U.S. v. Matías-Maestres

Decision Date20 September 2010
Docket NumberCriminal No. 09-337 (FAB)
Citation738 F.Supp.2d 281
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Alex MATÍAS-MAESTRES, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
738 F.Supp.2d 281

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Alex MATÍAS-MAESTRES, Defendant.


Criminal No. 09-337 (FAB).

United States District Court,
D. Puerto Rico.


Sept. 20, 2010.

738 F.Supp.2d 282

Carmen M. Marquez-Marin, United States Attorneys Office, District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Before the Court is the motion to suppress, (Docket No. 19), filed by defendant Alex Matías-Maestres ("defendant" or "Matías") and the report and recommendation, (Docket No. 29), concerning that motion. After making an independent examination of the record in this case and considering the arguments raised in the government's objection to the report and recommendation, the Court ADOPTS the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations as the opinion of the Court and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion to suppress.

DISCUSSION

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

The indictment in this case charges Matías with one count of possession of a

738 F.Supp.2d 283
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Docket No. 1.) On April 5, 2010, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized in the search of his person and the search of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. (Docket No. 19.) Both searches were conducted as a result of a traffic stop on July 24, 2009. Id. Defendant argues that the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, specifically that the searches were conducted without a warrant and do not fall under any of the exceptions to the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively illegal. Id. On April 5, 2010, the Court referred the motion to suppress to United States Magistrate Judge Bruce McGiverin. (Docket No. 20.) On April 9, 2010, the government opposed the motion to suppress, arguing that: (1) defendant failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 47 ("Rule 47") governing motions to suppress; and (2) the contested search of Matías's person was incident to a lawful arrest, thus making it valid despite the lack of a warrant. (Docket No. 22.)

On April 21, 2010, both parties presented evidence related to the motion to suppress at a hearing before Magistrate Judge McGiverin. ( See Docket No. 26.) On May 1, 2010, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, recommending that the motion to suppress be granted in part and denied in part. 1 (Docket No. 29.) On May 6, 2010, the government filed an objection to the report and recommendation, reiterating the arguments outlined in its opposition to the motion to suppress and voicing its disagreement with the Magistrate Judge's determination. (Docket No. 31.)

B. Factual Background

Given that no party presents any legitimate objection to the findings of fact made by the magistrate judge, the Court adopts the following factual background presented in the report and recommendation: 2

On the night of July 24, 2009, Officers Robles and Estrada were assigned to the Bayamon Traffic Division and were on preventive patrol in a marked patrol car on State Road 29. The car was equipped with a video recording system which was not operational at the time. At around 10:15 p.m., they pulled up to a red light behind a white Ford Ranger pickup truck with dark-tinted windows. Using the car's siren and speaker system, Robles instructed the driver to proceed through the intersection onto State Road 168 once the light turned green and then pull over. The driver complied and stopped in front of a church. The officers parked the patrol car in a "safety" position behind the pickup and got out. Robles went to the driver's side of the pickup, carrying an instrument to measure light transmittance through the tinted windows. Officer Estrada went to the pickup's other side, where a passenger,

738 F.Supp.2d 284
later identified as Matías, was seated. Estrada testified that he was providing support and security to Robles in accordance with standard police procedure.

Robles requested the driver's license and registration and said she had stopped him because the tint of the pickup's windows was too dark. Torres, the driver, produced the requested documents, which identified him as the owner of the pickup. Robles informed him that she was going to conduct a window tint test, showed him the window tint meter and explained its function, and said that Puerto Rico law required the window to have thirty-five percent or greater light transmittance. Robles conducted the test, and results came back at fifteen percent, meaning that the window tints were illegal. Robles told Torres the results and invited him to exit the vehicle and look at the meter to verify the results, but he declined. She told Torres he would be issued a ticket.

Robles also noticed that Torres's eyes were red and he smelled strongly of alcohol. Suspecting Torres of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), Robles read Torres the implied consent warning for DUI suspects and asked him if he understood it. He said yes and added that he felt all right and was giving his friend a ride home. Robles told Torres to get out of the vehicle. As Torres exited, Robles saw a beer bottle, its contents spilling on the driver's side floor mat. She mentioned this to Torres and told him that it was illegal to transport an open alcoholic beverage in a vehicle.

According to Robles, Puerto Rico regulations require that police wait twenty minutes before field-testing a driver for DUI, commencing at the time the officer begins the intervention. After Torres exited the vehicle and the prescribed period had elapsed, Robles administered a preliminary DUI field test for the driver's blood alcohol content ("BAC"), which showed Torres exceeded the legal limit. Robles then informed Torres that he would be taken to the Bayamon Traffic Division police station for further DUI testing since the Intoxilyzer machine used for DUI testing at the station yields printed results which can be used as evidence. Robles testified that it is standard Transit Division police practice and that a DUI suspect must be transported in handcuffs in an official police vehicle with the officer who did the intervention. Accordingly, Robles told Torres she was going to handcuff him, did so, and told him she was going to pat him down. She raised Torres's untucked shirt and observed an ammunition magazine in his pants pocket, which she seized. Continuing the patdown, she discovered and seized a loaded Glock pistol from the front of Torres's pants, near his genital area. She asked him if he had a license to possess firearms and he shook his head no.

Meanwhile, Officer Estrada was keeping an eye on Matías for security and could see the patdown of Torres from his position at the passenger side of the car. Robles told Estrada that Torres was armed and instructed Estrada to arrest Matías because Torres had no license to carry weapons. Estrada then ordered Matías out of the car and read him the Miranda warnings from a card issued by the Puerto Rico Police Department because, he testified, the weapon that had been seized from Torres was not legal. He then handcuffed Matías and told him, "I'm going to pat you down for my safety as well as yours." After handcuffing Matías, Estrada raised the back of Matías's shirt and seized a loaded black pistol he found at Matías's back. Estrada told Robles that Matías was armed. As soon as Estrada seized the weapon, he asked Matías if he was under any death threat, because both men were armed, and Matías told Estrada he had no license for the pistol and that he was on probation for murder.

738 F.Supp.2d 285

Robles put Torres in the patrol car and called for backup. The shift sergeant arrived a few minutes later. The officers told him what had happened and showed him the two guns. The group departed for the Transit Division station house sometime after 10:35 p.m. Robles transported Torres in her patrol car, the shift sergeant transported Matías in his patrol car, and Estrada drove Torres's pickup truck. It took approximately five to seven minutes to transport the two men to the station, and about thirteen or fourteen minutes elapsed between the officers' call for backup and their arrival at the station.3

II. Legal Analysis

A. Standard under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

A district court may refer, inter alia, "a motion ... to suppress evidence in a criminal case" to a magistrate judge for report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Loc. Rule 72(a). Any party adversely affected by the report and recommendation may file written objections within fourteen days of being served with the magistrate judge's report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party that files a timely objection is entitled to a de novo determination of "those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which specific objection is made." Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 389 F.Supp.2d 189, 191-92 (D.P.R.2005) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)). Failure to comply with this rule precludes further review. See Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.1992). In conducting its review, the court is free to "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(b)(1). Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir.1985); Alamo Rodriguez v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 286 F.Supp.2d 144, 146 (D.P.R.2003). Furthermore, the Court may accept those parts of the report and recommendation to which the parties do not object. See Hernandez-Mejias, 428 F.Supp.2d at 6 (citing Lacedra, 334 F.Supp.2d at 125-126).

B. Request for a De Novo Hearing

The government requests a de novo hearing "to demonstrate that the traffic violations committed by the driver of the pick up truck, were enough to support the legal detention of the vehicle that led to the legal arrest and search of both the...

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  • “lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amendment
    • United States
    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 36-03, March 2013
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