U.S. v. Mancias
| Decision Date | 28 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-1037.,03-1037. |
| Citation | 350 F.3d 800 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Arnaldo Losoya MANCIAS, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Gary H. Lee, argued, Minot, ND, for appellant.
Rick L. Volk, argued, Asst. U.S. Atty., Bismarck, ND, for appellee.
Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and READE,1 District Judge.
After the district court2 denied his motion to suppress evidence, Arnaldo Losoya Mancias ("Mancias") entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and to criminal forfeiture of $2,225.00 under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). The district court3 sentenced Mancias to 80 months imprisonment. On appeal, Mancias argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and in denying his motion to dismiss the prosecution for violations of the Speedy Trial Act. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
Shortly after midnight on April 28, 2002, North Dakota Highway Patrolman Jody Skogen ("Skogen") received a report that an intoxicated driver was operating a motor vehicle in a remote area of North Dakota. While investigating the report, Skogen observed a vehicle proceeding east on Highway 52 near Harvey, North Dakota. The vehicle's tires were on the centerline. After turning his patrol car around to follow the vehicle, Skogen activated the video camera mounted on the windshield of his patrol car. Skogen observed the vehicle swerve and enter the oncoming lane of traffic. Skogen stopped the vehicle.
When asked to step out of the vehicle and to produce identification, the driver complied. Based on the identification presented to him, Skogen determined Mancias to be the driver of the vehicle. After being informed he was stopped for erratic driving, Mancias attributed such driving to being sleepy. When asked about his intended destination, Mancias gave details which conflicted with Skogen's knowledge of the area. Skogen patted Mancias down and asked him to sit inside his patrol car. While verifying whether Mancias had a valid driver's license, Skogen informed Mancias that he would receive a citation for "care required." After he learned Mancias had a valid Minnesota driver's license and a suspended North Dakota driver's license, Skogen informed Mancias that he would receive an additional citation for driving with a suspended license. After telling Mancias that he would not be allowed to drive, Skogen offered to drive Mancias to Harvey, North Dakota where he could spend the night. Skogen indicated he would direct another officer to follow them in Mancias' vehicle to Harvey, North Dakota. Mancias agreed to this arrangement.
Skogen placed Mancias under arrest for driving under a suspended North Dakota driver's license. Skogen informed Mancias that he would be jailed if he could not post a cash bond of $200.00. Meanwhile, Wells County Deputy Sheriff Hoyt ("Hoyt") arrived to assist Skogen. In order to move things along more quickly, Skogen continued the paperwork while Hoyt conducted a search of Mancias' vehicle. During the course of his search, Hoyt noticed the rear seat of the vehicle was not bolted down. When Hoyt put his weight on the rear seat, the backrest of the rear seat slid out of position. Hoyt moved the backrest and noticed a cutout. Looking through the cutout and into the trunk of Mancias' vehicle, Hoyt saw several suspicious-looking bundles.
While Hoyt was conducting his search, Skogen finished the necessary paperwork, conducted an alcohol-screening breath test and collected the $200.00 cash bond. As Mancias stepped out of the patrol car to receive a final pat down, Hoyt approached Skogen and Mancias. Hoyt informed Skogen there was something in the trunk area of the vehicle that they needed to check out. Upon hearing what Hoyt had to say, Skogen returned to Mancias to pat him down and to place handcuffs on him. After putting Mancias in the rear seat of the patrol car, Skogen asked Mancias on at least two separate occasions if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. Each time Mancias consented to the search. After securing Mancias inside the patrol car, Hoyt and Skogen continued the search of the vehicle pursuant to Mancias' consent. Skogen observed a digital scale on the rear seat and the cutout behind the backrest. Ultimately, the officers seized twenty-six pounds of marijuana from the trunk of Mancias' vehicle.
As a result of the events that occurred on April 28, 2002, the government filed a one-count criminal complaint against Mancias in the district court on June 17, 2002. The complaint charged Mancias with possession with intent to distribute twenty-six pounds of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Officials arrested Mancias on June 19, 2002, and Mancias initially appeared before a United States Magistrate Judge on June 21, 2002. The magistrate judge conducted a detention hearing on June 25, 2002 and a preliminary hearing and arraignment on July 2, 2002. In its July 3, 2002 pretrial order, the magistrate judge set August 23, 2002 as the date by which to file any pretrial motion. On July 19, 2002, the government filed a two-count indictment ("Indictment"). The counts charged: (1) possession with intent to distribute approximately twenty-six pounds of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) ("Count I"); and (2) criminal forfeiture of $2,225.00 under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) ("Count II"). On August 7, 2002, the district court set September 26, 2002 as Mancias' trial date.
Mancias filed a motion to suppress evidence on August 26, 2002. On September 13, 2002, Mancias also filed a motion to dismiss the prosecution for violations of the Speedy Trial Act. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Mancias' motion to dismiss on September 23, 2002. That same day, the district court arraigned Mancias on Count II of the Indictment and conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding Mancias' motion to suppress. On September 24, 2002, the district court denied Mancias' motion to suppress.
On September 26, 2002, Mancias entered a conditional guilty plea. By doing so, Mancias preserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss and motion to suppress. On December 12, 2002, the district court entered judgment against Mancias. This appeal followed.
When reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we will affirm a denial "unless we find that the decision is unsupported by the evidence, based on an erroneous view of the law, or the [c]ourt is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made." United States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Estrada, 45 F.3d 1215, 1217-18 (8th Cir.1995)). We review the district court's finding of voluntary consent for clear error. United States v. Zamoran-Coronel, 231 F.3d 466, 468 (8th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Pena-Saiz, 161 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir.1998)).
Mancias claims the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the twenty-six pounds of marijuana found in the trunk of his vehicle. Both parties agree Mancias gave the officers consent to search his vehicle. Mancias contends, however, that the totality of the circumstances surrounding his consent render it involuntary because at the time he gave his consent: (1) he was suffering from extreme fatigue; (2) he was handcuffed and sitting in the back of the patrol car; and (3) he was not advised of his Miranda rights.
Consent to search is voluntary if it is "`the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker ... rather than the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.'" United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances in a given case, including "`both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.'" Id. at 380-81 (quoting Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041). The following factors relating to the person giving consent may be relevant in determining the voluntariness of consent:
(1) the defendant's age; (2) the defendant's general intelligence and education; (3) whether the defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol; (4) whether the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights prior to consent; and (5) whether the defendant had experienced prior arrests so that he was aware of the protections the legal system affords to suspected criminals.
United States v. Alcantar, 271 F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Hathcock, 103 F.3d 715, 719-20 (8th Cir. 1997)). Characteristics of "the environment in which consent was given" include:
Whether the person who consented: (1) was detained and questioned for a long or short time; (2) was threatened, physically intimidated, or punished by the police; (3) relied upon promises or misrepresentations made by the police; (4) was in custody or under arrest when the consent was given; (5) was in a public or a secluded place; or (6) either objected to the search or stood by silently while the search occurred.
Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 381 (internal citations omitted). The factors set forth above "should not be applied mechanically." Id. at 381. Rather, "the inquiry turns on the totality of the circumstances, which must demonstrate that `the police reasonably believe[d] the search to be consensual.'" Zamoran-Coronel, 231 F.3d at 469 (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 156 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir.1998)).
Examining Mancias' individual characteristics, we note at the time of the search Mancias was a forty-two year old man with a tenth grade education. The record reflects Mancias generally appeared to...
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