U.S. v. Miranda-Santiago

• Citation: 96 F.3d 517
• Decision Date: 02 April 1996
• Docket Number: D,Nos. 95-1301,MIRANDA-SANTIAG,95-1302 and 95-1304,RIVERA-D,PACHECO-RIJOS,s. 95-1301
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Juan Joseefendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Carmen, a/k/a Fina, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. IsmaeleCELIS, a/k/a Macho, Defendant-Appellant. . Heard
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Page 517

96 F.3d 517

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Juan Jose MIRANDA-SANTIAGO, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Carmen PACHECO-RIJOS, a/k/a Fina, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Ismael RIVERA-DeCELIS, a/k/a Macho, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 95-1301, 95-1302 and 95-1304.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard April 2, 1996.

Decided Sept. 19, 1996.

Edward E. Parson, Washington, DC by Appointment of the Court, on brief for appellant Juan Jose Miranda-Santiago.

Norberto Coln by Appointment of the Court, for appellant Carmen Pacheco-Rijos.

Harry R. Segarra, Puerto Neuvo, PR by Appointment of the Court, for appellant Ismael Rivera-DeCelis.

Miguel A. Pereira, Assistant United States Attorney, Hato Rey, PR, with whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, were on brief, for appellee.

Before SELYA and CYR, Circuit Judges, and GERTNER, ^* District Judge.

GERTNER, District Judge.

In this consolidated appeal, we consider challenges to the sentences of Ismael Rivera-DeCelis, Carmen Pacheco-Rijos and Juan Jose Miranda-Santiago. In September of 1994, these defendant-appellants, along with twenty-one co-defendants, pled guilty to participation in a drug distribution conspiracy spanning over a year and involving trafficking in crack cocaine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, as well as using or brandishing firearms, and engaging in carjacking to facilitate their drug trade.

The defendants were arraigned in two groups, pled guilty before the same judge and were sentenced before him by early 1995.

Ismael Rivera-DeCelis contends that his guilty plea was entered in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that the district judge erred in calculating his sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. He did not press the first point below. We find that the plea colloquy in his case conformed with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 and that the sentence calculations with respect to him were not in error. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

Carmen Pacheco-Rijos challenges her sentence, arguing that the district court erred in imposing the mandatory minimum required for her offense. Her attack is based on her claim that she met the conditions set forth in the "safety valve provision" of the Sentencing Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. We find the record inadequate to justify the district court's decision not to grant relief. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand the case for the purpose of allowing the district court to revisit this issue and to clarify the record by filing supplemental findings. In the event that the court finds its initial calculation in error, it should so identify and return, as well, to the issue of other adjustments, if appropriate, under the Guidelines.

Juan Jose Miranda-Santiago also attacks his sentence, arguing that the sentencing court erred, as a matter of law, by failing to grant a two-level downward adjustment based on a finding that the defendant was a "minor participant" in the criminal activity. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). We find inadequate support in the record for the court's conclusion that a downward adjustment was inappropriate. We vacate this sentence and remand the case to the district court for the purpose of having the court file supplemental findings with respect to appellant Miranda-Santiago's role in the offense. In the event that the court finds its computation in error, it should include such a determination in its findings.

I. BACKGROUND

We begin with an overview of events involving the three appellants. ¹

On March 9, 1994 a grand jury returned an indictment against 19 defendants, including appellants Pacheco-Rijos and Miranda-Santiago, charging them with conspiracy to distribute drugs, and with using firearms in connection with a drug offense. Apparently, the conspirators hid drug substances, firearms and proceeds of drug sales in specific locations, guarded by members of the conspiracy. Members of the conspiracy were also encouraged to commit--and committed--"carjacking" offenses; armed, they would steal cars and then use the vehicles to transport drugs back to their storage locations.

The indictment and the PSRs adopted by the appellants and the district court detailed a criminal enterprise with a strongly hierarchical structure; some of the accused controlled the operation, while others served as drug runners and bodyguards. A superseding indictment, returned on May 12, 1994, named five additional defendants, including appellant Rivera-DeCelis.

When arraigned, each defendant entered a plea of not guilty. In September of 1994, Rivera-DeCelis, Pacheco-Rijos and Miranda-Santiago, among others, offered to change their pleas with respect to certain charges. After each plea colloquy, conducted individually, the court accepted the defendants' pleas. Each was separately sentenced.

II. DISCUSSION

We consider the facts with respect to each defendant and his or her legal challenges in turn.

A. Ismael Rivera-DeCelis

1. Facts

Appellant Rivera-DeCelis was alleged to have been involved in several phases of the drug conspiracy detailed in the superseding indictment. He was charged in Count One with distributing not less than fifty grams of cocaine base, an amount of not less than five kilograms of cocaine, an amount of not less than one kilogram of heroin, and some amount of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846. Counts Three, Four and Five charged him with possessing and brandishing various firearms in connection with his drug trafficking, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).

After an initial plea of not guilty, on September 8, 1994, Rivera-DeCelis offered to change his plea to guilty to Count One's charge that he acted in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and Count Three's charge that he acted in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The plea agreement was entered into under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(c). ² It provided that the defendant would be held accountable at sentencing for the distribution of no less than 15 but no more than 50 kilograms of cocaine, resulting in a base offense level of 34. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3). The parties also agreed that the defendant was entitled to a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)(1) & (2), reducing his offense level to 31. The parties further defined the term of imprisonment: In light of the ten year mandatory minimum sentence facing Rivera-DeCelis under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), and a criminal history category of III, they stipulated to a 139 month term of confinement on Count One to be followed by a 60 month term on Count Three. ³

During the plea colloquy, the district judge directly addressed Rivera-DeCelis. He explained each charge, detailing, among other things, the time frame of the conspiracy in which the defendant allegedly was involved (roughly from January of 1993 through March of 1994), the elements of the offenses and the burden the government would have if it tried to prove its case. ⁴ He also explained to the defendant the sentences he faced and the consequences of his plea, inquired about coercion and made sure the defendant understood the particular strictures of a plea entered into under Rule 11(e)(1)(c). The defendant agreed to the facts presented in the indictment, without asserting that there were any temporal limits to his personal involvement in the conspiracy.

Turning to the factual basis of the charges, the judge asked Rivera-DeCelis whether the defendant was "recognizing [his guilt] ... for the drug conspiracy participation and also for the weapons or firearms count," and whether he acknowledged the punishment he could face. Rivera-DeCelis answered in the affirmative to both questions. ⁵

At sentencing, the defendant challenged the drug amount attributed to him in the PSR. Notwithstanding his earlier admissions, Rivera-DeCelis asserted that he was only involved in the conspiracy for three months and that the amount of cocaine reflected in the plea agreement was greater than the amount he could reasonably have foreseen would have been part of the conspiracy during his membership in it. The government cast doubt on the short duration of Rivera-DeCelis' involvement, noting that he was pictured holding a gun and serving as a bodyguard for one of the conspiracy's leaders. Logically, the prosecutor argued, such a responsibility would not devolve to a new and marginal member of the organization. In any event, even within a 90 day period, the government contended, the daily quantities of drugs sold as part of the conspiracy would result in a drug offense level of over 34.

The district judge did not accept the defendant's characterization of his involvement and rejected his challenge. The judge noted that the benefits of this plea agreement to the defendant were substantial, since, for instance, no amount of crack cocaine was attributed to the defendant, a drug "which all of them were dealing ... without a doubt." Accordingly, the court adopted a base offense level of 34 and granted the defendant a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). Based on a criminal history category of III, Rivera-DeCelis was sentenced on the drug charge to a prison term of 139 months, at the lower end of the guideline range, ⁶ to be followed by a term of 60 months on the firearms charge. The remaining charges against Rivera-DeCelis were dismissed.

2. Legal Analysis

a. Challenge to the Guilty Plea

Although he never moved to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing, Rivera-DeCelis now challenges its validity. ⁷ He claims that his plea was not voluntary, because the district court failed to offer an adequate explanation of the charges against him or to determine whether he understood the consequences of his plea.

We do not agree. On the record before us, we find no error.

1. Legal Standards

A...