U.S. v. Molina-Tarazon, 00-50171.

Decision Date29 January 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-50171.,00-50171.
Citation279 F.3d 709
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose MOLINA-TARAZON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Shaun Khojayan, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, California, argued the cause and submitted a brief for the appellant.

Brian M. Pearce, Assistant U.S. Attorney (on the brief), Patrick K. O'Toole, United States Attorney (argued), U.S. Attorney's Office, San Diego, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California; Barry T. Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-99-02764-BTM.

Before: D.W. NELSON, BRUNETTI and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges.

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge.

Looking for contraband, customs agents removed and dismantled Jose Molina-Tarazon's fuel tank. We consider whether this procedure is a "routine" border search for which no suspicion whatsoever is required.

I

At approximately 3:30 one early morning, Molina entered the United States from Mexico driving a pickup truck. Molina was directed to secondary, where Customs Inspector Kevin Brown ordered a narcotics-trained dog to sniff the truck. When the dog failed to alert, Brown inspected the truck's undercarriage with an autocreeper.1 Brown then turned his attention on the gas tank.

Brown first tried to look into the tank with a fiberoptic scope,2 but was stopped by an anti-siphoning valve.3 He then summoned an off-site contracting mechanic, who arrived fifteen or twenty minutes later. The mechanic hoisted the truck onto a lift and removed several bolts and straps that connected the tank to the truck, disengaging electrical connections and hoses in the process. The mechanic then removed the sensing unit, revealing thirty-one packages of marijuana inside the tank.

Charged with violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 951 and 960, Molina challenged the search on the grounds that the government lacked reasonable suspicion. The government argued that it needed no suspicion because the search was routine. The district court held that, even if the search was not routine, the officers had reasonable suspicion based on unnatural mud patterns they observed during their visual inspections of the gas tank. Molina entered a conditional guilty plea and now appeals the district court's suppression ruling.

II

While the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches without probable cause, it is subject to a few narrow and well-delineated exceptions. One such exception is the border search. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Authorized by the same Congress that proposed the Fourth Amendment, the border search has a long history of judicial and public acceptance. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.5(a), at 531, 535 (3d ed.1996).4 As the Supreme Court has observed, "[b]order searches ... [are] considered to be `reasonable' by the single fact that the person or item in question ha[s] entered into our country from outside." United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977). Pursuant to this exception, routine searches of persons and their effects entering the country may be conducted without any suspicion whatsoever. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-38, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985).

But border searches are not exempt from the irreducible constitutional requirement of reasonableness. The border search exception therefore authorizes only routine searches; it does not authorize any kind of search in any manner whatsoever. In order to conduct a search that goes beyond the routine, an inspector must have a reasonable suspicion that the person to be searched may be carrying contraband. United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61 (9th Cir.1994).

While we have never defined the limits of a routine search, we have observed that the critical factor is the degree of intrusiveness it poses. Id. at 61. This is consistent with the approach of several other circuits, which have held that the distinction between "routine" and "nonroutine" turns on the level of intrusiveness. See, e.g., United States v. Uribe-Galindo, 990 F.2d 522, 525-26 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511-12 (1st Cir.1988). Our caselaw recognizes four categories of searches as being so intrusive as to be clearly nonroutine: Body cavity, strip, pat down and involuntary x-ray searches. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 3304; United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.1995). By contrast, we have held that searches of handbags, luggage, shoes, pockets and the passenger compartments of cars are clearly routine. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538, 105 S.Ct. 3304; Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d at 61-62; United States v. Sandoval Vargas, 854 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir.1978).

In Ramos-Saenz we observed that a border search goes beyond the routine "only when it reaches the degree of intrusiveness present in a strip search or body cavity search." Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d at 61. The government seizes on this phrase to argue that a border search is always routine unless it involves a search of the person; at oral argument government counsel went so far as to assert that "the border search authority gives the government the right to dismantle a car with no reasonable suspicion whatsoever." Were we to accept this argument, it would mean that customs agents at the border could, acting on no suspicion, order a car disassembled down to the last o-ring, and hand it back to the owner in a large box. We think not. We hold, rather, that some searches of inanimate objects can be so intrusive as to be considered nonroutine.

Determining when an inanimate object search becomes as intrusive as a body search is tricky. Object searches certainly do not cause the same degree of personal indignity as searches of the human body. But causing indignity is just one way a search can be intrusive; there are others. We write on a relatively clean slate because we have never identified what factors render the search of an object nonroutine. However, our analysis is informed by factors we consider in the border search context, as well as those from our general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

III

Three aspects of the search here render it nonroutine: Force was used to remove and disassemble the fuel tank; the procedure involved some risk of harm; and someone whose vehicle was subjected to such a search is likely to feel a diminished sense of security.5

A. Use of Force

Courts that have considered searches of inanimate objects in the border context have found the use of force to be a critical factor in assessing intrusiveness. See United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367-68 (5th Cir.1998); United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1995). We have noted, albeit not in the border search context, that force is a factor that bears on the intrusiveness of the search. United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir.1994) (observing that sniff search of a car is unintrusive because it involves no forcing of closed containers or sealed areas). Searches of inanimate objects that courts have held to be routine generally have not involved the use of force. See e.g., United States v. Uribe-Galindo, 990 F.2d 522 (9th Cir.1993).

While force is a factor in assessing a search's intrusiveness, it is not dispositive. For example, if the lock is jammed on a suitcase or its owner refuses to present a key, agents have to employ some degree of force to gain access to its interior. But this fact alone does not render a search overly intrusive. Conversely, other types of searches for which force is not required have been deemed overly intrusive: No degree of force is required to effect an x-ray search or to issue an order to disrobe, both of which we have consistently found to be so intrusive as to be nonroutine. United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.1982). While not dispositive, the use of force in conducting a search will weigh against finding the search routine.

What constitutes the use of force depends on the circumstances. Certainly, if the search requires breaking, drilling into or permanently altering a portion of the item being searched, that is a use of force. Similarly, if the search involves the use of tools and the application of physical force to those tools, this will also amount to the use of force.

The search of Molina's truck required the use of tools. The mechanic hoisted the truck onto a lift, loosened the straps holding the tank to the chassis, disconnected the filler and the sending hoses, detached electrical connections, disengaged the fill neck and unscrewed the bolts. He then detached the tank itself by unscrewing the pump unit and removing the pressed in "bushing" which held the tank to the truck. All of those actions required the use of force and in their totality they raise the inference that this was not a routine search.

B. Danger

The Supreme Court has held that if a search poses a danger to the subject, this is a significant factor bearing on whether the search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985), the Court considered whether forcing a suspect to undergo minor surgery to remove a bullet was such a serious intrusion as to be unreasonable. In holding that it was, the Court noted that a crucial factor in analyzing the magnitude of a search's intrusiveness "is the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual." Id. at 761, 105 S.Ct. 1611 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)) (emphasis added). The Court reached this conclusion despite a dispute over how much danger, if any,...

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