U.S. v. Maravilla, s. 88-1061

• Decision Date: 11 January 1990
• Docket Number: Nos. 88-1061,88-1062,s. 88-1061
• Citation: 907 F.2d 216
• Parties: 30 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 600 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Daniel Joseph MARAVILLA, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Rafael Jesus DOMINGUEZ, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 216

907 F.2d 216

30 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 600

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Daniel Joseph MARAVILLA, Defendant, Appellant.

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Rafael Jesus DOMINGUEZ, Defendant, Appellant.

Nos. 88-1061, 88-1062.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Jan. 11, 1990.

Decided June 28, 1990.

David Shaughnessy, Boston, Mass., with whom John Wall and Law Offices of John Wall, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for defendant, appellant Maravilla.

Benjamin S. Waxman with whom Robert G. Amsel and Weiner, Robbins, Tunkey & Ross, P.A., Miami, Fla., were on brief, for defendant, appellant Dominguez.

Lisa J. Stark with whom Jessica Dunsay Silver, Civil Rights Div., Appellate Section, Dept. of Justice and James P. Turner, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellee.

Before BREYER, ALDRICH and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges.

BREYER, Circuit Judge.

A jury has found that, on September 10, 1982, two United States Customs officers kidnapped a Dominican money courier as he entered the United States, murdered him, and stole about $700,000 that the courier intended to deposit in a Puerto Rican bank that afternoon. The federal government did not charge them with murder, however, for murder ordinarily is a state, not a federal, crime. Rather, the government indicted them for, and the jury convicted them of: (1) depriving an "inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District" of a civil right, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 242, (2) engaging in "robbery" and committing acts of "physical violence" affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951(a), (3) transporting stolen money interstate, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314, and (4) receiving or concealing stolen money that has moved interstate, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2315. In addition, the jury convicted each officer of two separate charges involving lying and obstruction of justice.

The two defendants appeal, arguing that the district court made several evidence-related errors. They also claim that, regardless, the government could not convict them of violating the civil rights statute because the victim, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was not an "inhabitant of any State, Territory or District" of the United States. We find their evidence-related claims unconvincing, but we agree that the victim--a foreign citizen who intended to stay in the United States for only a few hours--was not an "inhabitant" of this country. We therefore affirm the robbery-related convictions, but we reverse the conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 242.

I. Evidence-Related Claims

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellants claim that the evidence is not sufficient to "warrant a jury to conclude" that they are "guilty" of the crimes charged "beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Rivera Rodriguez, 808 F.2d 886, 890 (1st Cir.1986). In assessing the legal merits of their claim, we must take "the view" of the evidence "most favorable to the government;" that is to say, we must assume witness credibility findings that favor the government and we must draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 983 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913, 108 S.Ct. 259, 98 L.Ed.2d 216 (1987); United States v. Anello, 765 F.2d 253, 262 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 996, 106 S.Ct. 411, 88 L.Ed.2d 361 (1985). Having done so, we conclude that a reasonable juror could find them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); accord United States v. Guerrero-Guerrero, 776 F.2d 1071, 1073 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1029, 106 S.Ct. 1233, 89 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986). The evidence that leads us to this conclusion, as summarized, includes the following:

First, there is evidence that the defendants had a special opportunity to commit the crime. The money courier, Yamil Mitri Lajam, arrived at Puerto Rico's airport on September 10, 1982, around midday. He presented customs forms showing he was carrying $370,000 in cash and $323,000 in checks (belonging to the Dominican foreign exchange business for which he worked). An inspector referred him for an interview to one of the defendants, customs officer Rafael Dominguez. Dominguez walked over to the other defendant, customs officer Daniel Maravilla, who, together with an FBI agent, was in the midst of another interview. Maravilla left the agent, joined Dominguez with the victim Mitri for a few minutes, returned to the agent, left again for a few minutes, and returned to the agent again, this time telling the agent that he (Maravilla) and Dominguez had finished interviewing the victim. In the meantime Dominguez and the victim walked back to the first inspector for further processing and then left the customs office together. About the same time Maravilla left the customs office. Dominguez returned to the customs office about five hours after he left it; Maravilla returned the next day. After the victim Mitri left the office with Dominguez, no one ever saw him alive again. He was shot to death; his body was found (without the money) ten days later, about 20 miles from the airport, in a state of decomposition consistent with his having been killed during the five hours that both Dominguez and Maravilla were away from the customs office.

Second, Dominguez and Maravilla had special knowledge about the money. They had interviewed Mitri and therefore knew about the money he was carrying. Mitri had planned to deposit the money in a San Juan bank that afternoon and return immediately to the Dominican Republic. Thus, there is reason to believe that few others in Puerto Rico knew about the money he was carrying.

Third, Dominguez and Mitri, who had little money before September 10th, had large quantities of money immediately thereafter. As of September 10th, their bank accounts each showed balances of less than $100; their salaries amounted to $37,000 and $34,000 per year respectively; yet, on the very evening of September 10th they bought first class plane tickets and flew to Miami, bringing with them a briefcase filled with about $265,000 in cash. Within a week Dominguez gave a girlfriend $7000 cash, bought $3500 in postal money orders, and, through a friend, deposited $5000 in a Miami bank account. In October he gave an uncle $15,000 to buy a new car for him. In February he agreed to make a cash down payment of $30,000 for a new house. Similarly, within a week of September 10th, Maravilla deposited $18,300 cash in his bank account in San Juan, gave $2000 to his parents, and, through a friend, deposited $2000 in a Miami bank account. The following February he flew to Colombia with $53,700 cash.

Fourth, the defendants tried to hide their cash. After flying to Miami on September 10th, they contacted Wayne Sausmer, a friend of Maravilla's, and paid him $12,000 to take $220,000 cash to Panama and deposit it in numbered, unnamed bank accounts.

Fifth, the defendants made up false stories about the money. When, some months later, Maravilla was stopped at the Colombian border with $53,700 cash, he said he did not know he was supposed to declare cash (though his United States customs job involved interviewing persons who made similar declarations) and that the cash was an inheritance. Subsequently, he and Sausmer agreed that, if questioned about the cash, they would say it came from another friend, Sultan Benyi, who had given or loaned Maravilla the money. Maravilla and Sausmer later repeated this story to the FBI; Dominguez discussed the story with Sausmer and repeated it before a grand jury. After it became apparent, however, that Benyi himself would not confirm this story, Maravilla and Sausmer decided to say that the cash came from a Panamanian businessman named Herman Maussinger, who (they said) had loaned it to Maravilla before he (Maussinger) died. Eventually Sausmer told the FBI, the grand jury, and the jury below in this case, that these stories were all false.

Sixth, in the week following September 10th Dominguez asked a friend to take his gun to Miami and to have a new barrel put on the gun.

We recognize that this evidence is circumstantial. Moreover, the record contains some contrary circumstantial evidence, consisting of (a) the fact that Sausmer had taken out a $70,000 letter of credit in Maravilla's behalf a few months before September, (b) the fact that Maravilla's bank account showed transactions totalling $50,000 a few months before September, (c) the testimony of a friend of Dominguez, to whom he owed about $2500, that Dominguez called her before September 10 and told her that he was sending money orders to repay the loan, and (d) the fact that the Miami gunsmith did not put a new barrel on Dominguez's gun (a gun which no one introduced into evidence).

Neither the circumstantial nature of this evidence, however, nor the theoretical possibility that it is consistent with innocence, not guilt, is sufficient ground for overturning the jury verdict. Circumstantial evidence, when strong, can prove guilt. The question is whether we can say that no reasonable juror could find that the evidence of timing, of special opportunity, of special knowledge, of the money's sudden appearance, of the false stories, of the gun, taken together, demonstrate guilt beyond reasonable doubt. We cannot say that no reasonable person could take such a view; thus, we cannot second guess the jury's verdict, and therefore must uphold it as a matter of law. See, e.g., Guerrero-Guerrero, 776 F.2d at 1073.

B. The Expert Testimony

The government presented testimony by two forensic pathologists. The first, Dr. Criado, testified that, in his opinion, the victim died between September 8 and September 12. The second, Dr. Davis, testified, on the basis of photographs of the body when found on September 20, that he thought, "from appearance, considering the nature of the environment," the person had then "been dead ... one or two weeks." The prosecutor then asked the...