U.S. v. Miller
Decision Date | 04 November 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 83-1162,83-1162 |
Citation | 720 F.2d 227 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Stephen MILLER, Defendant, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
William A. Brown, Boston, Mass., with whom Brown & Prince, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for defendant, appellant.
Dennis J. Kelly, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., with whom William F. Weld, U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellee.
Before BOWNES, Circuit Judge, ALDRICH and COWEN, * Senior Circuit Judges.
On this appeal from a conviction for possessing and passing counterfeit money, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 472 and 473, the dramatis personae are the following: defendant appellant Miller, a supplier of counterfeit bills; co-defendant Albert, a security guard at Blanchard's Liquor Corp. who pleaded; Holguin, a Blanchard cashier, and Coppede, a Secret Service agent. In Act I defendant gave Albert bills; he, in turn, gave them to Holguin, and she, for a commission, exchanged them in the till for lawful money. In Act II Holguin, on being apprehended by Coppede, confessed and agreed to cooperate. She was instructed to call Albert, with her line attached to a tape recorder. In Act III, Holguin called Albert and asked for more bills and he told her to hold on and he would call defendant. Albert's phone had a connecting, or conference, device, which could join parties at three separate stations. While Holguin was holding, Albert called defendant, said he had Holguin "on the other line," to which defendant said "OK," and defendant and Albert thereupon arranged for a drop. This conversation came through on Holguin's line, and was duly recorded.
In moving to suppress, defendant argued that the warrantless recording violated his reasonable expectations of privacy, Katz v. United States, 1967, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, under the fourth amendment as well as his rights under the federal eavesdropping control law, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2511, 2515. 1 We start with the proposition that listening in to a telephone conversation on an extension, with the consent of one party, does not violate the rights of the other party under the fourth amendment. United States v. White, 1971, 401 U.S. 745, 753, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 1126-27, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (plurality opinion), On Lee v. United States, 1952, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270; United States v. Gladney, 1 Cir., 1977, 563 F.2d 491, 493. See also Rathbun v. United States, 1957, 355 U.S. 107, 111, 78 S.Ct. 161, 164, 2 L.Ed.2d 134, where, when construing 47 U.S.C. Sec. 605, the Court stated: Nor, equally, when one is lawfully listening to a conversation, is there a violation merely because, unknown to the other party, he records it. Lopez v. United States, 1963, 373 U.S. 427, 439, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 1388, 10 L.Ed.2d 462.
Defendant argues that neither party consented with respect to the defendant-Albert conversation. This overlooks the fact that Albert, by operating his conference device, consented to Holguin's being connected on, in effect, an extension. In discussing the crime with Albert, defendant impliedly accepted the risk that his conversation might be overheard on an extension and/or recorded. White, ante, 401 U.S., at 751-52, 91 S.Ct. at 1126; Rathbun, ante. It would be extraordinarily technical to hold his implied acceptance of the risk of a recording came to a stop merely because Holguin was not, strictly, on an extension, but on another line. As between such artificiality and carrying over the conversation to Holguin as a windfall at defendant's--and Albert's--inadvertent expense, we regard the latter as the more sensible.
The anti-eavesdropping statute was directed against the use of sophisticated electronic equipment, cf. White, ante, 401 U.S. at 756-57, 91 S.Ct. at 1128-29 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and not against long accepted use of rudimentary material. Under the statutory definitions, 3 Holguin's use of the phone receiver to overhear the conversation did not constitute a proscribed "interception." The acquisition being lawful, the recording was not a separate actionable "intercept." Lopez, ante; United States v. Harpel, 10 Cir., 1974, ...
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