U.S. v. Magassouba

• Decision Date: 19 September 2008
• Docket Number: Docket No. 06-2628-cr.
• Citation: 544 F.3d 387
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Moustapha MAGASSOUBA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

544 F.3d 387

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Moustapha MAGASSOUBA, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 06-2628-cr.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: May 10, 2007.

Decided: September 19, 2008.

Andrew R. Polland (John P. Cooney, Jr., on the brief), New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.

Maria E. Douvas, Assistant United States Attorney (Jonathan S. Kolodner, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Michael J. Garcia, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.

Before: B.D. PARKER, RAGGI, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.

REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Moustapha Magassouba appeals from a May 10, 2006 interlocutory order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Deborah A. Batts, Judge) that (1) denied his motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A), 846; and (2) ordered his hospitalization pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A) for psychiatric treatment, including the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. On this appeal, Magassouba does not dispute the merits of the district court's findings that (a) he is incompetent to stand trial, see 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d); (b) there is a substantial probability that, with treatment, he could attain competency in the foreseeable future, see id. § 4241(d)(2)(A); or (c) the circumstances of his case satisfy the criteria for involuntary treatment specified in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003). Instead, he argues that, at the time of the challenged order, the district court lacked authority to commit him for psychiatric treatment. He further submits that the length of his unauthorized confinement violated due process so as to require the dismissal of his indictment and his release from custody.

Magassouba's arguments largely depend on the construction of § 4241(d), a statute that authorizes a district court to commit a mentally incompetent defendant to custodial hospitalization (1) for a reasonable period "not to exceed four months" to determine whether he can attain competency to stand trial, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1); and, (2) if the court finds a "substantial probability" that the defendant can attain such competency in the "foreseeable future," for an additional "reasonable period" of appropriate treatment, id. § 4241(d)(2)(A). Magassouba submits that a district court is only authorized to order additional hospitalization if it makes the requisite substantial probability finding under § 4241(d)(2)(A) within the term of a defendant's § 4241(d)(1) confinement, which was not done in this case.

The government submits that we lack jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal. Alternatively, it challenges defendant's arguments on the merits.

For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the collateral order doctrine supports our exercise of jurisdiction. We further conclude that the district court did not exceed its authority in ordering Magassouba's § 4241(d)(2)(A) commitment for additional custodial hospitalization and involuntary psychiatric treatment. We agree with defendant that § 4241(d) does not permit an incompetent defendant to be held in uninterrupted custodial hospitalization unless a district court finds, before the expiration of a defendant's initial term of § 4241(d)(1) confinement (which cannot exceed four months), that circumstances warrant additional hospitalization pursuant to § 4241(d)(2)(A). Thus, when a defendant's term of § 4241(d)(1) confinement expires and no § 4241(d)(2) order has yet been entered, the Attorney General lacks statutory authority to hold a defendant in further custodial hospitalization. But we cannot agree that the statute also limits a district court's authority to enter a § 4241(d)(2)(A) order to the term of § 4241(d)(1) confinement. Such a construction could itself raise constitutional concerns to the extent it failed to afford a defendant a reasonable time to secure and present evidence in opposition to additional § 4241(d)(2)(A) hospitalization, particularly hospitalization involving involuntary medication. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. at 180-81, 123 S.Ct. 2174.

In this case, it appears that the Attorney General exceeded his § 4241(d) authority by holding Magassouba in custodial hospitalization for a few weeks longer than the four months authorized by the district court's § 4241(d)(1) order. We conclude that this error was harmless because Magassouba was not subjected to psychiatric treatment during this unauthorized hospitalization, and his general confinement was otherwise authorized by the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142. Thus, the error could not deprive the district court of its authority subsequently to enter the challenged § 4241(d)(2)(A) order.

We further conclude that Magassouba's nineteen-month detention from the time he was found incompetent until the date of the challenged order was not constitutionally unreasonable so as to violate due process. Magassouba's refusal to accept treatment that his own lawyers acknowledged would likely render him competent required the district court carefully to consider a host of medical and legal factors that due process demands be satisfied before a defendant can be hospitalized for involuntary medication. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. at 180-81, 123 S.Ct. 2174.

Accordingly, we affirm the challenged order denying dismissal of the indictment and ordering further hospitalization and treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2).

I. Background

A. The Indictment and § 3142 Order of Detention

Moustapha Magassouba is a citizen of Guinea who has resided in the United States since 1990. On August 12, 2003, a grand jury sitting in the Southern District of New York charged Magassouba in a one-count indictment with conspiracy to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, a crime carrying a sentencing range from ten-years-to-life incarceration. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A), 846. This charge gave rise to a presumption of detention under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e), (f)(1)(C) (establishing rebuttable presumption "that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the [defendant's] appearance . . . and the safety of the community" for drug offenses carrying maximum prison sentence of ten years or more), and Magassouba was ordered detained under this statute without objection.

A few months later, in November 2003, defendant's initial attorney was relieved and present counsel was appointed by the court. At no time in the district court did past or present counsel challenge the § 3142 detention order or seek its amendment. On January 29, 2004, however, defense counsel raised a concern as to Magassouba's mental competence. To understand the proceedings that ensued and defendant's challenge on this appeal, it is necessary briefly to outline the federal statutory scheme for resolving the competency of criminal defendants.

B. The Statutory Scheme for Determining a Criminal Defendant's Competency

1. The Initial Competency Determination

When a criminal defendant's competency is called into question, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) requires the district court to make a preliminary finding as to whether a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the defendant is, in fact, incompetent, i.e., whether a "mental disease or defect" renders him "unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense." To make this determination, the district court must conduct a hearing at which the defendant, represented by counsel, is afforded an opportunity to testify and to call and confront witnesses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(a), (c) & 4247(d). Prior to this hearing, the district court "may order" a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant. Id. § 4241(b). To effect such examination, the court "may" order the defendant committed "to the custody of the Attorney General for placement in a suitable facility." Id. § 4247(b). This commitment may not "exceed thirty days," although the statute permits the director of the designated commitment facility to apply for a "reasonable extension . . . not to exceed fifteen days." Id.

2. The Evaluation and Treatment of Incompetent Defendants

If the district court makes a preliminary finding of incompetence, the second step of the statutory scheme—at issue in this case—mandates the defendant's custodial hospitalization for evaluation and possible treatment. The district court "shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General," who "shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility." Id. § 4241(d). Initially, such hospitalization seeks "to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future [the defendant] will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward." Id. § 4241(d)(1). This evaluative hospitalization is limited to "a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months." Id. Thereafter, "if the court finds that there is a substantial probability" that the defendant "will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward," the law provides for further hospitalization "for an additional reasonable period of time." Id. § 4241(d)(2)(A).

3. The Final Competency Determination

At the conclusion of the specified hospitalization commitment, if the court determines that the defendant has not attained the competency necessary to proceed to trial, § 4241(d) provides for the defendant to be referred for civil commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246 and 4248. If, however, the director of the hospital facility to which the defendant is committed determines that he has attained the requisite mental competency, the director shall so certify to the...