U.S. v. McEachin

• Decision Date: 22 December 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-2512,80-2512
• Citation: 670 F.2d 1139,216 U.S.App.D.C. 320
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Tyrone McEACHIN, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1139

670 F.2d 1139

216 U.S.App.D.C. 320

UNITED STATES of America v. Tyrone McEACHIN, Appellant.

No. 80-2512.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Sept. 11, 1981.

Decided Dec. 22, 1981.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Criminal No. 80-419).

Arthur Marc Levin, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court), for appellant.

Michael D. Hays, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Charles F. C. Ruff, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and C. Madison Brewer, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before TAMM, WILKEY and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HARRY T. EDWARDS.

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Tyrone McEachin was arrested on August 21, 1980, when a police officer discovered a sawed-off shotgun during a warrantless search of McEachin's apartment. On October 24, 1980, in a bench trial before the District Court, McEachin was convicted of possessing an unregistered firearm and of possessing a firearm not identified by a serial number in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), (i) (1976). On December 5, 1980, McEachin was sentenced to a five-year prison term for each count, to be served concurrently. He appeals the District Court's denial of his motion to suppress tangible evidence (i.e., the sawed-off shotgun). His appeal raises two issues: (1) whether there was probable cause to search his apartment for the shotgun and (2) whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The District Court held a hearing on appellant's motion to suppress on October 24 1980. Officer William Oldham of the Metropolitan Police Department, the officer who searched appellant's apartment and arrested him, was the only person to testify at the suppression hearing. The basic factual chronology must, therefore, be gleaned from his testimony. See note 1 infra.

On or about August 1, 1980, Officer Oldham monitored a radio lookout for three suspects wanted in connection with an armed robbery that had occurred on that same date. One of the alleged robbers was described as carrying a sawed-off shotgun. Tr. 7-8. ¹ Sometime during the evening of August 1, a person, referred to by the parties as "S-1," ² informed Oldham that a man named Tyrone, matching the description of one of the suspects in the lookout, was one of the robbers. S-1 did not know Tyrone's last name, but he did state that Tyrone's address was 462 K Street, N.W. He also informed Officer Oldham that Tyrone kept a sawed-off shotgun in a wardrobe closet in his room. Tr. 10-15. S-1 was not a witness to the robbery, and it is not clear how he obtained his information. Tr. 15, 17, 20. Officer Oldham testified that he considered seeking a warrant after speaking to S-1 but abandoned the idea because he concluded that he had insufficient information to establish probable cause. Tr. 15-16.

Within twenty-four hours of the robbery, Officer Oldham spoke to a second source, S-2, who also stated that a man named Tyrone had been involved in the robbery and had a shotgun. He gave the same general description of Tyrone as had S-1, and he also told Officer Oldham that Tyrone lived on the south side of the 400 block of K Street, N.W. Apparently, Officer Oldham did not believe that S-2 was a witness to the robbery when he spoke to him. Furthermore, it is not clear from the record how S-2 obtained his information; according to Officer Oldham, S-2 stated only that he "had heard it." Tr. 20-21.

Approximately two weeks later, while investigating a homicide at 462 K Street, N.W., Officer Oldham examined a list of the tenants of that building and found the name Tyrone McEachin on the list. Tr. 22-23. About one week later, on August 20, 1980, Officer Oldham arrested another suspect in the robbery who provided no new information about McEachin. Tr. 23-24.

On August 21, 1980, between 2:00 p. m. and 3:00 p. m., Officer Oldham went to McEachin's apartment and spoke to him about the homicide that had occurred in McEachin's apartment building. Tr. 39. Between 3:00 p. m. and 4:00 p. m. on the same day, Officer Oldham spoke with three eyewitnesses to the robbery, S-3, S-4, and S-5, who told him that the robbery suspect who had already been arrested had played a passive role in the robbery and that McEachin had held the shotgun. They also provided McEachin's address and offered information about a third suspect in the robbery. Tr. 26-27. Apparently, these eyewitnesses referred Officer Oldham to a person standing nearby who offered no information but referred Oldham to yet another person, S-6, who was in the same general vicinity. Tr. 28-29.

At approximately 5:00 p. m. to 6:00 p. m. on August 21, Officer Oldham spoke with S-6. In their conversation, S-6 told Officer Oldham that McEachin had a sawed-off shotgun in his room and provided McEachin's address. He also stated that McEachin was nervous because the first suspect in the robbery had been arrested and that McEachin was "going to move" or "get rid of" the shotgun. Tr. 30-31. Officer Oldham testified that S-6's statements were based on first-hand knowledge. Tr. 38.

After speaking with S-6, Officer Oldham looked for two other possible sources for approximately forty-five minutes. Tr. 31. Finally, at 7:15 p. m., Officer Oldham went to appellant's apartment, explained the purpose of his visit, and requested permission to search the premises. Appellant stated that the room was not his and that he could not give the officer permission to search it. Officer Oldham nevertheless entered the room with appellant, went directly to the wardrobe, and searched it. He found the sawed-off shotgun wrapped in paper on the floor of the wardrobe. Tr. 4-5, 31-34.

The District Court ruled that Officer Oldham had probable cause for a warrant to arrest McEachin and to search his apartment at approximately 4:00 p. m. on August 21, 1980 (after speaking with S-3, S-4, and S-5). The District Court further concluded that, at approximately 6:00 p. m., when Officer Oldham learned from S-6 that appellant was about to move or get rid of the shotgun, the officer was faced with exigent circumstances which justified his warrantless entry and search. On this basis, the District Court denied appellant's motion to suppress. Tr. 47.

II. PROBABLE CAUSE

A. The General Test of Probable Cause Based on Information From Unidentified Police Informants

As a general rule, "probable cause exists when known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C.Cir.1972). In the case of a search, "(p)robable cause exists when circumstances known to a police officer are such as to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a search would reveal incriminating evidence." United States v. Hawkins, 595 F.2d 751, 752 n.2 (D.C.Cir.1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 2005, 60 L.Ed.2d 380 (1979).

In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), the Supreme Court delineated the requirements for establishing probable cause for a search warrant based on hearsay information from an unidentified police informant. An affidavit for a warrant in such a case must describe some of the underlying circumstances showing (1) the basis of the informant's information, and (2) the informant's general credibility or the reliability of the information he has provided. Id. at 114, 84 S.Ct. at 1513-14. In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), the Court stated that an informant's tip may be used to establish probable cause if it is corroborated by independent sources and if the corroborated tip is as reliable as one that meets the two-pronged Aguilar test. Id. at 415, 89 S.Ct. at 588. The same general probable cause standards also apply to warrantless searches and arrests. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 1058, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967); United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 720 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092, 97 S.Ct. 1104, 51 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); United States v. Carter, 498 F.2d 83, 85 (D.C.Cir.1974) (per curiam).

B. Application of the Aguilar-Spinelli Test in This Case: Assessing the Basis and Credibility of Information Furnished by Unidentified and Disinterested Eyewitness Sources

After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we hold that the District Court correctly found that the information available to Officer Oldham provided him with probable cause to enter and search appellant's apartment. Specifically, we conclude that the first-hand information obtained from the three eyewitnesses to the robbery (S-3, S-4 and S-5) and from S-6 gave Officer Oldham probable cause to search appellant's apartment.

We have little difficulty concluding that the information provided by these sources meets the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test. The first prong of the test is clearly satisfied because each source's information was based on direct, personal observation or first-hand knowledge. ³ See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 594 F.2d 1167, 1170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 873, 100 S.Ct. 154, 62 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979); United States v. Lee, 581 F.2d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048, 99 S.Ct. 725, 58 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); United States v. Watts, 540 F.2d 1093, 1095 (D.C.Cir.1976).

As to the credibility prong, we note that many courts have suggested that it may be inappropriate to rigidly apply this aspect of the test to information offered by disinterested eyewitnesses (as distinguished from professional informants). ⁴ While we are inclined to agree that, as a general proposition, the credibility prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test should be applied with some measure of leniency in cases involving first-hand...