U.S. v. Martinez
Decision Date | 13 September 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 93-4076,93-4076 |
Citation | 96 F.3d 473 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hector MARTINEZ; Jorge Gomez; Humberto Gallo, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
William A. Meadows, Jr., Miami, FL, Thomas W. Risavy, South Miami, FL, for Hector Martinez.
Steven E. Kreisberg, Coconut Grove, FL, for Jorge Gomez.
Richard C. Klugh, Asst. Federal Public Defender, James R. Gailey, Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Humberto Gallo.
Roberto Martinez, U.S. Atty., Jeanne M. Mullenhoff, Asst. U.S. Atty., Miami, FL, for U.S.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and FOREMAN *, Senior District Judge.
On petition for rehearing, Humberto Gallo now claims that the court's affirmance of his conviction, see U.S. v. Martinez, 83 F.3d 371 (11th Cir.1996), clashes with our decision in U.S. v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 697 (11th Cir.1993) ( ). Gallo, who moved for a judgment of acquittal following the government's case-in-chief, argues that we incorrectly considered the later testimony of one of his codefendants (Martinez) in determining the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Because the conviction was correctly affirmed, we deny Gallo's petition for rehearing.
We do not consider issues or arguments raised for the first time on petition for rehearing. U.S. v. Richards, 646 F.2d 962, 963 (5th Cir.1981) (); U.S. v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d 1152, 1158 (5th Cir.1970) (), appeal after remand, 463 F.2d 641 (5th Cir.1972). On appeal, Gallo neither raised this issue nor made his present argument.
Nowhere in his briefs did Gallo frame the issue on appeal as the sufficiency of the evidence before the district court at the close of the government's case. Instead, Gallo said the issue was "[w]hether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Gallo conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute." (Gallo's Opening Brief, p. 2.) By contrast, his codefendant Gomez, who also moved for acquittal at the close of the government's case and rested immediately thereafter, stated his issue on appeal in a different way:
Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts I, II and III of the superseding indictment at the close of the government's case, based upon insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law to prove knowledge on his part that drugs were involved?
(Gomez's Brief, p. 1.) (Emphasis added.)
These questions are not the same. Precedents have already pointed out the difference. The Fifth Circuit has explained the distinction as follows:
Brechtel purports to challenge the district court's denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a) as well as raise a sufficiency claim. By presenting defense evidence, Brechtel waived any objection to the district court's denial of his Rule 29(a) motion at the close of the government's case-in-chief. E.g., United States v. Elam, 678 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir.1982). Thus, Brechtel's challenge to the denial of his latter Rule 29(a) motion simply restates the sufficiency claim.
U.S. v. Brechtel, 997 F.2d 1108, 1115 n. 31 (5th Cir.1993) (emphasis added). 1 Cf. U.S. v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir.1995) () (emphasis in original). As in Brechtel, before the district court submitted the case to the jury, Gallo again moved for a judgment of acquittal (R., Vol. 4, p. 64); and--given Gallo's statement to us of the question presented--it is only the denial of this motion that he appealed. So, the question before us about Gallo's conviction was whether there was sufficient evidence based on all of the evidence admitted at trial.
Even if we assume that Gallo had properly framed the issue on appeal, never did he argue that it was or would be error to consider Martinez's testimony. Gallo simply argued that nothing in the actions or statements made by Gallo or the other participants indicated that Gomez or Martinez had knowledge of the cocaine aspect of the crime and, therefore, contended that the evidence was insufficient to convict him. (Gallo's Opening Brief, p. 11.)
Considering that neither Gallo nor Gomez testified, the only "statements" "made by Gallo or the other participants" were Gallo's statements to the government agent and confidential informant and Martinez's testimony. Before the petition for rehearing, Gallo had never argued that the appellate court was limited in the evidence it could consider in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. 2 In its appellate brief, the government did not differentiate among the three defendant-appellants, but argued that "the record is replete with evidence to sustain appellants' convictions" based on the entirety of the evidence admitted at trial, including Martinez's testimony. (United States's Brief, pp. 18, 21-22.) But nowhere in Gallo's Reply Brief did Gallo try to distinguish the evidence that could be used against him from the evidence that might properly be used only against one or both of his codefendants. (Gallo's Reply Brief, p. 2.)
Even if we assume that Gallo--during the course of his appeal--had properly preserved both the issue he now tries to advance and his present argument regarding it, he--at trial--waived the underlying legal proposition by making affirmative use of Martinez's testimony. By introducing evidence or by using evidence introduced by a codefendant, a defendant waives his right to have the sufficiency of the evidence determined as the evidence was at the close of the government's case. Thomas, 987 F.2d at 703 () (quoting U.S. v. Rhodes, 631 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. Unit B 1980)); U.S. v. Cardenas Alvarado, 806 F.2d 566, 570 n. 2 (5th Cir.1986).
In Cardenas Alvarado, the Fifth Circuit held that it would evaluate a codefendant's testimony in determining the sufficiency of the evidence because the defendant "utilized his codefendant's testimony concerning duress in his closing argument, and requested that the jury be instructed on duress." Id. (Emphasis added.) In a similar way, Gallo's counsel, in his summation to the jury, argued as follows:
One other witness testified about elements of knowledge and conspiracy. That is Martinez. Mr. Waters [the prosecutor] would have you disbelieve his testimony.
If you will get up on the stand and lie, then you get up on the stand and you exonerate yourself completely. That is not what Mr. Martinez did. He got up, and he admitted to you he was involved in a rip-off of a burglary; right? He admitted to a crime. What he said as I am telling you in Mr. Gallo's case, it was not possession of cocaine. It was not conspiracy to possess cocaine. It was money. "We went there to get money."
(3 SR, Vol. I, p. 13.) 3
Lawyers know that argument to the jury must be based solely on the evidence admitted at trial. See e.g., U.S. v. Herberman 583 F.2d 222, 230-231 (5th Cir.1978) ( ); U.S. v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401, 402 (5th Cir.1978) () (improper summation constituted error). In the light of the argument made to the jury by Gallo's lawyer, he must have believed that Martinez' testimony, including Martinez's supposed veracity, was part of the "evidence" in Gallo's case and, thus, could be considered in determining "sufficiency." More important, Gallo's attempt to "utilize his codefendant's testimony to advantage" constituted a waiver of the right to have the sufficiency of the evidence against him looked at as the evidence stood at the close of the government's evidence.
Even if we assume that Gallo did not waive his right to a mid-trial determination of the sufficiency of the evidence against him, Gallo's present argument is meritless. Gallo seems to assume that his conviction must be based on a conspiracy with Martinez. That is not so.
In the context of our previous opinion, we pointed out the obvious: because Martinez's conviction was upheld, Gallo's argument that he lacked co-conspirators was without merit. U.S. v. Martinez, 83 F.3d 371, 375 (11th Cir.1996). We did not say that Gallo's conspiracy conviction was dependent upon Martinez's conspiracy conviction. It is not.
We have repeatedly held that a defendant may be convicted of conspiring with "persons unknown," if sufficient evidence supports the existence and involvement of such unknown persons. See U.S. v. Mosquera, 779 F.2d 628, 630 (11th Cir.1986); U.S. v. Carcaise, 763 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.1985). 4 In Mosquera, the Coast Guard discovered 300 bales of marijuana on board a boat. The captain and crew were charged with, among other things, conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. The jury convicted the captain but acquitted his crew. On appeal, we...
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