U.S. v. Maxwell

• Decision Date: 03 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. CR 01-10446-MLW.,CR 01-10446-MLW.
• Citation: 247 F.Supp.2d 25
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Peggy L. MAXWELL
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

247 F.Supp.2d 25 UNITED STATES of America
v.
Peggy L. MAXWELL No. CR 01-10446-MLW. United States District Court, D. Massachusetts. March 3, 2003.

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Adam J. Bookbinder, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

Bernard Grossberg, Bernard Grossberg, Barry S. Pollack, Donnelly, Conroy & Gelharr, LLC, Owen S. Walker, Federal Defender's Office, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WOLF, District Judge.

I. SUMMARY

On December 6, 2001, the grand jury returned a sealed indictment charging Peggy Maxwell, Eduardo McIntosh and Calvin DeAson with conspiracy and several counts of mail and wire fraud. Almost eleven months later, in response to the court's oral order of November 1, 2002, Maxwell filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. (the "STA"). The court denied Maxwell's motion in its December 24, 2002 Memorandum and Order. On February 13, 2003, Maxwell filed a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Her Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights. The government filed a response and Maxwell submitted a reply. The court heard oral

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argument on the motion on February 26, 2003. For the reasons described below, Maxwell's motion is being denied.

II. FACTS

The following statement of facts necessarily repeats many included in the December 24, 2002 Memorandum and Order, but also includes additional information relevant to the instant Motion to Dismiss.

Maxwell was indicted on December 6, 2001. She was arrested twelve days later on December 18, 2001 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Maxwell was brought to the District of Massachusetts and had her initial appearance before the Magistrate Judge on January 4, 2002. A detention hearing held on Thursday, January 10, 2002 was continued until Friday, January 11, 2002 because Maxwell did not have an attorney. The January 11, 2002 hearing was again continued as Maxwell had not yet been interviewed by Pretrial Services. The hearing resumed on Monday, January 14, 2002, and was held in conjunction with the arraignment and detention hearing of McIntosh. It is unclear whether the Magistrate Judge addressed the issue of Maxwell's detention on January 14, 2002, but she did consider the issue when the hearing continued on January 18, 2002. On January 18, 2002, Maxwell requested that the hearing be continued again so that a third party custodian could appear before the court. The third party custodian appeared in court on January 23, 2002 and testified on Maxwell's behalf. The Magistrate Judge set conditions of release including the posting of a two unsecured bonds totaling $35,000. Maxwell and her third party custodian posted their bonds that day.

On March 5, 2002, Maxwell filed a motion to sever her trial from that of the other two defendants. The government responded on March 19, 2002. DeAson was arraigned on March 6, 2002. The Magistrate Judge issued a final status report as to Maxwell on March 7, 2002. She did not issue a final status report as to McIntosh and DeAson until October 1, 2002.

The same day, I issued a notice that I would hold a change of plea hearing for McIntosh and a scheduling conference for the other two defendants on November 1, 2002. Usually, I do not schedule proceedings in a criminal case until the Magistrate Judge issues a final status report for every defendant who has made an initial appearance. This practice generally serves the efficient administration of justice. I do, however, depart from this practice in appropriate cases, particularly if a request that I take some action is directed to me.

During the November 1, 2002 status conference, I indicated that my Courtroom Deputy and the Magistrate Judge agreed that there were seventy days remaining for trial under the STA.¹ I asked counsel for Maxwell whether Maxwell was asserting that an STA violation had occurred because some of the filings indicated that there might be a dispute as to whether certain periods of time were excludable for STA purposes. Counsel for Maxwell stated that he believed that the seventy-day period had expired as to Maxwell. I, therefore, ordered Maxwell to file a motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum.

After receiving briefing on Maxwell's motion from both Maxwell and the government

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I heard oral argument on December> II, 2002. At the conclusion of the argument, I instructed the parties to be ready to plan to begin jury selection on February 25, 2003 in the event that I denied Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss. On December 18, 2002, the government filed a Motion to Reconsider Trial Date because the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the case had a conflict with a trial in the District of Rhode Island.

On December 24, 2002, I denied Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss. On January 6, 2002,1 allowed the government's Motion to Reconsider Trial Date and rescheduled the trial for March 10, 2003. That motion was allowed because "the requested two-week postponement of the February 24, 2003 trial date [was] necessary to afford the government continuity of counsel in this complex case and to provide the lead prosecutor with the time reasonably necessary to prepare this case for trial. ..." Jan. 6, 2003 Memorandum and Order at 1.

On January 6, 2003, the court also held that granting the government's request for a two-week postponement of the trial would not violate Maxwell's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Id. at 1-2. On February 13, 2003, as part of a series of pretrial motions, Maxwell for the first time claimed that the total time that it has taken to bring her case to trial violated the Sixth Amendment. As set forth below, this contention is not correct.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Applicable Standard

"That there was no violation of the STA in this case does not necessarily preclude a court from finding a violation of [Maxwell's] Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." United States v. Munoz-Amado, 182 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir.1999). However, "it would be unusual to have a case where the STA is satisfied but the Sixth Amendment guarantee is violated." United States v. Salimonu, 182 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.1999). Indeed, Maxwell has not cited such a case.²

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court established a four-part balancing test to be used in determining whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated. A court should consider: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. "None of these factors is `either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.'" United States v. Henson, 945 F.2d 430, 437 (1St. Cir.1991) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101).

The first factor, the length of the delay, was identified by the Supreme Court as:

to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay

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which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. For example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. The Supreme Court has said that "the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay `presumptively prejudicial' at least as it approaches one year." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (citations omitted).

Munoz-Amado, 182 F.3d at 61.

B. The Court Assumes that the Delay in This Case is Presumptively Prejudicial

"The speedy trial right attaches upon arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first." United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 87 (1st Cir.2001). In this case, Maxwell was indicted on December 6, 2001 and her trial will commence on March 10, 2003. The total delay is 459 days or slightly more than fifteen months.

The defendant and the government both describe United States v. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d 11 (1st Cir.1997) and Munoz-Amado, supra, as cases in which...