U.S. v. Martinez

Decision Date12 May 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-3599.,05-3599.
Citation446 F.3d 878
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Araceli MARTINEZ, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Raphael M. Scheetz, argued, Cedar Rapids, IA, for appellant.

Daniel C. Tvedt, argued, Asst. U.S. Atty., Cedar Rapids, IA, for appellee.

Before COLLOTON, HEANEY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Araceli Martinez pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. On appeal, Martinez challenges the determination of the district court1 that Martinez was competent and the district court's denial of Martinez's motion to recuse. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Martinez was indicted for possession with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. A guilty plea hearing was conducted before a United States Magistrate Judge2 on December 22, 2003. On January 16, 2004, the district court accepted the guilty plea in accordance with the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. Martinez was released on bond pending sentencing. In June 2004, the district court granted a motion for continuance of the approaching sentencing hearing to allow Martinez's attorney, JoAnne Lilledahl, to obtain a mental health examination of Martinez because Lilledahl was concerned about Martinez's ability to assist in her own defense. Kirk Witherspoon, Ph.D., a clinical and forensic psychologist, interviewed Martinez in July 2004 to assess her current mental status. In August, a warrant was issued for Martinez's arrest for noncompliance with the conditions of her bond.

In January 2005, the magistrate judge granted Martinez's pro se motion for substitution of counsel, noting that Martinez was manipulative and "practiced an amazing amount of deceit since she first entered the system" and that Martinez's deceit made it difficult for Lilledahl to represent her. On February 28, 2005, Martinez filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea based, in part, on her alleged incompetence to plead guilty. The hearing on her motion was scheduled for March 17, but Martinez filed a motion seeking a continuance of the hearing to allow time for Dr. Witherspoon to interview her a second time in order to offer an opinion on her mental competency as of the date of the guilty plea hearing. The district court granted the motion, and Dr. Witherspoon met with Martinez on March 25. On April 5, the magistrate judge granted the Government's motion for a competency evaluation of Martinez. Michelle Hoy-Watkins, Psy. D., a clinical and forensic psychologist and contract employee with the United States Bureau of Prisons, conducted the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation and submitted a report to the district court in July.

The district court held the hearing regarding Martinez's motion to withdraw guilty plea on August 9 and 10, 2005 ("August 2005 hearing"). The district court heard from Martinez's initial defense attorney, Lilledahl, as well as the two psychologists who evaluated Martinez. Due to Lilledahl's concerns about the attorney-client privilege, Lilledahl testified only as to her standard practices in representing criminal defendants. Lilledahl stated that if she thought a defendant was under the influence of an illegal substance during a plea hearing, she would alert the court that there was a problem with the proceeding. Lilledahl confirmed that she did not alert the court in Martinez's plea hearing or file an objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation that Martinez's guilty plea be accepted.

Dr. Witherspoon testified that he met with Martinez for two hours in July 2004 and for two and a half hours in March 2005. Dr. Witherspoon found that Martinez understood the criminal charge and the possible penalties and generally comprehended the legal system. He testified that depression is common among defendants facing extended incarceration and that Martinez suffered from "a major depressive disorder with extreme anxiety, which chances are is a product itself of posttraumatic stress, substance abuse tendencies, underlying personality disorder." Dr. Witherspoon also found that Martinez had a "tendency to be untruthful on numerous occasions" and "may well have grown manipulative and deceitful to survive in a hostile and abusive environment." Dr. Witherspoon opined that Martinez had been incompetent to plead guilty on December 22, 2003, and was incompetent at the current time.

Dr. Hoy-Watkins testified telephonically that as part of the court-ordered evaluation process of Martinez, she spoke with the prosecutor and current defense counsel, reviewed the records from the case, and conducted three different types of testing during her meetings with Martinez. Dr. Hoy-Watkins met weekly with Martinez during the 30-day evaluation period for a total of more than four hours. Dr. Hoy-Watkins opined that Martinez was feigning severe psychological symptoms. She also found Martinez to be manipulative and deceitful based on the court records and inconsistencies in the information Martinez supplied to others and to Dr. Hoy-Watkins. Dr. Hoy-Watkins concluded that Martinez had been competent at the time of her guilty plea and was competent at present.

Martinez filed a motion to recuse on September 2, 2005, asking Judge Reade to recuse herself from the sentencing because of the appearance of partiality due to Judge Reade's law clerk, Teresa Baumann. Baumann served as the courtroom deputy during the August 2005 hearing because the district court did not have a courtroom deputy at that time as a result of a change in personnel. In her former position as Special Assistant United States Attorney, Baumann had initiated the prosecution against Martinez in October 2003. Baumann made no appearances in Martinez's case after December 8, 2003, when an Assistant United States Attorney replaced Baumann in the case.

On September 7, 2005, the district court issued an order denying Martinez's motion to withdraw her guilty plea and an order denying Martinez's motion to recuse. Following a sentencing hearing on September 7 and 16, the district court sentenced Martinez to 168 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Martinez appeals the district court's determination that Martinez was competent when she pled guilty and at subsequent court proceedings and the district court's decision not to recuse.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Competency

We first address Martinez's argument that the district court erred in holding that Martinez was competent to enter a guilty plea on December 22, 2003, and proceed with sentencing. The district court's finding that a defendant is competent is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Robinson, 253 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.2001). "A finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Perry, 437 F.3d 782, 786 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)).

Due process prohibits a defendant who is mentally incompetent from making a valid guilty plea, United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346, 347 (8th Cir. 1994), and from being convicted, United States v. Jimenez-Villasenor, 270 F.3d 554, 559 (8th Cir.2001). A defendant is competent if she possesses a "sufficient present ability to consult with [her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (holding that the Dusky standard for competency to stand trial applies equally to competency to plead guilty).

In determining the defendant's competency, the "district court may consider `numerous factors, including expert medical opinions and the court's observation of the defendant's demeanor.'" United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting Robinson, 253 F.3d at 1067). The district court concluded that Martinez was competent after considering the expert medical opinions of the two psychologists, the transcript of the plea hearing on December 22, 2003, and the court's independent observations of Martinez in the courtroom during the August 2005 hearing.

Contrary to the contention of Martinez, the district court did not clearly err in crediting the opinion of Dr. Hoy-Watkins over that of Dr. Witherspoon. With respect to Martinez's competency to enter the guilty plea, the district court explained that Dr. Witherspoon evaluated Martinez's current mental state and extrapolated backward to December 2003. The district court found the approach of Dr. Hoy-Watkins to be more reasonable because not only did Dr. Hoy-Watkins consider her observations of Martinez during their meetings and the results of the tests she administered to Martinez, but she also carefully examined the December 22 plea transcript in arriving at the opinion that Martinez was competent to plead guilty. Similarly, the district court credited the opinion of Dr. Hoy-Watkins that Martinez currently was competent for...

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