U.S. v. Miller, s. 80-3353

• Decision Date: 20 May 1981
• Docket Number: Nos. 80-3353,80-3457,80-3358,s. 80-3353
• Citation: 645 F.2d 473
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lannon E. MILLER, Travis A. Miller, Bill G. Broadway and Miller Builders& Developers, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tydes William ALLEY, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Glen D. GRAVES et al., Defendants-Appellees. , and 80-3470. . Unit A
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 473

645 F.2d 473

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lannon E. MILLER, Travis A. Miller, Bill G. Broadway and Miller Builders& Developers, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tydes William ALLEY, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Glen D. GRAVES et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 80-3353, 80-3358, 80-3457, and 80-3470.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Unit A

May 20, 1981.

Al J. Daniel, Jr., Alexander Younger, Mark H. Gallant, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Michael F. Hertz, Dept. of Justice, Appellate Staff, Civil Div., for United States.

Gordon E. Rountree, Shreveport, La., for Lannon E. Miller and Miller Builders.

Peters, Ward, Miller & Bright, Hugh T. Ward, Shreveport, La., for Travis A. Miller.

Sockrider & Bolin, James E. Bolin, Jr., Shreveport, La., for Bill G. Broadway.

Smitherman, Smitherman, Lunn, Hussey & Chastain, John B. Hussey, Shreveport, La., Joe J. Tritico, Lake Charles, La., Rose, Nash, Williamson, Carroll, Clay & Giroir, W. Dane Clay, Little Rock, Ark., for Tydes William Alley, Jr., et al.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before COLEMAN, GARZA and SAM D. JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

GARZA, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal filed by the United States under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-235. The United States filed four complaints against a number of defendants. The defendants include the owners and employees of real estate companies, construction companies and a mortgage company as well as the companies themselves. Bossier Bank and Trust Company is also a defendant in this case, but recovery is sought only for payment based upon mistake of fact rather than the False Claims Act. The present appeal is a consolidation of these four cases. The defendants below filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court granted the motions as to all defendants.

As to the developers, the basic factual situations are similar. The developers are alleged to have either conspired to submit or submitted to the Federal Housing Authority Applications for Mortgagor Approval and Commitments for Mortgage Insurance. Each application filed on behalf of the purchasers of homes contained materially false statements as to the credit worthiness and net worth of such home buyers, the amount of down payment which each home buyer would make and their past and present debts. The complaints state that the developers knew these facts to be false. On the basis of these applications, the FHA insured the mortgages in the name of the home purchasers.

Thereafter, each of the insured mortgages went into default. Claims were made by the insurance mortgagees against the government, which were paid by the latter. The United States then filed its complaints under the False Claims Act against the developers as well as a claim for recovery of money against the bank due to mistake of fact. Against the developers, the United States sought double the damages which it expended in acquiring, maintaining and preserving the properties less the actual resale amount. The United States also sought forfeiture penalties against the developers. Both such claims for relief are permissible under 31 U.S.C. § 231.

As mentioned earlier, the United States also sought recovery against Bossier Bank and Trust Company for the recovery of money which the former had paid to Bossier under mistake of fact. The United States sought only that amount which it had paid to Bossier. No action under the False Claims Act was brought against Bossier Bank.

31 U.S.C. § 231 provides as follows:

Any person not in the military or naval forces of the United States, or in the militia called into or actually employed in the service of the United States, who shall do or commit any of the acts prohibited by any of the provisions of section fifty-four hundred and thirty-eight, Title "CRIMES," shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two thousand dollars, and, in addition, double the amount of damages which the United States may have sustained by reason of the doing or committing such act, together with the costs of suit; and such forfeiture and damages shall be sued for in the same suit. ¹

The district court, in its orders dismissing the complaints, relied entirely upon two cases to support its decision: United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1977) and United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972). In Hibbs, applications were submitted to the FHA which possessed misrepresentations as to the conditions of certain residential property. The FHA insured the mortgages and subsequently paid the mortgagee when default occurred. The district court in that case awarded both the statutory forfeiture penalty and double damages to the United States. The only issue presented on appeal involved that of damages, not the forfeiture penalty. The Third Circuit held that under the Act, the United States must show an element of causation between the false statements and the loss. United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d at 341. In other words, the United States must demonstrate that the events which caused the defaults were related to the false statements in the applications. Id. The Third Circuit's reasoning was based upon the phrase in § 231 that anyone violating the Act shall pay to the United States "double the amount of damages which the United States may have sustained by reason of the doing or committing such act." (emphasis added). The Third Circuit held that the default which occurred in that case had not been related to the false statements regarding the conditions of certain residential property.

In Aerodex, the Fifth Circuit held, inter alia, that the language of the False Claims Act does not include a claim by the United States for consequential damages which were caused by the delivery of defective goods rather than the submission of a false voucher. United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d at 1011.

This court finds no error in the decisions in Hibbs and Aerodex. The language of the statute clearly requires that before the United States may recover double damages, it must demonstrate the element of causation between the false statements and the loss. In the context of a federal housing case, the United States must show that the false statements in the application were the cause of subsequent defaults.

On this appeal, we are not dealing with a well developed record. The litigation in the district court had proceeded no further than the filing of Motions to Dismiss the Complaints pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 992 (5th Cir. 1981). Taking the complaint as true, which we are required to do, id. at 988, it is clear that it does present a set of facts which could entitle the United States to relief. False statements regarding residential property may not reasonably be a cause for subsequent defaults of mortgagors, as was the case in Hibbs. ² Nonetheless, false statements regarding the ability of purchasers to afford housing could very well be the major factor for subsequent defaults. ³ This being the case, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint against the developers since the government has clearly alleged the necessary causation factor. ⁴

One of the developers, Lannon E. Miller, contends that he should be dismissed regardless of this court's holding on the causation factor. He contends that the complaint does not accuse him of making false statements nor that any damages are sought against him. For these reasons, he contends that he should be dismissed for failure to state a claim against him. This point is completely without merit.

Lannon Miller is listed as a defendant in the complaint. Lannon Miller is also listed as the president and principal owner of Miller Builders & Developers, Inc. (MBD). MBD is specifically accused of filing false statements. Lannon Miller is specifically accused of conspiring to defraud the United States based upon the false claims, and damages are sought against all the defendants, including Lannon Miller, jointly and severally. We do not hold today that Lannon Miller is liable in this action. We only hold that the complaint is...