U.S. v. Montford, 93-7094
Decision Date | 14 July 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93-7094,93-7094 |
Citation | 27 F.3d 137 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tommy D. MONTFORD, Gregory Adamavich and Daniel Adamavich, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
W. Eugene Henry, Biloxi, MS (Court-appointed), for G. Adamavich.
R. Wayne Woodall, Gulfport, MS, Daniel Adamavich, Oxford, WI, Lindsay C. Patterson, Jackson, MS (Court-appointed), for D. Adamavich.
Chester D. Nicholson, Gulfport, MS (Court-appointed), for Montford.
Richard T. Starrett, Peter H. Barrett, Asst. U.S. Attys., George Phillips, U.S. Atty., Jackson, MS, for appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Before REAVLEY, JONES and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
In this appeal we address whether gambling boat excursions a few miles offshore to avoid the reach of state law are in "foreign commerce" for purposes of certain federal criminal statutes. We conclude that such travels do not amount to foreign commerce, and therefore reverse appellants' convictions.
The Europa Jet, an American owned, Bahamian flagged vessel, operated as a "cruise to nowhere" gambling ship out of Gulfport, Mississippi. The ship offered its passengers casino gambling. It would travel briefly beyond three miles offshore on each excursion in order to avoid the reach of Mississippi state law. During these gambling trips the vessel never docked at a foreign port or ventured anywhere close to the territorial waters of a foreign country.
The government contended through indictment and trial that appellants Tommy Montford, Gregory Adamavich and Daniel Adamavich were bookies who took illegal bets on football games that were communicated onshore through the use of a cellular phone aboard the Europa Jet. Montford and Gregory Adamavich worked on the vessel, solicited bets from others on the vessel, and then communicated onshore with the cellular phone. Daniel Adamavich received some of these calls and engaged in a bookmaking operation at an onshore site in Mississippi. The three appellants and two other defendants were indicted on various counts of conspiring to violate and violating 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1084 and 1952(a)(3). Each appellant was convicted on some counts.
United States v. McRary, 665 F.2d 674, 678-79 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011, 102 S.Ct. 2306, 73 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1982). Hence, a violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952, requires travel in interstate or foreign commerce or use of a facility in interstate or foreign commerce. 1 Similarly, an essential element of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1084 is the transmission of bets or wagers in interstate or foreign commerce. 2 The government makes no argument that the cellular phone calls from the Europa Jet to onshore sites in Mississippi involved interstate commerce. 3 The jury was only instructed on foreign commerce. 4 The case turns, therefore, on whether the vessel travelled in foreign commerce. We cannot uphold a conviction "when the jury is instructed on only one jurisdictional ground which is contradicted by the evidence." McRary, 665 F.2d at 680.
The parties here disagree on whether the vessel ever entered international waters, 5 and appellants argue that there was no proof that the calls were made while the vessel was past the three-mile mark. Our decision does not turn on these issues. Instead, we hold that a "cruise to nowhere," where the vessel has no contact whatsoever with a foreign country or waters within the jurisdiction of a foreign country, and where indeed no such contact is intended, does not involve foreign commerce.
We begin our analysis by looking to relevant statutes. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 10 provides: "The term 'foreign commerce,' as used in this title, includes commerce with a foreign country." Of course this statute does not end our inquiry, since it does not state that foreign commerce is limited exclusively to commerce with a foreign country. The current Sec. 10 consolidated and recodified prior provisions of Title 18. "Section 10 first appeared in the 1948 recodification of Title 18 ... and the Revisor's Notes to that section state that it 'consolidates into one section identical definitions contained sections 408, 408b, 414(a) and 419a(b)....' " United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 467-68 (3d Cir.1987) (Sloviter, J., dissenting in part). In these prior provisions "interstate or foreign commerce" was consistently defined to include "transportation from one State, Territory or the District of Columbia to another State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or to a foreign country; or from a foreign country to any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia." Id. at 468; McRary, 665 F.2d 674. These prior definitions further suggest that Congress intended foreign commerce to mean travel to or from, or at least some form of contact with, a foreign state. See Goldberg, 830 F.2d at 468 () ; McRary, 665 F.2d at 678 n. 6 () .
We do not mean to suggest that Congress could not criminalize the conduct in question if it chose to do so. We note that the general provisions of Title 18 include a separate statute defining the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 7 defines that term to include:
(1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof ... when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.
* * * * * *
(7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States.
Several federal criminal statutes cover acts within the special maritime and admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. E.g. 18 U.S.C. Secs. 81 (arson), 113 (assault), 1111 (murder). The criminal statutes under which appellants were convicted, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1952 and 1084, do not contain such a jurisdictional basis.
The Lindbergh law covers kidnapping occurring both in foreign commerce and within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201(a)(1), (2). In McRary, we held that a kidnapping which involved an abduction on the high seas and transportation of the victim to Cuba did not involve foreign commerce. Our holding states "that the foreign commerce jurisdictional basis mandates that the kidnapping take place in the United States and that the victim be subsequently transported to a foreign State." McRary, 665 at 678. Later, in United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985 (5th Cir.1990), we held that the foreign commerce jurisdictional basis of the kidnapping statute is sufficiently broad to cover an abduction in a foreign country and subsequent transportation to the United States. Id. at 989 (1990). We similarly held, in Londos v. United States, 240 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1957), that transportation of a counterfeit security from a foreign country to the United States was transportation in foreign commerce under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314...
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