U.S. v. Mingo
Decision Date | 14 August 2003 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 02-1711. |
Citation | 340 F.3d 112 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Tyrone MINGO, Defendant-Appellant, Jerard Smalls, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Alexander E. Eisemann, Katonah, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
Daniel S. Ruzumna, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York (James B. Comey, United States Attorney, Meir Feder, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), New York, NY, for Appellee.
Before: JACOBS, F.I. PARKER,* and SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Tyrone Mingo appeals from a final judgment of conviction entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Sidney H. Stein, Judge), following his guilty plea to one count of conspiring to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2. His sentence of imprisonment was enhanced under § 2F1.1(b)(8)(B) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (2000) ("U.S.S.G." or the "Guidelines") based on findings that his offense "affected a financial institution," and that he "derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from the offense."1 Id.
Mingo arranged for nominees — often using stolen identities — to obtain mortgage loans that were used to purchase real properties. Mingo concedes that he controlled these real properties, and that their value, when added to the cash proceeds he obtained from his offense, exceeds one million dollars. He argues, however, that the full value of these real properties should not be considered "gross receipts from [his] offense" for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(8)(B), because the victim banks that extended the loans secured mortgages on the properties, which reduced Mingo's equity and afforded the banks a cushion against any full loss. Mingo claims that the value of the liens therefore should be subtracted from the value of the properties for purposes of calculating his gross receipts from the fraudulent scheme.
The application notes accompanying § 2F1.1 broadly define "gross receipts from the offense" to include "all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, which is obtained directly or indirectly as a result of such offense." U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 comt. n. 21 (2000) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(4)); see also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-43, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) ( ). It is undisputed that Mingo obtained use of the real properties as a result of his offense. Therefore, the district court properly looked not only at Mingo's cash receipts but to the value of these real properties in determining whether his "gross receipts from the offense" exceeded one million dollars for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(8)(B). See United States v. Bennett, 252 F.3d 559, 566 (2d Cir.2001) .
The Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990) ("CCA"), directed the Sentencing Commission to increase sentences for defendants whose offenses affected financial institutions where "the defendant derive[d] more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from the offense." CCA § 2507(a) (emphasis added). This language tracks that found in U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(8)(B). Mingo argues that, whatever the language of the CCA and the resulting Guidelines provision, the legislative history of the CCA reflects congressional intent that the enhancement apply only in the prosecution of individuals who netted more than one million dollars in criminally obtained proceeds.
Where, as here, the language of the Guidelines provision is plain, the plain language controls. See United States v. SKW Metals & Alloys, Inc., 195 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Lewis, 93 F.3d 1075, 1080 (2d Cir.1996)); see also United States v. Demerritt, 196 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir.1999) ; United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 346 (2d Cir.1996) ...
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