U.S. v. Miller Bros. Const. Co.

Decision Date13 November 1974
Docket NumberNo. 74-1028,74-1028
Citation505 F.2d 1031
Parties74-2 USTC P 9817 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MILLER BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al., Defendants, Rapidways, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Robert L. Boyce, Jr., Kansas City, Kan. (Howard Washburn, Kansas City, Kan., on the brief), for defendant-appellant.

Daniel F. Ross, Washington, D.C. (Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Meyer Rothwacks, Michael L. Paup, Dept. of Justice, Robert J. Roth, U.S. Atty., James A. Pusateri, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LEWIS and HILL, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, * District judge.

HILL, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas ordering foreclosure of federal tax liens against certain real property, the ownership of which is in dispute.

The facts leading up to this appeal are complex and may be summarized as follows. Anthony Sielman owned certain land in Kansas City, Kansas. In 1952, Wilmer Miller (taxpayer) purchased this land but directed Sielman to deed it to Edward and Nellie Schmidt. The Schmidts, taxpayer's brother-in-law and sister-in-law, had no interest in the land but held it solely as taxpayer's nominee.

Taxpayer, in 1959, negotiated a mortgage of the land to Anchor Savings & Loan Company (Anchor) as security for a note evidencing the loan. The mortgage was arranged by taxpayer for his benefit and the Schmidts executed the mortgage at his request.

During this period of time taxpayer and his brother were partners in Miller Brothers Construction Company (Miller Brothers). The partnership failed to pay certain income and FICA taxes in 1959. Deficiencies were assessed against it and notice of tax liens was filed in 1959 and 1960.

Taxpayer became delinquent in his payments to Anchor and refinanced the loan through Investments, Inc. (Investments) in 1961. Investments paid off the delinquent note held by Anchor, took title to the land from the Schmidts, and gave taxpayer an option to purchase. Taxpayer again refinanced the loan in 1962 through Union Mortgage & Investment Company (Union). Union paid off Investments, took title to the land, and gave taxpayer an option to purchase. Sometime before May, 1963, Miller Brothers, already burdened with tax problems, encountered several financial setbacks culminating in foreclosure of its Small Business Administration loan and liquidation.

In May, 1963, taxpayer organized Fairfax Hauling, Inc. (Fairfax) to take over a hauling contract from the defunct Miller Brothers. Taxpayer was not an officer, director or stockholder in Fairfax, but he nevertheless exercised managerial control over the corporation.

At around the same time, taxpayer contacted Wilford Sublett, an officer of Rapidways, Inc. (Rapidways), a leasing corporation. Rapidways had previously leased trucks and heavy equipment to Miller Brothers and taxpayer wanted it to do the same for Fairfax. After mesne negotiations it was decided that Rapidways would lease trucks and equipment to Fairfax and loan it $5,000 for operating capital. Rapidways was to acquire legal title to the land in question and lease it to Fairfax with an option to purchase.

On June 7, 1963, Rapidways paid Union approximately $10,400, which amount Union used to close out taxpayer's option contract. Taxpayer was present at the closing and directed Union to place legal title in Rapidways' name. That same day Rapidways and Fairfax entered into a rental and option to purchase agreement which provided, inter alia, that Fairfax would receive legal title to the land after eleven months if it made all lease rental payments and paid Rapidways $10,400 plus interest.

Fairfax never used the land. It encountered financial problems after a few months of operation and became unable to fulfill its agreement with Rapidways. Rapidways took possession of the leased equipment, but not of the land. Although it pays taxes and insurance on the land, it has never used it or tried to sell it.

Since its purchase in 1952, taxpayer has exercised the rights of ownership over the land. He built improvements on it, occasionally rented the house to others, and his family used the land for recreation purposes. Taxpayer began using the land as a permanent residence in 1963.

On May 26, 1965, the government filed this suit against Miller Brothers and taxpayer. 1 The complaint stated, inter alia, that Miller Brothers was defunct and without assets and requested that taxpayer's real and personal property be sold to satisfy the tax liens. An amended complaint was filed on October 26, 1969, adding Rapidways as a defendant and the land to which it held legal title as property subject to the tax liens. The government claimed taxpayer was the equitable owner of the land and that Rapidways' interest therein was subject and inferior to the tax liens. Rapidways answered and asserted it acquired the land free and clear of any federal tax liens

On May 5, 1971, taxpayer died. On November 23, 1971, Rapidways filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds the government had failed to move for substitution of taxpayer's representative as a party to the action within 90 days after suggestion of death, as required by Rule 25 F.R.Civ.P. The district court denied the motion because a formal suggestion of taxpayer's death had not been made. Rapidways filed a formal suggestion of death on March 13, 1973.

The government, on June 5, 1972, successfully moved for a fifteen day extension of time to file its Rule 25 motion for substitution for the reason that a hearing for the appointment of taxpayer's administrator was not to be held until June 13, 1972. On June 9, 1972, Rapidways again filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds the government had failed to comply with Rule 25. Thereafter, on June 26, 1972, the government moved to substitute taxpayer's administrator as a party to the action. Following a hearing, the district court denied Rapidways' motion and granted the government's motion.

Subsequent to trial the district court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, including the following: (1) the conveyances in issue were methods of loaning taxpayer money and taking title to the land as a security interest; (2) taxpayer possessed the equitable ownership of the land; (3) Rapidways was aware of taxpayer's tax problems and of his ownership in the land, and took title thereto as security for the cash advance and equipment lease; (4) Rapidways took legal title to the land subject to the tax liens. Accordingly, the district court ordered the tax liens foreclosed on the land. Rapidways' subsequent motions for a new trial and for amendment or alteration of the judgment were denied, and it appeals.

Rapidways first contends its February 23, 1972, motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 25, F.R.Civ.P., should have been sustained. 2 Specifically, it contends a formal suggestion of death was not necessary for the Rule's 90 day time limitation to take effect because the government was fully aware of taxpayer's death.

Rule 25 provides that suggestion of death on the record is made by service of a statement of the fact of the death on the parties as provided in Rule 5, F.R.Civ.P. 3 3B Moore, Federal Practice P25.06(2.-1) and (3) (2nd ed. 1974). The 90 day time limitation does not commence until this has been done. Id. Since Rapidways failed to comply with the service and filing requirements of Rule 5, there was no suggestion of death on the record and the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss.

Rapidways next contends the district court abused its discretion in granting the government an extension of time to file a motion for substitution because the government, aware of taxpayer's death in 1971 delayed initiation of probate proceedings to appoint an administrator for his estate until May, 1972. We disagree. A discretionary extension should be liberally granted absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the movant for substitution or undue prejudice to other parties to the action. See Rule 6, F.R.Civ.P.; 3B Moore, Federal Practice P25.06(3) (2nd ed. 1974). We find no bad faith attributable to the government and Rapidways has not shown that it was unduly prejudiced.

Rapidways next contends the district court was required to determine the respective rights of the parties to any surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale. Although a court must determine the merits of all claims to the property subjected to tax liability, 4 none of the parties to the instant action made any claims to surplus proceeds. The matter was never raised, the sole issue being whether, in view of the competing claims of the government and Rapidways, the property was subject to tax liability. Since parties are entitled only to a determination of issues raised before the court, 5 the district court committed no error in refraining to rule on the matter.

Relying upon First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Liebert, 195 Kan. 100, 403 P.2d 183 (1965), and Kan.Stat.Ann. 60-2405, 6 Rapidways argues the government's judgment must be revived against taxpayer's representative before the tax liens can be foreclosed. We disagree. Liebert concerns revival of a dormant judgment against a deceased debtor's personal representative and 60-2405 concerns substitution of a deceased or incompetent judgment holder's personal representative as a successor in interest.

In the instant case taxpayer died during pendency of the action, not after rendition of a judgment, and the administrator of his estate was substituted as a party pursuant to Rule 25. Since a substituted party steps into the same position as the original party there is a continuance of the original action and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
65 cases
  • In re Krause
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Tenth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Kansas
    • 21 de abril de 2008
    ...is fraudulent since those elements were similar to determining whether a property holder is a nominee under federal law). 162. 505 F.2d 1031, 1036 (10th Cir.1974). See Dkt. 407, pp. 163. 505 F.2d at 1036. 164. This Court's own research of Kansas law would support this conclusion. See Robert......
  • Schell v. OXY USA Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 9 de fevereiro de 2016
    ...See generally Fed. R.App. P. 43 (providing for substitution of parties after notice of appeal is filed); United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1036 (10th Cir.1974) ("Since a substituted party steps into the same position as the original party there is a continuance of th......
  • Mobil Oil Corp. v. Lefkowitz
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 29 de junho de 1977
    ...after a formal "statement of the fact of death" (Form 30) is filed under Rule 25(a), Fed.R. Civ.P. United States v. Miller Brothers Construction Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1034 (10th Cir. 1974); Dolgow v. Anderson, 45 F.R.D. 470, 471 (E.D.N.Y.1968). If defendant wanted to move for dismissal on the......
  • Schell v. Oxy USA Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 14 de dezembro de 2015
    ...See generally Fed. R.App. P. 43 (providing for substitution of parties after notice of appeal is filed); United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1036 (10th Cir.1974) ("Since a substituted party steps into the same position as the original party there is a continuance of th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT