U.S. v. Lynch, CR 99-18-M-DWM.

• Decision Date: 26 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. CR 99-18-M-DWM.,CR 99-18-M-DWM.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. John Lanny LYNCH, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Montana

207 F.Supp.2d 1133

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. John Lanny LYNCH, Defendant.

No. CR 99-18-M-DWM.

United States District Court, D. Montana, Missoula Division.

June 26, 2002.

Judy Clarke, Roger Peven, Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho, Spokane, WA, for defendant.

Bernard F. Hubley, Office of The U.S. Attorney, Joseph Thaggard, Office of the Montana Attorney General, Helena, MT, for USA.

ORDER

MOLLOY, Chief Judge.

I. Introduction

This Court denied Defendant Lynch's motion under Rule 29 during the jury trial on this matter. Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded this case instructing me to determine

whether the evidence presented at trial supports the conclusion that Lynch (1) stole from a person "directly and customarily engaged in interstate commerce;" (2) created a likelihood that the assets of an entity engaged in interstate commerce would be depleted; or (3) victimized a large number of individuals or took a sum so large that there was "some cumulative effect on interstate commerce."

United States v. Lynch, 282 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.2002)(relying on United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 99-101 (5th Cir.1994)). Federal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act exists if there is a de minimis effect on commerce under any of the three prongs of the test delineated above by the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit has instructed me to deny Lynch's Rule 29 motion if I find federal jurisdiction under its new test for measuring the interstate commerce nexus for robberies of individuals. If the connection exists, as the test is laid out for the first time in this case, then Lynch's conviction and sentence stand. Absent a finding of the necessary jurisdictional nexus, on the other hand, means that I must dismiss Lynch's Indictment with prejudice. Lynch, 282 F.3d at 1055.

II. Analysis

The jury here found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lynch was guilty of the Hobbs Act crime for which he was indicted. Normally the issue of jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. United States v. Gomez, 87 F.3d 1093, 1097 n. 3 (9th Cir.1996).

But if this issue is resolved by the jury, then the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict is given by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560[](1979): If upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

Id.

The government argues that there was a de minimis effect on commerce here under all three prongs of the Collins test. First, it argues that Brian Carreiro was directly and customarily involved in interstate commerce because he regularly used his bank debit card. Regardless of the point of origin of the use of the card, a request on the card to make charges or withdraw cash from Carreiro's credit union account in Nevada routed through a server in Kansas to the credit union in Nevada and then back to Kansas and back to the point of origin of the request. The government argues that the interstate electronic connections are sufficient nexus to establish a de minimis effect. In response, Lynch argues that Carreiro had no business connection to interstate commerce, but that he merely used his debit card as an individual. Lynch argues that the critical distinction posited by the court in United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir.1996), is not that credit cards were robbed and used, but rather that credit cards of businesspeople were robbed and used.

The government next contends that Lynch created a likelihood that the assets of an entity engaged in interstate commerce would be depleted by removing money from the credit union where Carreiro had his account. Essentially the government argues that custodial depository accounts, including Carreiro's account, are considered assets of a financial institution, not just the assets of the individual depositor. If the depository accounts are assets of the institution, then Lynch depleted the assets by remotely withdrawing money from Carreiro's account. Lynch responds that the funds in Carreiro's account at the credit union were solely Carreiro's own private assets, and not the assets of the credit union, therefore there was no risk that the assets of an institution engaged in interstate commerce could be depleted.

The government finally asserts that there was a cumulative effect on interstate commerce here because there were several victims and the funds stolen constituted all the money Carreiro had. Lynch responds that Carreiro was...