). 1
The issue before us, therefore, requires us to exhaust the various combinations of factual alternatives and...
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