U.S. v. Little Boy, 78-1066
| Decision Date | 26 June 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-1066,78-1066 |
| Citation | 578 F.2d 211 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Richard LITTLE BOY, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Richard O. Sharpe of Costello, Porter, Hill, Nelson, Heisterkamp & Bushnell, Rapid City, S. D., for appellant.
Jeffrey L. Viken, Asst. U. S. Atty., Sioux Falls, S. D., argued, and David V. Vrooman, U. S. Atty., Sioux Falls, S. D., on brief, for appellee.
Before HEANEY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and MacLAUGHLIN, District Judge. *
Richard Little Boy appeals from a conviction for rape in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2031 (1976). We reverse.
Little Boy admitted being present at the scene of the rape but denied participating. The prosecution's case implicating him rested solely on the testimony of the victim and of two acknowledged participants in the offense, Wayne High Hawk and Val High Hawk.
On direct examination, Wayne High Hawk described his participation in the rape and then, over objection by defense counsel, testified that he had pled guilty to the rape. Val High Hawk similarly testified that he intended to plead guilty as part of a plea bargain. 1 The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in admitting the testimony relating to the guilty pleas.
In United States v. Wiesle, 542 F.2d 61, 62 (8th Cir. 1976), we stated that such evidence may be admitted for limited purposes with appropriate cautionary instructions:
Evidence that he entered a plea of guilty to the same offense is not error unless it is elicited as substantive proof of the defendant's guilt. Where it is introduced for other purposes, such as to impeach, to reflect on a witness' credibility, or to show the witness' acknowledgment of participation in the offense, evidence of a codefendant's guilty plea is clearly admissible. In such circumstances, the trial judge should instruct the jury that the evidence is received for this purpose alone and that the plea cannot form the basis of any inference as to the guilt of the defendant.
The testimony in the present case was admitted without a cautionary instruction and used for improper purposes by the prosecutor. In closing argument the prosecutor strongly implied that Wayne and Val High Hawk, who were honest enough to plead guilty and accept the responsibility for their actions, must have told the truth; by implication, therefore, Richard Little Boy must have been lying when he denied participating in the rape. 2 Thus, the prosecutor improperly argued that the testimony in question served as a basis for establishing Little Boy's guilt.
In using the testimony as he did, the prosecutor merely seized an opportunity provided by the district judge, who failed to instruct the jury to limit its use of the testimony. Under the circumstances of this case, admission of the testimony without a cautionary instruction constituted prejudicial error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
* HARRY H. MacLAUGHLIN, United States District Judge, District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
1 Defense counsel did not object to the question directed to Val High Hawk....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Halbert
...593 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1979), when the plea has been used improperly to vouch for the codefendant as a witness, United States v. Little Boy, 578 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1978), when the use of the plea involves aggravated circumstances known to the trial court, United States v. Harrell, 436 F.2d ......
-
Zepeda v. United States
...1981). But the prosecution may not use a guilty plea to vouch for a codefendant as a witness. See id. (citing United States v. Little Boy, 578 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1978)). The Court finds improper vouching did not occur. Matthew Zepeda testified over the course of two days, October 21 and 22,......
-
U.S. v. Walker
...Cir.1986), and may also be used to show the witness' first-hand knowledge of and participation in the offense. United States v. Little Boy, 578 F.2d 211, 212 (8th Cir.1978). "Admissibility of the plea turns on the purpose for which it is offered. When that purpose is to further the jury's d......
-
U.S. v. Hutchings
...v. Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719, 725-26 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 340, 78 L.Ed.2d 308 (1983); United States v. Little Boy, 578 F.2d 211, 212 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Wiesle, 542 F.2d 61, 62 (8th Cir.1976); Gerberding v. United States, 471 F.2d 55, 60 (8th Cir.1973......