U.S. v. Maggard, No. 77-3125

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before EDWARDS and ENGEL; EDWARDS
• Citation: 573 F.2d 926
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alonzo MAGGARD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Decision Date: 17 April 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-3125

Page 926

573 F.2d 926 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Alonzo MAGGARD, Defendant-Appellant. No. 77-3125. United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit. Submitted Oct. 13, 1977.
Decided and Filed April 17, 1978.

Page 927

Thomas E. Clay, Louisville, Ky., pro se.

Albert Jones, U. S. Atty., James H. Barr, Asst. U. S. Atty., Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before EDWARDS and ENGEL, Circuit Judges, and GRAY, ^* District Judge.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Alonzo Maggard was found guilty of possessing a firearm while being a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1) (1976). On this appeal his principal contention is that he was entitled at his federal trial to litigate a claim that the state felony conviction, which was the predicate offense, was constitutionally invalid because he had been deprived of effective representation by counsel.

The evidence at his trial on the federal offense, which the jury had a right to believe (and did), showed that Maggard had a shotgun in his lap at the time of his arrest for drunk driving. The government also introduced evidence that Maggard had been previously convicted of a felony (possession of a concealed deadly weapon) on a plea of guilty in the Circuit Court of Fayette County, Kentucky.

Maggard claims that his plea of guilty to the Kentucky offense had been induced by his counsel telling him that he would be placed on probation as a result of his plea of guilty to the state offense, whereas in fact, he received a sentence of three years. He asserts that the federal district judge in the instant case "erred in refusing to conduct a hearing and suppress the defendant's (prior state court) conviction."

It is clear from this record 1) that Maggard had never appealed his prior state conviction, 2) that he did unsuccessfully attack this conviction in state post-conviction proceedings alleging the same grounds as are alleged here, but abandoned his appeal to Kentucky's highest court, and (3) that the claimed unconstitutionality of the Kentucky conviction was not apparent from the record of the conviction itself. Hence, for the first time this court has before it the suggestion that a collateral attack upon an otherwise presumptively valid state felony conviction can be made and must be heard and decided prior to determination of a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of § 1202.

Page 928

The general issue with which we are confronted has recently divided the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1977). The majority of the en banc court in considering a § 1202 conviction held:

By contrast, it is not at all clear that Graves was deprived of any constitutional right during his state trial on the auto larceny charge. Indeed, we have considerable doubt whether the state proceedings did contravene the due process clause in any respect.

Had Graves' conviction been invalidated on constitutional grounds prior to the alleged violation of § 1202, there would have been no basis for imposing the statutory disability on him. Likewise, had that disability been lifted by executive action, for constitutional or other reasons, again there would be no justification for the disability. Nevertheless, the restriction here was a continuing one, a status derived from the fact of conviction and a failure to abide by the resultant weapons prohibition. There would appear to be no ground to deem such restriction a nullity, merely because Graves, having been apprehended on the gun charges, then claimed for the first time that its source was defective.

United States v. Graves, supra at 80-81.

The challenge to the...