U.S. v. McCoy

• Decision Date: 10 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-3754,87-3754
• Citation: 848 F.2d 743
• Parties: 25 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1258 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lewis Arnold McCOY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 743

848 F.2d 743

25 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1258

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lewis Arnold McCOY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 87-3754.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 6, 1988.

Decided June 10, 1988.

Hal R. Arenstein (argued), Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.

Robert Behlen (argued), Asst. U.S. Atty., Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before MARTIN, WELLFORD and NELSON, Circuit Judges.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Lewis Arnold McCoy appeals his jury conviction for bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a). McCoy argues, among other things, that his defense was unfairly prejudiced by the admission into evidence of photographs taken at a lineup. While we believe that the district court improperly overruled McCoy's objection, we hold that this error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm.

On April 2, 1987, McCoy was indicted by a federal grand jury on three counts of bank robbery. The first count charged McCoy with the armed robbery of a bank in Middletown, Ohio on November 7, 1986. The second count charged McCoy with the unarmed robbery of the Forest Park, Ohio branch of the Central Trust Company on December 22, 1986. The third count charged him with the unarmed robbery of the same Forest Park bank on February 25, 1987.

McCoy asked the district court to conduct separate trials on each of the three counts. The court granted McCoy's motion in part and denied it in part. The district court ordered that the third count be tried separately because McCoy intended to offer an alibi defense to that charge, but the court ruled that the first and second counts were of the same or similar character and should be tried jointly. At the first trial, McCoy was acquitted of the February 1987 robbery charged in the third count. Following a subsequent trial, a jury adquitted McCoy of the November 1986 robbery charged in the first count, but the jury convicted him of the December 1986 robbery charged in the second count. McCoy now appeals that conviction.

First, McCoy claims that the district court's refusal to conduct separate trials on the first and second counts of the indictment compromised his right to a fair trial on the alleged offenses. McCoy contends that the joint trial prejudiced his defense because the jury may have viewed the evidence cumulatively, or because the jury may have improperly used evidence pertaining to one charge to infer that he was inclined to have committed the other crime. We are not persuaded.

Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a), two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment if the offenses "are of the same or similar character." Rule 14, however, authorizes the district court to order separate trials if it appears that the defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses. "A motion for severance pursuant to Rule 14 is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." United States v. Wirsing, 719 F.2d 859, 864 (6th Cir.1983). We believe the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied McCoy's motion to have the first and second counts tried separately. McCoy has failed to cite specific instances where the joint trial may have prejudiced his defense. His general allegations are clearly not sufficient to outweigh the public's interest in avoiding multiple litigation.

McCoy next claims that his rights under the fourteenth amendment were violated. He argues that the prosecuting attorney unconstitutionally exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a potential juror solely on the basis of race.

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court held that purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of a jury violates a defendant's right to equal protection. In order to establish a prima facie case, the defendant must prove three things: 1) that the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group; 2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges against members of the defendant's race; and 3) that the relevant circumstances raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. If the defendant can make out a prima facie case, the prosecutor must then present a neutral explanation for having excluded the jurors.

During voir dire, the prosecuting attorney excused a prospective juror who was black. At a sidebar conference, McCoy's attorney contested this challenge, arguing that this woman was being dismissed solely because she was a member of the same racial group as McCoy. The prosecuting attorney responded that she was being dismissed because she was unemployed.

The record substantiates the prosecuting attorney's neutral explanation. The United States exercised two peremptory challenges. The prosecution challenged a young black woman and a young white man. Both prospective jurors, though, were unemployed. McCoy was also young and unemployed, and the prosecution believed that these two individuals might improperly sympathize with McCoy. Although three white jurors who were not challenged also did not work, the prosecution could reasonably assume that they, a 63-year-old male, a 62-year-old male, and a 41-year-old married female, would not excessively sympathize with McCoy. Moreover, two blacks who were employed did serve on the jury.

McCoy also claims that he was denied a fair trial when photographs of a lineup were admitted into evidence. During the trial, the prosecuting attorney elicited testimony from several witnesses concerning a lineup. Although McCoy did not challenge the fairness of the lineup, the prosecution offered the photographs as evidence in order to show that the lineup was not improperly suggestive. McCoy argues that, because he and the other individuals were dressed in "prison garb," the photographs suggest that he was incarcerated and their admission unfairly prejudiced his defense. McCoy compares this situation to the admission of "mug" shots, a practice which "has been strongly condemned ... as effectively eliminating the presumption of innocence and replacing it with an unmistakable badge of criminality." Eberhardt v. Bordenkircher, 605 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir.1979). McCoy's attorney advanced this argument at trial, but the district court overruled his objection.

Fed.R.Evid. 403 provides that evidence, though relevant, "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury...." The advisory notes which follow this rule define "unfair prejudice" as "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."

Applying this balancing test to the facts of this case, we believe the district court erred when it overruled McCoy's objection to the admission of the lineup photographs. Such photographs are potentially prejudicial. They show the defendant and five other individuals wearing identical, institutional uniforms. Although the men look as if they could be answering a casting call for the role of a thug in a television police drama, their unhappy faces indicate that they are not there voluntarily. Moreover, clearly evident between two of the men is a sign which reads "Cincinnati Police Department," and behind them are lines which enable a viewer to estimate their relative heights. These photographs suggest that McCoy is a "bad guy" who belongs in jail. A typical juror could thereby be influenced irrationally to conclude that he is guilty of the offense charged. And this unfair prejudice is more likely where, as here, the prosecutor presented very little other tangible evidence because the visual impact of a photograph is almost certainly more significant than the impression left by oral testimony.

In contrast, this photographic evidence had no probative value. At the trial, the prosecutor claimed that the photographs were being offered to show that the lineup was not unduly suggestive. McCoy's attorney, however, argued that he had not challenged the fairness of the lineup. Therefore, the district court should have sustained McCoy's objection to the admission of the photographs. If the court were worried that McCoy's attorney would subsequently suggest that the lineup was unfair, the court could have made its ruling subject to the condition that McCoy's attorney not raise the issue with subsequent witnesses or in his closing remarks to the jury.

Had McCoy claimed that the lineup was not fair, however, the balance would have tipped in favor of admitting the photographs. In that case, admission of the photographs would have been necessary to bolster a crucial element of the prosecution's case: the eyewitness identification of the defendant. On the other side of the balance is the prejudice potentially produced by the lineup photographs. This potential prejudice is not as substantial as the prejudice caused by the admission of mug shots. "Mug shot evidence is prejudicial because it informs the jury that a defendant has a criminal record." Murray v. Superintendent, Kentucky State Penitentiary, 651 F.2d 451, 454 (6th Cir.1981). Here, the potential prejudice is less palpable because conveying the impression that the defendant may be a "bad guy" is not as...