U.S. v. Loney

• Decision Date: 06 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-3120.,02-3120.
• Citation: 331 F.3d 516
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven G. LONEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

331 F.3d 516

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven G. LONEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-3120.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued May 2, 2003.

Decided and Filed June 6, 2003.

Marcia J. Harris (argued and briefed), United States Attorney, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Gordon Hobson (argued and briefed), Federal Public Defender's Office, Columbus, OH, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before NELSON and COLE, Circuit Judges; ROSEN, District Judge.^*

OPINION

ROSEN, District Judge.

1. INTRODUCTION

While conducting a January 9, 2001 search, parole officers discovered an automatic rifle in the possession of Defendant-Appellant Steven G. Loney. At the time of this discovery, Defendant was on parole stemming from a 1997 felony conviction in Ohio for carrying a concealed weapon. A grand jury in the Southern District of Ohio subsequently indicted Defendant for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Thereafter, Defendant filed motions to dismiss the indictment and to suppress the rifle arguing that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and that the parole officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the January 9 search. Following a suppression hearing, the District Court denied the motions and found Defendant, who had waived his right to jury trial, guilty of violating § 922(g)(1). Defendant appeals the denial of the aforementioned motions.

For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the District Court's denial of both motions.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On August 1, 1998, the State of Ohio placed Defendant on parole for three years following his May 1997 felony conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. That same day, Defendant met with his parole officer Corey Dykstra and signed a form agreeing to the terms and conditions of his parole. The form prohibited Defendant's possession or use of firearms, ammunition, or drugs, required Defendant to submit to drug testing, and provided further:

9. I agree to a search, without warrant, of my person, my motor vehicle, or my place of residence by a supervising officer or other authorized representative of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction at any time. Notice: Pursuant to section 2967.131 of the Revised Code, Officers of the Adult Parole Authority may conduct warrantless searches of your person, your place of residence, your personal property, or any property which you have been given permission to use if they have reasonable grounds to believe that you are not abiding by the law or terms and conditions of your supervision.

[J.A. at 91].

Thereafter, Defendant repeatedly tested positive for drugs. In particular, Defendant tested positive for marijuana use in October, November, and December of 1998, after which Officer Dykstra ordered Defendant to complete substance abuse counseling at Neighborhood House. Defendant continued to use drugs during his counseling, and tested positive for marijuana on October 4 and October 25, 1999, and marijuana and cocaine on November 1, 1999. When Defendant failed to report to Officer Dykstra for a December 14, 1999 meeting, he was arrested and incarcerated for violating the terms of his parole. After serving ninety-two days of imprisonment, Defendant again was released to Officer Dykstra's supervision in May of 2000. Despite another counseling assignment for drug treatment, Defendant quickly lapsed back into drug use, testing positive for marijuana and cocaine on July 12 and positive for marijuana on July 19, 2000. After the July 19 session, Defendant ceased reporting to Officer Dykstra.

On October 19 and November 13, 2000, Officer Dykstra issued a local order for Defendant's arrest and labeled him a violator at large, respectively. Thereafter, in an effort to locate Defendant, Officer Dykstra randomly drove by and telephoned a house owned by Defendant's mother where Defendant was known to reside. When Defendant answered a phone call to the house on January 9, 2001, Officer Dykstra promptly contacted three other parole officers, all of whom proceeded to the house with Officer Dykstra to arrest Defendant.

After telephoning the house again to confirm Defendant's presence, Officer Dykstra knocked and identified himself. When Defendant's mother opened the door, Officer Dykstra saw Defendant in the back kitchen dressed in a t-shirt and underwear. As Officer Dykstra entered the house, Defendant moved to the top of the basement stairs. Although Officer Dykstra told Defendant to stop, Defendant proceeded down the stairs, stating that he needed to get dressed. Shortly after Officer Dykstra ordered Defendant to come back upstairs, Defendant ascended the stairs, still wearing the same t-shirt and underwear. The officers then placed Defendant into custody, dressed him, and removed him to a transport vehicle outside.

After Defendant's removal from the home, the parole officers searched Defendant's bedroom, finding marijuana and ammunition. The officers then searched the basement, finding a loaded AK-47 rifle. Thereafter, Defendant was sentenced to 119 days of imprisonment for violating the terms and conditions of his parole.

B. Procedural History

As recited above, on June 19, 2001, a grand jury indicted Defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).¹ On July 17, 2001, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss indictment for lack of federal jurisdiction or in the alternative, based on insufficiency of evidence, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause by not requiring a "substantial" connection to interstate commerce, and that the government lacked evidence to establish such a substantial connection. That same day, Defendant filed his motion to suppress, asserting that the parole officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the January 9 search that produced the rifle. On August 27, 2001, the District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. Officer Dykstra testified at the hearing that he based his decision to search the bedroom on "Mr. Loney's extensive drug past while under supervision and his prior conviction." [J.A. at 188]. According to Officer Dykstra, the parole officers then searched the basement "because it was where Mr. Loney went when we entered the house." [J.A. at 188]. On cross-examination, Officer Dykstra further explained his reasons for searching the basement as follows:

He has access to that room so we went to that room. Another reason we searched that basement was because during the search of his room, we uncovered narcotics, suspected narcotics. We also uncovered ammunition. So at this point we find ammunition we are thinking: There may be a gun in this house somewhere. So the first place we looked was the basement where Mr. Loney went, and that's where we found the rifle.

[J.A. at 198].

Following the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated to Defendant's prior felony conviction and his possession of a firearm. Defendant also stipulated and agreed that:

[T]he Norinco SKS 7.62 caliber rifle, serial number 8102741, had been shipped and transported in interstate commerce, to wit: the rifle had been manufactured in China; imported by K-Sports Imports, Inc., Pomona, California; shipped to Lew Horton Dist. Co., Inc. in Westboro, Massachusetts; and, finally shipped to Statewide Guns, Gallipolis, Ohio.

[J.A. at 66].

On November 7, 2001, the District Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, citing both Sixth Circuit precedent upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g) and Defendant's stipulation, quoted above, that the rifle had been shipped and transported in interstate commerce. The District Court also denied Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the January 9 search was a valid special needs search under Grffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), and its progeny. After finding Defendant guilty of violating § 922(g)(1), the District Court sentenced Defendant to thirty-five months of imprisonment.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress

On appeal, Defendant renews his contention that Officer Dykstra and his fellow parole officers lacked reasonable grounds to conduct the January 9 search. Although we review the District Court's findings of fact for clear error, we review de novo the ultimate question of whether a search survives constitutional scrutiny. United States v. Payne, 181 F.3d at 781, 785 (6th Cir.1999). When, as here, the District Court has denied a motion to suppress, "we review all evidence in a light most favorable to the Government." United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 628 (6th Cir.2003).

1. Special Needs Searches Under Griffin

In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the Supreme Court delineated the standards for analyzing searches of probationers under the Fourth Amendment. Citing the "special need" of states to closely supervise probationers to assure the observance of probation conditions, the Griffin Court upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge a Wisconsin regulation authorizing the warrantless search of a probationer's home when a probation officer has "reasonable grounds" to suspect the presence of contraband. Id. at 870-76, 107 S.Ct. at 3167-170. As explained by the Supreme Court, the reasonable grounds search at issue in Griffin "satisfied the demands of the Fourth Amendment because it was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement under well-established principles." Id. at 873, 107 S.Ct. at 3168.

Because the special needs of parole systems mirror those of probation systems, subsequent courts logically extended the Griffin exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement to searches of parolees as well. See, e.g., Payne, 181 F.3d at 787 (citing Griffin for the proposition that "[i]n the context of the special needs of the parole system, the presence of a reasonable regulatory scheme...