U.S. v. Mathurin

• Decision Date: 27 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-4576.,07-4576.
• Citation: 561 F.3d 170
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Domiquite MATHURIN, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

561 F.3d 170

UNITED STATES of America v. Domiquite MATHURIN, Appellant.

No. 07-4576.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued December 9, 2008.

Filed: March 27, 2009.

Jesse A. Gessin (Argued), Office of Federal Public Defender, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, VI, Thurston T. McKelvin, Office of Federal Public Defender, Christiansted, VI, for Appellant.

Delia L. Smith (Argued), Office of United States Attorney, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, VI, for Appellee.

Before: FISHER, JORDAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

Domiquite Mathurin was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, while aiding and abetting his co-defendant, Francisco Perez-Polanco, and unlawfully using cellular phones to facilitate possession with intent to distribute cocaine. On appeal, he contends that the District Court committed reversible error in denying in part his motion to suppress cocaine discovered during a stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. Specifically, Mathurin argues that the law enforcement officers lacked reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment, as needed for a valid investigatory stop of the vehicle in which he was traveling, because the facts the officers relied upon, under the totality of the circumstances, failed to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers. Because we conclude that the officers possessed sufficient information to give rise to a reasonable suspicion, we will affirm Mathurin's conviction.

I.

A. Factual History

At approximately 11:00 a.m. on June 15, 2006, Hillary Hodge, Jr. ("Agent Hodge"), the resident agent in charge for the United States Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") Office of Investigations, received a call from a DHS Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") aircraft, alerting him that a "suspicious vessel" had departed Culebra, Puerto Rico and was heading for Crown Bay Marina ("Marina") in St. Thomas, United States Virgin Islands. CBP described the boat as suspicious because "it was a yolla-type vessel, low to the water line, painted probably blue in color, two outboard engines, no appearance of any recreational use ..., and with only a single occupant on board."

Agent Hodge directed two agents in his local ICE office, Special Agent Michael Aguilar ("Agent Aguilar") and Task Force Agent Shawn Querrard, to go to the Marina to look for the vessel, and then contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") resident agent in charge in St. Thomas to seek assistance in locating the boat and person on board. The ICE agents located the boat matching the tipster's description docked in a slip at the Marina and maintained surveillance on it. CBP Inspector Richard Peak joined them shortly thereafter. The agents questioned Marina workers and learned that a man named Francisco Perez-Polanco¹ had arrived in the boat, checked into the Marina that day, rented the slip until midnight that evening for approximately $43 or $45, requested a taxi to the nearest hotel, and carried no luggage.

The agents called local area hotels and located Perez-Polanco at the Island Beachcomber Hotel ("Hotel"). After serving the Hotel with a DEA administrative subpoena, the agents further learned that Perez-Polanco paid approximately $116 for the room in cash, checked in that day, planned to check out the following day, and occupied room 207. The agents researched Perez-Polanco's criminal record and found that he was arrested in Puerto Rico on April 26, 2004, for possession of approximately six kilograms of cocaine. In September 2004, he was "detained in the seizure of approximately $260,000," and was also arrested in April 2005 for aggravated assault.

The agents established surveillance on the hotel room because, as Agent Aguilar later testified, Perez-Polanco was a "known drug trafficker" and they believed, based on their experience in St. Thomas, that "a drug transaction was imminent." After several hours of surveillance, the agents noticed Mathurin arrive at the Hotel around 7:30 p.m. in a green Toyota 4Runner with Dionicio Mercedes. Mathurin exited the vehicle with a light-colored plastic bag, entered Perez-Polanco's hotel room, exited it a few minutes later without the plastic bag, and left the Hotel in the 4Runner. At around 9:30 p.m., the agents observed the same 4Runner arrive at the Hotel again. Mathurin exited the vehicle carrying a dark-colored plastic bag and entered Perez-Polanco's hotel room. Mathurin exited the room alone a few minutes later without the plastic bag, and started to return to the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Perez-Polanco exited the hotel room with a small tan backpack on his back. However, before proceeding toward the parking lot, he paused to look around, then headed to the same 4Runner, leaving some distance between Mathurin and himself. Mathurin and Perez-Polanco both got into the 4Runner.

The 4Runner left the Hotel parking lot with Mercedes driving, heading in the direction of the Marina. The agents stopped the vehicle and ordered all three men out of the car. Perez-Polanco fled on foot from the rear seat of the vehicle. The officers arrested Mathurin and Mercedes, and later apprehended Perez-Polanco. The agents found a tan backpack in the back seat of the 4Runner, which contained 2.2 kilograms of a substance that tested positive for cocaine.

B. Procedural History

On July 6, 2006, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment against Mathurin and his codefendants. Count one charged Mathurin with possessing with intent to distribute 2.2 kilograms of cocaine, while aiding and abetting Perez-Polanco, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), and count three charged him with using cellular phones to facilitate possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and (d)(1). Count two charged Perez-Polanco with violating 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and (d)(1) as well.

Mathurin filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the 4Runner and the statements he made to law enforcement agents following his corresponding arrest and interrogation. The District Court held a hearing on this motion and denied Mathurin's motion to suppress the cocaine found in the 4Runner, finding that the agents had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle to "confirm or dispel their suspicion that [Perez-]Polanco was engaged in criminal activity." The agents lawfully arrested Perez-Polanco outside the 4Runner as he attempted to flee, and therefore legally discovered the cocaine in the rear seat as part of a search incident to Perez-Polanco's arrest.² The agents would have had probable cause to arrest Mathurin at that point, making the cocaine admissible against him as well.

As a result, Mathurin proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty of both counts on which he was tried. On November 20, 2007, the District Court sentenced Mathurin to 78 months' imprisonment with credit for time served. Mathurin filed this timely appeal of his conviction, challenging the District Court's denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine found in the 4Runner.

II.

The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612. We have jurisdiction over Mathurin's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 1294(3). In considering the District Court's denial of Mathurin's motion to suppress, we review the Court's underlying factual findings for clear error, and we exercise plenary review over its application of the law to those facts. United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir.2008); United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir.2002).

III.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures," and searches without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. U.S. Const. amend. IV;³ Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). However, under the exception to the warrant requirement established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court has held that "police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity `may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Further, an officer may conduct an investigatory stop of a moving vehicle if he has reasonable suspicion that its passengers are engaged in criminal activity. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226-27, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985).

Reasonable suspicion is just that: suspicion that is reasonably based on the totality of the facts and circumstances. It is a belief that has been defined as "`a particularized and objective basis' for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity." Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). "The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion ... will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion...." Id. Officers may base their reasonable suspicion on less reliable information than that needed to show probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

To assess whether reasonable suspicion existed "that the particular individual being stopped [wa]s engaged in wrongdoing," courts look to "the totality of the circumstances" from the viewpoint of law enforcement officers, which involves dealing not "with...