U.S. v. Mansion House Center North Redevelopment Co.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-1679,78-1679 |
| Citation | 594 F.2d 653 |
| Parties | , Bankr. L. Rep. P 67,086 UNITED STATES of America, Gerald A. Rimmel, Receiver, Appellee, v. MANSION HOUSE CENTER NORTH REDEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Limited Partnership, Mansion House Center Redevelopment Company, a Limited Partnership, Mansion House Center South Redevelopment Company, a Limited Partnership, Mansion House Center North Redevelopment Corporation, a corporation, and Maurice B. Frank, General Partners of Mansion House Center North Redevelopment Company, a Limited Partnership, Mansion House Center Redevelopment Corporation, a corporation, and Maurice B. Frank, General Partners of Mansion House Center Redevelopment Company, a Limited Partnership, Mansion House Center South Redevelopment Corporation, a corporation, and Maurice B. Frank, General Partners of Mansion House Center South Redevelopment Company, a Limited Partnership, Defendants-Appellants, REMSCO Management, Inc., a corporation, Mansion House Motor Hotel Company, a Limited Partnership, Ocean Sea Breeze, Inc., a corporation, and Maurice B. Frank, General Partners of Mansion House Motor Hotel Company, a Limited Partnership, Mansion House Motor Hotel Corporation, a corporation, Willowbrook Realty, Inc., a corporation, Pierre v. Heftler, E. J. Ehrlich, Hart Perry, Norman S. Altman, Mansion House Center North Tower Redevelopment Corporation, Mansion House Center Tower Redevelopment Corporation, Mansion House Center South Tower Redevelopment Corporation. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Frank A. Bussmann, Clayton, Mo., for appellants.
J. Christopher, Kohn, Civil Division, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., argued, Barbara Allen Babcock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., Robert D. Kingsland, U. S. Atty., Joseph B. Moore, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., and Leonard Schaitman, Washington, D. C., on brief, for appellee, United States.
Gerald A. Rimmel, Merle Silverstein of Rosenblum, Goldenhersh, Silverstein & Zafft, St. Louis, Mo., argued, Gene M. Zafft, St. Louis, Mo., on brief, for appellee.
Before LAY, BRIGHT and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal 1 from an order of the district court 2 enjoining appellants Mansion House Center North Redevelopment Company, Mansion House Center Redevelopment Company, Mansion House Center South Redevelopment Company, all limited partnerships, Maurice B. Frank, former general partner of the companies, and others (hereafter, all parties are referred to as the Frank Group), from asserting any ownership interests in the Mansion House Tower complex in St. Louis, Missouri, in any future or pending Chapter XII 3 bankruptcy proceedings and from interfering with the possession or control of the court-appointed receiver of these properties. We affirm.
This order arises from a suit filed in the Eastern District of Missouri on January 12, 1976, by the United States as mortgagee of the Mansion House towers, to protect its interests in this complex, which had been constructed with the proceeds of loans insured by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. On September 8, 1976, the court appointed a receiver and enjoined the Frank Group from interfering with the Mansion House properties or the receiver's management and control of them during the pendency of the action. See United States v. Mansion House Center N. Redev. Co., 419 F.Supp. 85 (E.D.Mo.1976). On December 30, Maurice Frank who had resigned as general partner of the companies, filed a petition in bankruptcy in Orlando, Florida, for the South Redevelopment Company, as president of the Mansion House Center South Redevelopment Corporation. Shortly thereafter, his attorney demanded of the receiver that he turn over immediate possession of the assets of the South Company.
Pursuant to this demand, the receiver requested instructions from the United States District Court in Missouri. On February 4, 1977, that court found the partnership on whose behalf Frank filed the Chapter XII petition was not the partnership whose assets the receiver held, and that therefore the receiver would not be required to surrender the assets of the South Company. United States v. Mansion House Center N. Redev. Co., 426 F.Supp. 479, 483 (E.D.Mo.1977).
Thereupon, Frank sought a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to withdraw its February 4 order; the writ was refused by this court. Frank v. Nangle, No. 77-1165 (8th Cir. Mar. 2, 1977). The government then moved to hold Frank in contempt for violating the non-interference provisions of the order appointing the receiver, and though the district court denied the motion as moot, it warned Frank of the serious possible consequences of his actions. United States v. Mansion House Center N. Redev. Co., 455 F.Supp. 434 (E.D.Mo.1977). 4
On September 1, 1977, the United States amended its original complaint to seek a declaration of identity of the owner-mortgagor. Both the Frank Group and a group purporting to have succeeded to ownership of the properties filed motions for summary judgment. Frank's motion was denied. United States v. Mansion House Center N. Redev. Co., 463 F.Supp. 591 (E.D.Mo.1977). Recently, the motion of the purported successor group was granted, entitling it to possession of the assets of the partnerships. United States v. Mansion House Center N. Redev. Co., 463 F.Supp. 595 (E.D.Mo.1978).
Once again, on July 11, 1978, the Frank Group filed Chapter XII bankruptcy petitions in which it claimed an interest in the Mansion House properties. This time it filed in Chicago, Illinois. The petitions were filed for all three partnerships by Maurice B. Frank, as president of the Mansion House Center, North and South Redevelopment Corporations, general partners of the companies. As before, the court-appointed receiver applied for instructions that he was not bound by the Illinois bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, the receiver requested a show cause order for a temporary injunction against the Frank Group enjoining it from proceeding further with the bankruptcy petitions filed in Illinois.
On August 17, 1978, the district court filed a memorandum granting the receiver's request for relief. United States v. Mansion House Center, 455 F.Supp. 434 (E.D.Mo.1978). The accompanying order enjoins the Frank Group from doing any of the following acts:
(1) Filing or causing to be filed any bankruptcy or reorganization proceeding in any state or federal court which claims or asserts any ownership or other interest in any of the Mansion House properties * * *.
(2) Asserting or claiming in the pending Chapter XII proceedings in the Northern District of Illinois * * * that the entities who are petitioning debtors in said cases have any ownership or other interest in the Mansion House properties * * *.
(3) Attempting by any other means, in addition to those listed above, to cause the Receiver in this action to surrender possession, control and administration of the aforesaid Mansion House properties to any bankruptcy or reorganization trustee, debtor in possession, assignee, or any other person or official unless same is specifically authorized by this Court.
In this appeal the Frank Group asserts that the district court erred in enjoining the Group from proceeding with the bankruptcy action in Chicago. It reaches this conclusion by two routes. First, it argues that the non-interference provision of the district court's order appointing the receiver is the basis for the present injunction. This established, the Frank Group contends that the non-interference provision is too vague to have given the Group notice that it was restrained from filing under the bankruptcy laws. In addition, the Frank Group attempts to link the non-interference provision with the government's prayer for relief in its original complaint, arguing that because the government did not include a specific demand to enjoin the filing of bankruptcy petitions, the district court could not in turn enter an order beyond the scope of the relief requested.
Whatever the origin of the non-interference provision or however it may be interpreted, the injunction now being appealed is sufficiently clear to alert the Group to its duty. We also note that the injunction does not bar the Group from proceeding with any or all bankruptcy...
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