U.S. v. Matassini
| Decision Date | 10 January 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-3631,76-3631 |
| Citation | 565 F.2d 1297 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Pasquale MATASSINI, a/k/a Pat Matassini, and Robert E. Rodriguez, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
John L. Briggs, U. S. Atty., Jacksonville, Fla., Eleanore J. Hill, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tampa, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
Harry Hobbs, Tampa, Fla., for Rodriguez.
Nicholas M. Matassini, Tampa, Fla., for Matassini.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before GOLDBERG and MORGAN, Circuit Judges, and WYZANSKI *, District Judge.
On September 26, 1950 defendant-appellee Pasquale Matassini was convicted in the Criminal Court of Record of Hillsborough County, Florida of the offense of breaking and entering. He was sentenced to serve three years in the state prison. On June 22, 1955 the governor and cabinet of Florida pursuant to their authority under the state constitution granted Matassini "a full and complete pardon of the above offense, thereby restoring to him full and complete civil rights." Twenty-one years later, on May 12, 1976, Matassini was indicted by a federal grand jury for receipt, 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1), 1 and for possession, 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1), 2 of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant-appellee Robert E. Rodriguez was charged in the same indictment with aiding and abetting Matassini in the receipt offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(a) and 922(h). In his pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment and now on appeal, Matassini contends that his "full and complete pardon" established an absolute defense to the offenses charged. The government does not dispute that the pardon was granted but contends that the pardon is insufficient as a matter of law to remove Matassini from the proscription of §§ 922(h)(1) and 1202(a)(1). In particular, the government argues that the pardon does not remove Matassini from the class of convicted felons reached by these provisions, that the exclusive avenues of relief from those proscriptions are those provided by the statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 925(c) 3 and 1203(2), 4 and that Matassini fails to come within the purview of those exemptions. In an order dated August 18, 1976, the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, dismissed the indictment as to both defendants. The government appeals, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the indictment and hold that "full and complete" Florida pardons granted prior to the enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 exempt recipients from criminal liability under §§ 922(h) and 1202(a). As defendant Rodriguez is charged only with aiding and abetting, the dismissal as to Matassini necessarily disposes of the indictment as to Rodriguez.
It is necessary initially to unravel, at least in part, the web of statutory prohibitions and exemptions regulating the receipt and possession of firearms. The provisions under which Matassini was indicted were enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (), as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213. The Omnibus Act, hurriedly considered and passed by Congress in the wake of the tragic assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy, contained two titles addressing the problem of control of firearms. Title IV, entitled "State Firearms Control Assistance," primarily concerned federal licensure of "persons engaging in the businesses of importing, manufacturing, or dealing" in firearms and was the subject of consideration by a Senate committee. Section 922, comprising a lengthy set of regulations governing activity by importers, manufacturers, and dealers, is found in this title. Title VII, entitled "Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms," was added as a floor amendment and enacted without committee consideration. Its operative provision, § 1202, was specifically addressed to the receipt, possession, or transportation in commerce of firearms by persons deemed to present special dangers to public safety. Both § 922 and § 1202 contain language proscribing the receipt of firearms by convicted felons; § 1202 reaches possession as well. Title VII contains a provision, § 1203(2), exempting convicted felons who have received pardons meeting specified conditions from criminal liability under § 1202. Title IV contains no parallel provision respecting pardons, but does provide for administrative relief from certain disabilities in § 925(c).
Defendant Matassini has abandoned any claim that the application of §§ 922 and 1202 to him raises issues of constitutional dimension. The issue before us, then, is one of statutory construction; we must decide whether these provisions of the Omnibus Act are properly construed to proscribe the receipt or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon who had received a full and complete pardon under state law prior to the enactment of the Omnibus Act. 5
We begin with an analysis of Title VII, for it is in this title that Congress spoke most directly to the effect of a state pardon on criminal liability.
The proscription of § 1202(a)(1) 6 extends to "(a)ny person who . . . has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony . . ." The statute defines "felony" as
any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but does not include any offense (other than one involving a firearm or explosive) classified as a misdemeanor under the laws of a State and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less § 1202(c)(2). The statute also contains an explicit exemption, in § 1203(2), from the operation of § 1202(a) for
any person who has been pardoned by . . . the chief executive of a State and has expressly been authorized . . . to receive, possess, or transport in commerce a firearm.
The statute does not provide us with a glossary to determine when a particular pardon "expressly" authorizes the receipt, possession, or transport of a firearm. With respect to pardons granted after the enactment of the Omnibus Act and in contemplation of its terms, such a glossary would not seem necessary; state pardoning authorities may simply adopt the language of the federal provision more or less in haec verba. But with respect to pardons granted prior to the enactment of the Omnibus Act, the meaning of express authorization is considerably more problematic. Our examination of the statutory language and legislative history 7 of Title VII does not suggest any determinative congressional intent or provide any universal resolution as to the effect of pre-enactment pardons. Accordingly, our analysis and conclusions focus rather closely on the terms and legal setting of Matassini's 1955 pardon.
At the time of Matassini's pardon, Title VII had not been enacted and no provision of federal law addressed the effect of a state pardon on the lawfulness of receipt or possession of firearms. Obviously, no federally-approved "express terms" were available to the Florida pardoning authorities for inclusion in Matassini's pardon. But as we shall discuss, the state pardon granted to Matassini did contemplate the removal of virtually all collateral disabilities flowing from Matassini's 1950 conviction. In particular, the pardon both contemplated and had the effect, under state law, of restoring to Matassini the right to receive and possess firearms. We must determine whether this pardon is sufficiently "express" to bring Matassini within the § 1203(2) exemption. We do so in light of the effect that the pardon was intended to have under Florida law, the language and legislative history of Title VII, and the applicable canons of statutory construction. We come to the following conclusions:
(1) That Matassini's Florida pardon was premised on an assessment of Matassini as an individual and was intended to restore to him full and complete civil rights, specifically including the right to receive and possess a firearm;
(2) That Congress, in requiring express authorization for convicted felons to receive and possess firearms, intended that pardoning authorities consider the effect on public safety of permitting any given pardonee to receive and possess firearms;
(3) That where this legislative purpose is satisfied, Congress did not intend the absurd requirement that talismanic words be employed prior to the time those words were specified; and
(4) That the 1955 pardon granted to Matassini satisfied the federal legislative purpose, came as close to "express authorization" as was reasonably possible under the circumstances, and thus satisfied the requirements of § 1203(2).
The language of § 1203(2) provides an unmistakable indication of one fact: that Congress believed the federal interests underlying Title VII could and would be adequately safeguarded by actions of state governors. Congress placed trust in governors to determine, in the exercise of their pardoning powers, whether the collateral consequence that a pardonee be permitted to receive and possess a firearm should follow from any given grant of pardon. A central inquiry for us, therefore, is whether Governor Collins and the Florida Pardon Board considered this issue and intended, in granting Matassini his 1955 pardon under Florida law, to permit him to receive and possess a firearm.
We begin by noting that the 1968 Florida Constitution, Art. IV, § 8(a) confers power on the governor, with the approval of three members of the cabinet, to "grant full or conditional pardons" and to "restore civil rights;" compare Art. IV, § 12 of the 1885 Constitution which conferred similar power on a Pardon Board composed of the governor and four members of the cabinet. The Florida courts have held that
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