U.S. v. McVicar, 89-1377
Decision Date | 08 February 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 89-1377,89-1377 |
Citation | 907 F.2d 1 |
Parties | UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Louis McVICAR, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Dennis Levandoski with whom Kettle, Carter, Levandoski, Anderson & Sharon, Portland, Me., was on brief, for defendant, appellant.
Margaret D. McGaughey, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, Me., with whom Richard S. Cohen, U.S. Atty., Augusta, Me., and Nicholas M. Gess, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, Me., were on brief, for appellee.
Before BREYER, Chief Judge, and ALDRICH and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges.
The appellant, Louis McVicar, pled guilty to bank robbery "by force and violence, or by intimidation." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a). After reading the presentence report, listening to McVicar's response, and consulting the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court found applicable the "career offender" guideline, a guideline that provides high sentences for one convicted of a third "crime of violence." See U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.1; 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(h) ( ). On April 3, 1989, the court sentenced McVicar under this guideline. McVicar appeals his sentence on the ground that neither his present bank robbery conviction, nor a previous "larceny from the person" conviction, count as "crime[s] of violence."
The short, conclusive answer to McVicar's claim in respect to his current crime is that the guidelines themselves, in commentary, list "robbery" as an example of a "crime of violence" for purposes of applying the "career offender" provision. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.2, comment (n. 2) (1989); U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.2, comment (n. 1) (1988). In so listing the offense the guidelines reasonably apply their own explicit definition of "crime of violence." Before November 1989, that definition (through a statutory cross-reference, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.2(1) (1988)) included
any ... offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person ... may be used....
18 U.S.C. Sec. 16(b); see 18 U.S.C. Secs. 3553(a)(4), 3553(a)(5) ( ). More recently, the Sentencing Commission amended the definition to include any offense ... that ... involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.2(1)(ii) (1989). Robbery fits either definition. Robbery typically involves a threat of violence. One making such a threat may carry it out. Even if the threatener is only bluffing, others in the area fear his threat, and their efforts to evade the threat, to protect themselves, to apprehend the robber, or simple panic, some or all of which, in turn, may lead the robber to react violently, mean that "substantial" or "serious" risks of "physical" force or injury are typically present.
Even if we were to go beyond the guidelines' specific list of "crimes of violence" and look at the individual facts in this case, cf. United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383, 389 (D.C.Cir.1989) ( ), we should still conclude that McVicar's crime was a "crime of violence." The presentence report says that he approached the teller window with a metallic object beneath his shirt, which the bank teller reasonably thought was a gun, and told the teller: As we have explained above, even if McVicar was bluffing, this conduct, typical of robbery, typically involves a "substantial" or "serious" risk of "physical" force or injury.
McVicar's previous Tennessee conviction for "larceny from the person" presents a somewhat closer question. If we follow the guidelines' application note instruction that was in effect at the time of McVicar's sentencing, see U.S.S.G. 4B1.2, comment (n. 1) (1988), a note that tells us (for an offense such as "larceny from the person" which the note does not list specifically) to look to McVicar's actual conduct, we should have no problem upholding the district court. That actual conduct, as specified in the presentence report's unchallenged description, consists of McVicar's having "accosted the victim, a 7-Eleven clerk at the time, and robbed him using a 'blank' pistol." Even were we to assume, favorably to McVicar, that we should follow the more recent guidelines' application note, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.2, comment (n. 2) (1989), and look at the conduct set forth in McVicar's indictment, it would make no difference. That is because the district court could reasonably assume (given a record that is silent on the subject and without objection from McVicar) that the Tennessee indictment set forth, roughly, the conduct just described, which McVicar admitted.
Finally, even if we assume, still more favorably to McVicar, that we should apply the recently amended application note and that the Tennessee indictment did no more than set forth the Tennessee statute, McVicar would still lose his argument. That is because, in our view, the Tennessee statute sets forth a "crime of violence" within the meaning of the career offender guideline. The statute explicitly says that the theft in issue is not simple larceny. The statute sets forth a serious penalty of three to ten years confinement "in the penitentiary;" and it specifies that the "theft must be from the person; it is not sufficient that the property be merely in the presence of the person from whom it is taken." Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 39-3-1106 (1988). Taking property directly from a person seems to us to run a "substantial" or "serious" risk that "physical force" or "physical injury" will follow. Traditionally,
stealing ... property from the person has been from an early period, under the English statutes, treated as a much graver and more heinous offense than ordinary or common theft,--partly by reason of the ease...
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