U.S. v. Mathis

• Decision Date: 10 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-2766,94-2766
• Citation: 96 F.3d 1577
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Eugene MATHIS a.k.a. Romeo, a.k.a. Rome a.k.a. Homey, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 1577

96 F.3d 1577

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Eugene MATHIS a.k.a. Romeo, a.k.a. Rome a.k.a. Homey,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 94-2766.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 10, 1996.

Rex Martin Barbas, Mina Morgan, Barbas, Weed, Glenn, Morgan and Wheeley, Tampa, FL, for Appellant.

Kathy J. Peluso, Tamra Phipps, Asst. U.S. Attys., Tampa, FL, for Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, and RONEY and CAMPBELL ^*, Senior Circuit Judges.

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge:

Defendant Ronald E. Mathis (a/k/a "Romeo") was convicted of multiple drug counts and received a life sentence without parole. On appeal, he alleges that the government violated his right to a speedy trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., that it unconstitutionally exercised its peremptory challenges, and that the district court erroneously admitted evidence from unconstitutional searches.

I.

On October 23, 1991, a 47-count indictment was returned against Mathis and eleven codefendants for their roles in a crack cocaine distribution organization that Mathis was alleged to have led in St. Petersburg, Florida in 1990 and 1991. Mathis was charged with multiple offenses including racketeering (both for dealing in drugs and participating in acts of violence), engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, conspiring to distribute and distributing crack cocaine, and using a telephone to commit a crime. A superseding indictment, returned on April 15, 1992, added a murder count. In November 1992 Mathis's trial was severed from that of his codefendants. His trial began in February 1994. Mathis was convicted of racketeering, engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, conspiracy, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and distribution of cocaine. He received a life sentence without parole. This appeal followed.

II. Speedy Trial Act

Mathis contests the district court's rejection of his motion, filed on March 24, 1992, to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. Mathis argues that much of the period from late November 1991, when the last codefendant was arraigned, ¹ to March 24, 1992, the date Mathis filed his speedy trial motion, counts as nonexcludable delay. As his motion was never renewed, there is no question of counting as delay any subsequent periods. See United States v. Tinson, 23 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. Wirsing, 867 F.2d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir.1989); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) ("[t]he defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion" for dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial grounds).

A defendant must be brought to trial within seventy days of his indictment or initial appearance, whichever occurs later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). However, certain delays resulting from pretrial motions and other contingencies that arise in the course of a criminal proceeding are excludable under the Act. Id. § 3161(h) & (h)(1)(F). Of importance here is the Act's ends-of-justice exclusion for delay "resulting from a continuance granted by a judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Id. § 3161(h)(8)(A). A district court's granting of an ends-of-justice continuance is reviewable for an abuse of discretion. E.g., United States v. Vasser, 916 F.2d 624, 627 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 907, 111 S.Ct. 1688, 114 L.Ed.2d 82 (1991).

Mathis had requested a continuance of the trial on November 25, 1991, and the trial was continued until January 29, 1992, making that period excludable from the seventy-day limit under the Act. See United States v. Henry, 698 F.2d 1172, 1173-1174 (11th Cir.1983). At issue here is the district court's further postponement of the trial on January 29, 1992. Mathis calls this postponement "indefinite" and says it was granted at the government's request. He denies that it amounted to an excludable ends-of-justice continuance. Mathis accuses the government of seeking delay in bad faith. According to him, the government's true motive is reflected in its request for time to obtain a superseding indictment that only differed from the original by adding a murder count against him that had already been charged as a predicate act under the racketeering count, and by requesting the death penalty. These additions were eventually abandoned just before the beginning of jury selection in February 1994. By then, several former codefendants had agreed to testify against Mathis. Mathis says that the district court should have inquired into or held a hearing on why the government had not charged him earlier with the murder count and should have made findings, instead of simply stating, as it did, that the "interests of justice" covered its decision to postpone trial.

The transcript of the January 29th conference reveals that the government was not the primary force behind the continuance. It made no specific request for one. Rather, the court granted a continuance sua sponte--as the Act permits, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). It also seems clear that neither side was ready for trial then, or so the court could reasonably surmise. At the January 29th conference, the district judge asked the government about the status of the case and what she could anticipate, to which the government responded that it was preparing a superseding indictment and awaiting permission from the Department of Justice to seek the death penalty. Mathis then complained of the government's failure to deliver promised discovery materials to the defense. The district court told the government to provide the discovery materials by February 18 and to report back on the status of the superseding indictment and death penalty within a few weeks as well, since those matters could require additional counsel and preparation time for Mathis. With the attorneys' assistance, the court then assessed the trial time that would be needed and tried to establish a trial date when everyone, including the court, would be available. The judge settled on January 1993 and advised counsel that the date would be moved up if it became possible to do so. The court added that another status conference would be held in the "not-too-distant future," after the superseding indictment was issued. In response to defendant's objection to any continuance of trial, the court stated that "[t]he interest of justice under 3161 certainly does protect us[.]"

The last quoted remark reflects the court's intention, on its own motion, to continue the case under authority of section 3161(h)(8)(A). The court, it is true, did not adhere to the Act's requirement to "set[ ] forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The reasons, however, are evident from the record, and we have held that a district court "need not enunciate its findings when it grants the continuance so long as there is sufficient evidence in the record indicating that it considered the factors identified in the statute when it granted the continuance." Vasser, 916 F.2d at 627. The factors the statute calls upon the court to consider include:

(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by this section.

(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B). "[G]eneral congestion of the court's calendar" is not a factor that operates to exclude delay resulting from such a continuance. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(C).

The transcript of the January 29th conference indicates that the court sufficiently took into account the relevant factors identified in section 3161(h)(8)(B), supra. See United States v. McKay, 30 F.3d 1418, 1420 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 323, 133 L.Ed.2d 224 (1995); see also United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir.1996) ("Courts need not necessarily expressly conduct a balancing or use particular language" if it is " 'clear from the record that the trial court struck the proper balance when it granted the continuance.' ") (citations omitted), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 25, 1996) (No. 95-9420). The court expressed concern with scheduling adequate preparation and trial time for this complex narcotics case involving multiple defendants. It set February 18 as the date for the handing over of discovery materials to defense counsel so that counsel would have time to review them with his client. Cf. United States v. Burke, 673 F.Supp. 1574, 1578 (N.D.Ga.1986) (need for a continuance was "patently obvious" in light of lengthy indictment "naming 12 defendants in 36 counts alleging numerous conspiracies to import massive quantities of narcotics, and to launder large sums of money, of the 225 pretrial motions filed, and of the scope of discovery required"), aff'd, 856 F.2d 1492 (...