U.S. v. Manetta

• Decision Date: 12 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-2452,76-2452
• Citation: 551 F.2d 1352
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew Anthony MANETTA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1352

551 F.2d 1352

39 A.L.R.Fed. 421

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew Anthony MANETTA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 76-2452.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 12, 1977.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 1977.

P. Bruce Kirwan, Federal Public Defender (court-appointed), Andrew H. Marshall, Federal Defender Program, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.

John W. Stokes, U. S. Atty., Dorothy Y. Kirkley, Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before GOLDBERG and HILL, Circuit Judges, and KERR, ^* District Judge.

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:

On April 19-21, 1976, Andrew Anthony Manetta stood trial in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for a November 11, 1974, knife assault on Charles Norgaard while both were incarcerated in the federal penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia. Manetta's trial defense was insanity, and he presented evidence, both expert and lay, that on November 11, 1974, he was legally insane that is, because of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. See Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). As is its wont, the prosecution presented evidence tending to show that Manetta was sane at the time of the stabbing. The jury apparently believed the prosecution's witnesses on this issue and returned a verdict of guilty. Manetta challenges his conviction on three grounds: denial of his right to a speedy trial, insufficient evidence of sanity, and violation of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Speedy Trial

Manetta argues that delay in bringing charges against him violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The stabbing occurred on November 11, 1974, but no indictment issued until June 24, 1975. During the seven-month interval, defendant-appellant found himself subjected first to segregation from other prisoners and later to confinement in the psychiatric ward of the prison.

While in segregation, Manetta received a visit from an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attorney who, as a result of the visit, filed a mandamus action seeking to compel prison authorities to provide psychiatric care for Manetta and to allow a psychiatric examination of him by a Dr. Corbett Turner. The prison authorities refused both requests but later admitted Manetta to care in the prison psychiatric ward. At this point, the mandamus suit was voluntarily dismissed.

On December 11, 1975, at the request of defense counsel and as part of trial preparations, Dr. Turner examined the defendant, after which defense counsel filed notice of intent to raise an insanity defense. Unfortunately, claims the defendant, Dr. Turner's diagnosis of Manetta's mental condition on November 11, 1974, suffered from the thirteen month lag between the stabbing and the examination. Such is the prejudice claimed by defendant to bolster his speedy trial claim. If the criminal proceedings in this matter had begun earlier, he claims, the uncertainties in Dr. Turner's diagnosis would have evaporated, since the examination would have been more proximate to the time of the assault. Defendant raised this claim on a pre-trial motion to dismiss, and the Court held a hearing at which Dr. Turner testified as to the increased uncertainty of his diagnosis due to the delay. The Court denied the motion.

As an initial legal point, defendant-appellant argues that his segregation constituted an "accusal" or an "arrest" for Sixth Amendment purposes, thereby triggering the ad hoc balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in evaluating the delay from "accusal" to trial. ¹ We have recently held segregation not to constitute such an "arrest" or "accusal." United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976). Duke controls this case since there is no appreciable difference between the segregation involved there and the segregation involved here.

Thus, since Manetta was already in federal custody, the event triggering Sixth Amendment scrutiny was the indictment issued on June 24, 1975. The appropriate standard for measuring this delay prior to "accusal" arises from United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). ² Under this test, the defendant demonstrates a violation of his right to a speedy trial only if he can show that the delay ". . . caused substantial prejudice to (his) right to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused." 404 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. at 465. See United States v. Duke, supra; United States v. McGough, 510 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1975); but see United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1107-08 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that issue may be open whether either substantial prejudice or tactical delay alone might be sufficient; indicating that earlier statements requiring both could be read as dicta). The prejudice shown must be actual, not speculative or hypothetical. Duke, supra; McGough, supra.

The District Court properly denied the motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, since defendant-appellant failed to show either actual substantial prejudice or any indication of intentional tactical delay by the prosecution. The sole source of prejudice claimed by defendant lies in the alleged increased difficulty encountered by Dr. Turner in making a definite diagnosis of defendant's mental state as of November 11, 1974. Prejudice based on this assertion is, at best, speculative. In addition, defendant makes no showing at all that the prosecution intentionally delayed proceedings in this matter for tactical advantage. The defendant-appellant's Sixth Amendment claim must therefore fail.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant-appellant relies most heavily on his assertion that the District Court should have granted a motion for verdict of acquittal, based on the state of the evidence on the insanity issue. He claims that the prosecution did not adduce enough evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Manetta was sane on November 11, 1974.

At trial, the prosecution set out its proof of the assault and Manetta's involvement therein. Manetta, in effect, admitted the facts but claimed that prior to the stabbing he heard voices, which told him that Norgaard was going to kill him, and claimed to be unable to remember anything on November 11 after he said "Good morning" to Norgaard and before he was led into segregation. Documents asserted that Manetta was diagnosed in 1962 and again in 1967, and in 1973, as a paranoid schizophrenic with psychosis. A few weeks before the stabbing, testified the defendant, he had requested medication and later removal to a solitary cell, on the basis that he had begun suffering from hallucinations. Prison officials denied both requests. The ACLU attorney testified to the defendant's agitated and incoherent state during her visit in January 1975. A physician employed by the prison determined during Manetta's time in the psychiatric ward that the defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Finally, Dr. Turner testified that in his opinion, Manetta suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, sometimes subject to remission, and possessed a sociopathic personality continuously from 1962. Dr. Turner expressed his judgment that on November 11, 1974, the defendant lacked a substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. This opinion found its basis in what defendant told Dr. Turner during the December 11, 1975, psychiatric examination. The doctor did, however, admit on cross examination that at times the defendant was lucid, rational, and coherent, and that he could at times appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and conform to the requirements of law.

The government, for its part, attacked the defense of insanity through testimony concerning the defendant's behavior on and immediately before and immediately after November 11. All of the testimony indicated that defendant was behaving normally without sign of mental affliction.

Mr. George Wells, the caseworker assigned to the defendant, testified that he saw the defendant regularly during the period immediately preceding and following the assault. He testified that the defendant "always seemed lucid," and had never told him about any delusions, hallucinations, or suspicions. Mr. Restivo, a prison official, testified as to a statement the defendant made to him immediately following the stabbing. This statement, discussed infra, indicated the mental clarity of the defendant at the time of the assault.

The prosecution also presented the expert testimony of Dr. Alderete and Dr. Baccus, psychiatrists, who both testified that based upon their observations, the defendant was legally sane under the Blake standard at the time of the incident.

Clearly, on this state of the record, there was enough evidence to reach the jury on the issue of insanity. United States v. Phillips, 519 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Collins, 491 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1974); Blake v. United States, supra. Much of the dispute involved questions of credibility, questions most appropriately suited for the jury. United States v. Fortune, 513 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1975). And, considered in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), we conclude that the evidence may be viewed as establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was legally sane at the time of the assault. See United States v. Fortune, supra. We therefore hold that the government met its burden of proof, and deny appellant's objection.

The Statement is that no Statement Will be Made

Rule 16

We grapple now with a most difficult question...