U.S. v. Martinez-Trujillo
Decision Date | 20 November 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 05-4122.,05-4122. |
Citation | 468 F.3d 1266 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Josafat MARTINEZ-TRUJILLO, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Stephen R. McCaughey, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant-Appellant.
Karin M. Fojtik, Assistant United States Attorney (Paul M. Warner, United States Attorney, and Wayne T. Dance, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HARTZ, EBEL, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
To expedite the handling of large volumes of cases involving persons accused of immigration offenses, certain judicial districts employ fast-track programs. These programs allow defendants to obtain a downward departure in their offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) in exchange for pleading guilty and waiving their rights to file certain motions and to appeal. See United States v. Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir.2005); USSG § 5K3.1. Congress authorized these programs in a provision of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (the PROTECT Act). See Pub.L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 ( ). The decision to adopt the program in a district is made by the United States Attorney General and the United States Attorney for the district. See id. § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 675; Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d at 1127.
A number of defendants prosecuted in non-fast-track districts have complained that the advantages of fast-track sentences are not available to them. They argue that judges in non-fast-track districts should avoid disparities in sentencing within the federal system as a whole by taking into account sentences under fast-track systems and reducing their sentences accordingly. They rely on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), which requires the sentencing court to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct."
Josafat Martinez-Trujillo is such a defendant. He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Utah to illegal reentry of a previously deported alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He filed a memorandum arguing that under § 3553(a)(6) the sentencing court must avoid unwarranted sentence disparities between similarly situated defendants by adjusting his sentence to correspond with sentences imposed in districts with fast-track programs. The district court rejected the argument, declaring that the sentence it pronounced was consistent with "the goals of providing just punishment for the offense, affording adequate deterrence to the criminal conduct, and protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant." R. Doc. 42 at 6. Refusing to consider fast-track programs as a sentencing factor, the court stated that it would not "attempt to account for the fast-track program, which is in place in only approximately 15 percent of districts," and said that doing so "would undermine the heart of the federal sentencing system, uniformity among similarly situated defendants." Id. at 7.
Mr. Martinez-Trujillo appeals, contending that the district court's ruling violated the sentencing standards set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), thereby rendering his sentence unreasonable. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) ( ). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
We considered a similar contention in Morales-Chaires. In that case we held that a district court could impose sentences on persons convicted of unlawful reentry without adjusting for disparities caused by fast-track sentencing. See Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d at 1131. We reserved for the future, however, "whether sentencing disparities caused by the existence of fast-track programs are or are not, or may be in certain circumstances, considered unwarranted under § 3553(a)(6)." Id. This case presents the question, and we answer it "No." We cannot say that a disparity is "unwarranted" within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6) when the disparity was specifically authorized by Congress in the PROTECT Act. See United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.2006) ( ; United States v. Mejia, 461 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir.2006) (); United States v. Aguirre-Villa, 460 F.3d 681, 683 (5th Cir.2006) () ; United States v. Perez-Pena, 453 F.3d 236, 244 (4th Cir.2006) () ; United States v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 718 (9th Cir.2006) ( ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
U.S. v. Andújar-Arias, 06-1189.
...436 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir.2006); United States v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 718 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martínez-Trujillo, 468 F.3d 1266, 1268-69 (10th Cir.2006); United States v. Anaya Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.2006). The Fourth Circuit has taken an additional ......
-
U.S. v. Gomez-Herrera, 07-10153.
...U.S.App. LEXIS 1520, at *2-3, 2008 WL 193210, at *1 (10th Cir. January 23, 2008) (unpublished); See also United States v. Martinez-Trujillo, 468 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir.2006) ("The decision that a defendant be `fast-tracked' is not made by the defendant but by the United States Attorney."......
-
U.S. v. Vargas, 06-1368.
...the Exploitation of Children Today Act ("PROTECT Act"), Pub.L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).10 See United States v. Martinez-Trujillo, 468 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir.2006) (explaining "[w]e cannot say that a disparity is `unwarranted' within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6) when the disp......
-
United States v. Lopez-Macias
...vary from the recommended guideline sentence on alternative grounds. First, the court relied on our holding in United States v. Martinez–Trujillo, 468 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir.2006), to deny Defendant's motion. In Martinez–Trujillo, we held as a matter of law that sentence disparities created by......