U.S. v. Longoria, 96-30010
Decision Date | 07 May 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96-30010,96-30010 |
Parties | 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3385, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5847 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Moses LONGORIA, Sr., Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Frank Noonan, Assistant United States Attorney, Portland, OR, for plaintiff-appellee.
William S. Labahn, Eugene, OR, for defendant-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Helen J. Frye, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-89-00225-1(HJF).
Before FLETCHER and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, * Senior District Judge.
This appeal comes to us after a long and tortuous journey through the courts. Suffice it to say that in 1989 Daniel Moses Longoria, Sr., was charged in a multi-count indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and possession and distribution of heroin and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. In 1990, Longoria entered a guilty plea to Count 1, the conspiracy count, and was sentenced to 216 months imprisonment. The case eventually came to this court on an appeal from a denial of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and was remanded for a hearing on whether Longoria was entitled to file an appeal from the judgment of conviction. On remand, the district court granted the § 2255 motion and Longoria filed his appeal from the original judgment of conviction and sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1294.
Longoria's principal contention on appeal 1 is that his guilty plea hearing violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because the court did not "address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following: (1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered...." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). "We review de novo whether the court's colloquy with the defendant satisfies the requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)." United States v. Smith, 60 F.3d 595, 597 n. 1 (9th Cir.1995). Only the record of the plea proceeding is to be considered. Id. at 597.
The relevant part of the plea-taking colloquy is as follows:
[The court then advised Longoria of his rights to a jury trial, speedy trial, attorney, confrontation, right to remain silent and burden of proof, maximum sentence, absence of parole, the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines and the plea agreement, and confirmed that no threats or promises had been made to Longoria to induce his plea.]
THE COURT [to the prosecution]: Are there any other questions you want me to ask on behalf of the Government?
MR. NOONAN: I don't think so, Your Honor. Thank you.
This colloquy failed to comply with Rule 11(c)(1) in two respects. First, the court failed to inform Longoria (and determine that he understood) that Count 1 of the indictment charged him with conspiracy to possess and distribute not only cocaine but also heroin. Second, the district judge did not explain the nature of the charge to Longoria; her comments "were inadequate [because they] did not inform the defendant of the nature (as opposed to the formal legal description) of the charges against him." United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 560 (9th Cir.1992) ( ); see also United States v. Wetterlin, 583 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir.1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127, 99 S.Ct. 1044, 59 L.Ed.2d 88 (1979) ().
The government cites Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), United States v. Butcher, 926 F.2d 811 (9th Cir.1991), United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir.1990), and United States v. Sharp, 941 F.2d 811 (9th Cir.1991), all for the proposition that the court need not recite each element of the crime. The first three are inapposite, as they do not involve federal proceedings subject to Rule 11. See Newman, 912 F.2d at 1123 ( ). Sharp found that Rule 11 was complied with where the prosecutor, at the court's request, explained the nature of the charges to the defendant and, according to defendant's counsel, "fairly stated" the charge. 941 F.2d at 816. Here, the court stated nothing at all.
Nor can it be said that the error "does not affect substantial rights." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h). "The harmless error clause of Rule 11 permits us to uphold guilty pleas only when there has been 'a minor or technical violation of Rule 11'." United States v. Gastelum, 16 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Graibe, 946 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir.1991)). The defendant's right to be informed of the charges against him is at the core of Rule 11,...
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