U.S. v. Mentz

• Decision Date: 22 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-3286,87-3286
• Citation: 840 F.2d 315
• Parties: 24 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1154 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Charles Richard MENTZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 315

840 F.2d 315

24 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1154

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Charles Richard MENTZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 87-3286.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 23, 1987.

Decided Feb. 22, 1988.

Joseph W. Gibson, argued, Hershey & Browne, Akron, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.

Thomas M. Bauer, Asst. U.S. Atty., Akron, Ohio, Carla D. Moore, argued, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before GUY, NELSON, and BOGGS, Circuit Judges.

BOGGS, Circuit Judge.

John Mentz was convicted of two counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C Sec. 2113(a)(1982). ¹ He was found guilty of robbing the Society National Bank on August 4, 1986, and the First National Bank of Ohio four days later. On appeal, Mentz raises two issues for our consideration. First, he contends that the district court's jury instruction improperly removed an essential element of the bank robbery charge from the jury's consideration. Second, he contends that he was not brought to trial within the time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 3161-74 (1982). Finding merit to Mentz's contentions, we reverse.

We proceed directly to Mentz's contentions, supplementing our discussion with those facts necessary for proper resolution of the issues.

I. JURY INSTRUCTION: FDIC INSURANCE.

A

In order to convict Mentz of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a), the government must prove "that the deposits of the financial institution robbed [were] insured by the FDIC [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] at the time of the robbery. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(f)." United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 555, 556 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1111, 106 S.Ct. 1522, 89 L.Ed.2d 920 (1986). See also United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 483 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied sub nom. Buchwald v. United States, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1772, 84 L.Ed.2d 832 (1985); United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Glidden, 688 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir.1982) ("Federally insured status is an essential element of a violation under Sec. 2113(a) and must therefore be established by the government."). In support of this statutory obligation, the government produced two witnesses. Lane Orem, Security Administrator for the First National Bank, testified that the bank's branches, including the one robbed, were federally insured. He produced the bank's FDIC certificate, dated 1985. The second witness was Richard Fisher, a security officer for the Society National Bank. He identified a letter from the FDIC, dated January 1985, certifying that the particular branch involved in the robbery was federally insured. He testified that in his eighteen years of service with the bank he was not aware of any cancellation of FDIC insurance. ²

At the close of the government's case, Mentz moved for dismissal of the charges, arguing that the evidence failed to establish that the banks were FDIC insured at the time the robberies occurred. The motion was denied. ³

In his charge to the jury, which we set out at some length, the district court stated:

Thus the government is required to prove the following essential elements for each of the three counts of the indictment.

These elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to warrant your finding of guilt in this case. They are, one, the identity of the defendant as the person who committed the crime or crimes charged in the indictment.

Two, the act or acts of taking from the person or presence of another money belonging to or in the case, custody, and control, management, or possession of the banks as charged in the indictment.

Three, the act or acts of taking such money by force or violence or by means of intimidation.

Your [sic] instructed that the First National Bank of Akron and Society National Bank are banking organizations, excuse me, institutions organized and operating under the law of the United States, and each is a bank whose deposits were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation at the time of the offenses alleged in the indictment. (emphasis added)

Mentz's counsel objected to this charge.

Mentz argues that the district court's charge improperly removed from the jury's consideration an essential element of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a), that the banks were FDIC insured on the dates the crimes occurred. While Mentz does not couch his argument in constitutional terms, we understand his main contention to be that the district court relieved the government of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the bank robbery charge. We agree.

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees to a defendant the opportunity for a jury to decide guilt or innocence. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). A necessary corollary is the right to have one's guilt determined only upon proof beyond the jury's reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). See also Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 309, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1968, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). ⁴ As the Supreme Court stated in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 313, 105 S.Ct. at 1970 (citations omitted), this right "protects the 'fundamental value determination of our society,' given voice in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Winship, 'that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.' " Accord, Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3107, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (the right "ensure[s] that only the guilty are criminally punished").

Regardless of how overwhelming the evidence may be, the Constitution delegates to the jury, not to the trial judge, the important task of deciding guilt or innocence.

[The jury's] overriding responsibility is to stand between the accused and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government that is in command of the criminal sanction. For this reason, a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict, regardless of how overwhelming the evidence may point in that direction. The trial judge is thereby barred from attempting to override or interfere with the jurors' independent judgment in a manner contrary to the interests of the accused.

United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977) (citations omitted). See also United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947).

In a criminal trial, the trial judge and the jury have well-defined roles, refined over many years of constitutional adjudication. The trial judge instructs the jury on the law applicable to the issues raised ⁵ and, in appropriate circumstances, may comment on the evidence. United States v. White Horse, 807 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1322, 1324-25 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc); 8A J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice p 30.05, at 30-40 (1987). The jury then independently determines the facts, and applies the law to those facts, in reaching its fateful decision. White Horse, 807 F.2d at 1430; Johnson, 718 F.2d at 1325. See also 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 485, at 711 (1982). However, the trial judge invades the jury's province when, instead of simply instructing on the law, he applies the law to facts he has determined. See White Horse, 807 F.2d at 1430 ("when the judge is no longer deciding the law that applies to the evidence, but rather is applying the law to the facts--facts that are determined after assessing the probative value of evidence introduced at trial--the judge has invaded the jury's province."). ⁶

There can be little doubt that a trial judge commits error of constitutional magnitude "when he instructs the jury as a matter of law that a fact essential to conviction has been established by the evidence, thus depriving the jury of the opportunity to make this finding." Id. at 1429 (citation omitted). This is tantamount to a directed verdict for the prosecution, a result that is condemned by the Constitution. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 572-73, 97 S.Ct. at 1355; United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 330 U.S. at 408, 67 S.Ct. at 782.

We now consider the district court's jury instruction, which we read in its entirety. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 315, 105 S.Ct. at 1971; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 99 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973); United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1498 (6th Cir.1986). We agree with Mentz that the trial judge invaded the jury's province by instructing that body, in clear and unequivocal language, that the banks were FDIC insured at the time the robberies occurred. His conclusive statement left no room for the jury to believe otherwise. ⁷ The judge improperly cast himself in the role of trier of fact, and directed a verdict on an essential element of the bank robbery charge. ⁸ His instructions had the effect of relieving the government of its burden of proving, beyond the jury's reasonable doubt, that the accused committed the crimes charged. See Glenn v. Dallman, 686 F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir.1982) ("The Constitutional right to a jury puts the government to the burden of proving the essential elements of the crime to the jury's satisfaction....").

It is not important that the jury might have reached a similar conclusion had it been given an opportunity to decide the issue under a correct instruction. A plea of not guilty places all issues in dispute, "even the most patent truths." United States v. Goetz, 746 F.2d 705, 708 (11th Cir.1984) (quoting Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir....