U.S. v. Loud Hawk

Decision Date07 August 1979
Docket Number76-2127,Nos. 76-1906,s. 76-1906
Citation628 F.2d 1139
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenneth Moses LOUD HAWK, Russ James Redner, Leonard Peltier, Dennis James Banks, Darlene Pearl Nichols, who gives her true name as Kamook Banks, and Anna Mae Aquash, also known as Annie May Pictou and Naguset Eask, Defendants- Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Sidney Lezak, U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., on brief; Charles H. Turner, U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., for plaintiff-appellant.

Schiffman & Jones (argued), Steenson, Parkinson & Lea, Portland, Or., Dennis Roberts (argued) Oakland, Cal., on brief; Ronald P. Schiffman, Portland, Or., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before BROWNING, ELY, HUFSTEDLER, WRIGHT, TRASK, CHOY, GOODWIN, WALLACE, KENNEDY, ANDERSON, and HUG, Circuit Judges. *

TRASK, Circuit Judge, files an opinion and the judgment of the court. BROWNING, EUGENE A. WRIGHT, CHOY, WALLACE, J. BLAINE ANDERSON, and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges, concur in the result and in sections I, II, III and VI.

I

On November 13, 1975, Leonard Peltier and companions were thought by the FBI to be traveling across the State of Oregon. Peltier was then a fugitive from the United States authorities and federal officers were attempting to take him into custody. It was thought that he might be traveling with a party of five others and going east. One other who was believed to be in this party of six and thought to be a federal fugitive was Dennis Banks. The events of the siege of Wounded Knee had occurred a short time before, 1 and the government was still in the process of tracking fugitives from that sorry affair.

Desiring to make Oregon State Police aware of this information, the Portland, Oregon FBI office sent a teletype message on that day to all Oregon law enforcement officers which stated that federal fugitives might be traveling through Oregon in a motor home and a station wagon. Both vehicles were described and the license number of the motor home was given. The message then stated that if the vehicles were sighted they should not be stopped, but the FBI notified. The next day, on November 14, at about 9:30 p. m., Oregon State Trooper Griffiths sighted the vehicles and verified their description and the license number of the motor home. He proceeded to stop the vehicles. Griffiths had not read the entire bulletin and made the stop under the impression that the bulletin required it. Findings of Fact at 1. 2 He then radioed for help and pulled in between the vehicles with his overhead lights flashing. Both vehicles stopped, with the station wagon about 100 yards behind the trooper's car. Trooper Griffiths got out of his car and approached the motor home on the right. He commanded the occupants of the motor home to get out. An Indian male got out, followed by two Indian women and a small child. Griffiths asked if anyone else was inside and they replied "No." At approximately the same moment the motor home accelerated swiftly forward and the man who had gotten out of it fled toward a fence along the highway. As he jumped the fence about 15 yards from the road he fired a shot in the direction of Trooper Griffiths. The trooper returned two shotgun blasts. Both of these shots missed.

As Trooper Griffiths was approaching the motor home, Corporal Kramer, also of the Oregon State Police, who had responded to the call for aid, got out of his patrol car and shined his flashlight into the rear window of the station wagon. Corporal Kramer cautiously approached the left side of the station wagon. When he reached the driver's door he ordered the driver (later identified as defendant Russ James Redner) out of the vehicle and to the rear of the station wagon where he was ordered to stand in the headlights of Kramer's patrol car. On request, the driver produced a Washington driver's license. The officer then approached the passenger's side and ordered the occupant to get out and also stand in the front of the headlights of his patrol car. The passenger was identified as defendant Loud Hawk. Griffiths meanwhile had followed the direction of the motor home and found it on the highway about one-half mile away from the initial stop. The motor was running, the lights were on and the door was shut. No occupants were found inside. Both vehicles were then locked, towed away and impounded by the Oregon State Police until a search warrant was obtained.

On Saturday, November 15, 1975, state search warrants were obtained for the search of both vehicles. 3 The Oregon State Police searched both vehicles on Saturday, November 15, 1975, pursuant to their warrants. No federal agent participated in the decision to obtain the state search warrant. Federal agents observed the search of both vehicles but did not participate directly except that federal agent Hancock entered the motor home on one occasion. The findings of the trial court on remand in part relate the subsequent events:

"Firearms were found in the motor home, which was searched first, and federal agents were told of this fact. 4 Federal agents then suggested that the station wagon be searched for firearms. State officers opened the station wagon and found the dynamite immediately. Federal agents did not participate physically in the search of the station wagon, and no federal warrant had been obtained. Federal agents did observe the state search and photograph the dynamite as it appeared in the station wagon.

"On November 16, the dynamite was transferred from the station wagon to a state police car by state officers. Federal agents did not participate physically but did observe and photograph the dynamite as it appeared in the trunk of the state police car. Federal agents did not advise or direct any action with respect to the removal or transportation of the dynamite. Federal agents made no request that any of the dynamite be preserved for their purposes. Had such a request been made, state police would have complied.

"The decision not to keep the dynamite was made by Trooper Fettig of the state police, pursuant to an unwritten policy defined by his practice of six years before November 1975. Trooper Fettig's practice of destroying explosives was based on the lack of state storage facilities, problems with chain of custody and public safety considerations. Federal agents did not actively participate in Trooper Fettig's decision not to transport the dynamite for safekeeping. Federal agents were present and aware of Trooper Fettig's intended destruction of the dynamite and neither encouraged nor discouraged such action.

"The decision to destroy, like the decision not to transport the dynamite, and containers was made by Trooper Fettig, pursuant to state police policy and in his discretion. No federal agent participated in this decision. Federal agent Milam, the only federal agent present at the destruction of the dynamite and containers, rode with a state officer in a car following Trooper Fettig's to a gravel pit outside Ontario for the purpose of observing and photographing the destruction. Agent Milam neither encouraged nor discouraged the destruction of the dynamite and containers." Findings of Fact at 3.

II

A five count superseding indictment charged all of the appellees with three counts relating to possession of an unregistered and unnumbered destructive device

"consisting of a combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a device into a destructive device; said combination of parts consisting of: (a) six (6) pocket watches, each with a hole drilled in the face with a metal screw inserted into the hole in a position with the moving hands of the watch, with a soldered battery connector and a ground wire attached with expended flash bulbs attached; (b) four (4) batteries with wires attached; and (c) two (2) expended flash bulbs with wires attached; and said device consisting of watches, timing devices, electrical blasting cap leg wires, wires, electrical blasting cap, detonating cord, batteries, and seven (7) cases of DuPont 70 percent dynamite, and said destructive device had not been registered to them in the National Firearms Registration & Transfer Record as required by section 5841, Title 26, United States Code, in violation of section 5861(j) and section 5871, Title 26, United States Code." C.T. at 113, 114, 115.

Count I charged the violation as above; Count II again described the same destructive device and charged violation of the provision requiring identification by serial number as required by section 5842(c) of Title 26, and 27 CFR 179.102 and violation of sections 5861(i) and 5871.

Count III again described the same destructive device but with violation of different registration requirements.

Count IV charged Loud Hawk with wilfully transporting weapons in interstate commerce which had their serial numbers obliterated, to wit: four Valmet semi-automatic rifles; one Colt AR-15 Cal. 223; three Smith & Wesson .357 Magnums and a Swiss-made 7.5 mm handgun, in violation of Title 18, section 922(k), United States Code.

Count V charged only Dennis James Banks, who was a fugitive when the indictment was returned.

Because the dynamite which was being transported was destroyed by Oregon State Police who had apprehended the defendants, the district court dismissed the dynamite counts with prejudice pursuant to Rule 48(b), Fed.R.Crim.P., on grounds of unlawful suppression of evidence. When the government then declined to proceed with the firearms count until it could appeal the ruling on the dynamite counts, the district judge dismissed the indictment with prejudice. The federal government then appealed the Order Dismissing the Indictment. On June 11, 1976, the appeals of the suppression order and the order dismissing the indictment were consolidated by this court....

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