U.S. v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 19 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-6801,96-6801
• Citation: 139 F.3d 412
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wilfredo Mario MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 412

139 F.3d 412

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wilfredo Mario MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96-6801.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 30, 1998.

Decided March 19, 1998.

ARGUED: James A. McLaughlin, College of Law, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, for Appellant. Michael R. Smythers, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Norfolk, VA, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Helen F. Fahey, U.S. Attorney, Norfolk, VA, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge, and MICHAEL, Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Senior Judge BUTZNER and Senior Judge MICHAEL joined.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Chief Judge:

After failing to appear for trial, Wilfredo Martinez was tried in absentia and convicted of engagement in a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848, interstate travel with intent to facilitate cocaine distribution, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, and cocaine distribution, 21 U.S.C. § 841. After his conviction became final, the Supreme Court held in Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 113 S.Ct. 748, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993), that Fed.R.Crim.P. 43 prohibits the trial in absentia of a defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial. Martinez brought a motion for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming Crosby required that his conviction be set aside. The district court denied relief, holding that under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-316, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1069-78, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion), Crosby could not be applied retroactively to Martinez's case. Because we agree that Crosby announced a new rule within the meaning of Teague and therefore cannot entitle Martinez to collateral relief, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Martinez was indicted in November 1987 on seven counts related to a cocaine distribution conspiracy. On February 10, 1988, he appeared before a magistrate, waived arraignment, and pled not guilty. In his presence, Martinez's trial was set for April 11, 1988. Although he was initially permitted to remain free on a $100,000 bond, Martinez's bond was revoked when he failed to appear for a scheduled hearing on March 21, 1988. After the hearing, Miami police found Martinez's residence empty and four days of newspapers lying in front of his house. F.B.I. agents also learned that a moving van had recently been used to empty Martinez's residence of furniture. Martinez then failed to appear at another hearing set for March 28, 1988. Finally, on April 11, 1988, he did not appear for trial. The district court ordered Martinez's bond forfeited.

Martinez's attorney moved for a continuance. Upon questioning by the district court, defense counsel conceded: "They [Martinez and his mother] knew of the trial date. I had gone over the trial date with them. In fact, I told them to make airplane reservations in advance.... No question they knew of the trial date." Additionally, the prosecutor explained that witnesses had been brought in from as far as Florida and Indiana for the trial and further delay would unnecessarily expose government witnesses to danger. Finding there to be no chance of Martinez appearing for trial, and assessing the prejudice to the government as great, the district court denied the motion for continuance and began Martinez's trial in his absence. After a one-day trial, the jury convicted Martinez of all counts. Authorities apprehended Martinez in Florida in December 1988 and returned him to Virginia. On April 3, 1989, the district court sentenced Martinez to twenty years in prison and a $10,000 fine.

Martinez appealed his conviction, in part, on the ground that his trial in absentia was error. This court rejected his appeal on the grounds that his failure to show up for a trial which he knew would take place constituted a voluntary waiver of his right to be present. United States v. Martinez, No. 89-5805, 1991 WL 89932 (4th Cir.1991). Martinez then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on October 7, 1991. Martinez v. United States, 502 U.S. 897, 112 S.Ct. 272, 116 L.Ed.2d 224 (1991). Martinez filed the present § 2255 motion claiming that the Supreme Court's decision in Crosby requires that his conviction be set aside. The district court disagreed and denied his motion. Martinez now appeals.

II.

Martinez's conviction became final on October 7, 1991, when the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Crosby, the decision from which Martinez seeks to benefit, was decided on January 13, 1993.

In Crosby, the Supreme Court considered whether a criminal defendant could be tried in absentia after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be present at the commencement of trial. At the time, Rule 43 stated, in relevant part:

(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.

(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present,

(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced....

In Crosby, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had concluded, like other Courts of Appeals, that a defendant could waive the right to be present at the beginning of trial and thereafter be tried in absentia. United States v. Crosby, 917 F.2d 362, 364-66 (8th Cir.1990). The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that Rule 43 only supported trial in absentia if the defendant voluntarily absented himself after the trial had commenced in his presence. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 259-60, 113 S.Ct. at 751-52.

Martinez claims that because he did not appear at the beginning of his trial--or at any point thereafter until sentencing--Crosby requires that his conviction be vacated. We must first determine whether the Court's interpretation of Rule 43 was a new rule within the meaning of Teague and therefore inapplicable to Martinez's § 2255 motion for collateral relief. We begin by reviewing Teague 's nonretroactivity rule and the principles supporting it.

A.

Subject to two narrow exceptions, a habeas petitioner is not entitled to the application of a new rule of criminal procedure in an action collaterally attacking a criminal conviction. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. at 1075. A rule announced in a case decided subsequent to the date on which the habeas petitioner's conviction became final is considered a new rule "if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Id. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070. The Supreme Court, since Teague, has restated the requirements for a new rule in various forms. For example, in Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217-18, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990), the Court held that a rule was not considered to be dictated by precedent if it "was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." And in Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, ----, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 1525, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997), the Court determined whether a rule was dictated by precedent by asking whether "the unlawfulness of [petitioner's] conviction was apparent to all reasonable jurists." See also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 2827, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990) (describing a new rule as a result "over which reasonable jurists may disagree"). Since Teague, the Supreme Court repeatedly has indicated its commitment to the nonretroactivity rule. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Netherland, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 1973, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997); Lambrix, 520 U.S. at ---- - ----, 117 S.Ct. at 1524-25; Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 166-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S.Ct. 948, 953-54, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 339-40, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 2115-17, 124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 466-67, 113 S.Ct. 892, 897-98, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993).

The Supreme Court has grounded the nonretroactivity rule both in the purposes of habeas corpus and in the values of federalism and finality. The purpose of the habeas writ is not to provide a substitute for direct review of a petitioner's conviction. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306, 109 S.Ct. at 1073. Habeas relief instead serves as an incentive--in addition to direct review--for state and federal courts to faithfully apply federal law. This purpose is served sufficiently by requiring courts to apply federal law as it exists at the time a defendant's conviction becomes final. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 234, 110 S.Ct. at 2827. The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is fulfilled without requiring courts to divine the future twists and turns that federal law might take. Thus, "Teague asks state court judges to judge reasonably, not presciently." O'Dell, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 1978.

The nonretroactivity rule also derives from a proper respect for federalism and finality. Retroactive application of new rules by federal courts to invalidate state convictions imposes an unnecessary cost on the States by requiring them to continually relitigate convictions, even when those convictions satisfied all constitutional requirements at the time they became final. Teague recognized that these federalism costs "generally far outweigh the benefits" of retroactive application of new rules. 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Just as importantly, the application of new rules of criminal procedure in actions for collateral relief threatens the...