U.S. v. Moore
| Decision Date | 06 January 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CRIM.A. 5:03-00262.,CRIM.A. 5:03-00262. |
| Citation | 299 F.Supp.2d 623 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Sean MOORE also know as Charles Tyson Moore |
Sean Moore, Beaver, WV, Pro se, David R. Bungard, Federal Public Defender, East Charleston, WV, for defendant.
Pending is Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment filed in this case (doc. no. 9). The Court has considered the motion, the Government's response, and the evidence and oral argument received on January 5, 2004. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is DENIED.
Defendant Sean Moore is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Beckley, West Virginia, where he is serving an eighty-four-month sentence imposed by the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for distribution of cocaine base and possession of a firearm. On May 29, 2003, Defendant was placed on administrative detention,1 after he was discovered to have ingested 25 balloons of marijuana. Since May, Defendant has remained in administrative detention. As a result, Defendant is confined to his cell for 23 hours per day. He is entitled to one hour of recreation every day and access to a telephone once per month. He is not permitted to participate in education or work programs, although he was allowed to work as an orderly for a few weeks during his stay in the unit.
Defendant alleges that during his time in the special housing unit he was not given a copy of his incident report nor an adequate opportunity to challenge his placement. Over five months after Defendant's alleged illegal conduct, an indictment was filed on November 19, 2003.
Defendant moves to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the Bureau of Prison's (BOP's) handling of his confinement and the delay between the Government's discovery of his criminal conduct and the indictment deprived him of rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court has already addressed these issues in United States v. Robert Madry, Crim. No. 5:03-171.2 As discussed in the Order for Madry and reviewed below, the Government's conduct does raise constitutional concerns, but these concerns cannot be remedied by the motion before the Court.
Defendant argues that his confinement in administrative detention, his lack of access to information, his inability to challenge his confinement, and the delay between the Government's discovery of his alleged crime and the indictment constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment. While the defendant's allegations concerning these potential due process deprivations are troubling, in the context of the current motion this Court is restricted to considering whether the defendant's ability to defend against the charges in the indictment was impaired. The issue is whether the Government's actions between the time when the marijuana was discovered and the time when the indictment issued actually prejudiced the defendant from defending himself against the possession claim. Specifically, the Court must ask whether the delay in issuing the indictment and the defendant's restricted access to information or means of communication would likely affect the outcome of the criminal proceeding.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay." United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). In the Fourth Circuit, courts must utilize a two-part test in analyzing whether preindictment delay mandates dismissal. First, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating "actual prejudice" as a result of the government's delay; second, the court must weigh this prejudice against the government's justification for delay. Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 904 (4th Cir.1996). The threshold question-actual prejudice-requires a defendant to show that "he was meaningfully impaired in his ability to defend against [the government's] charges to such an extent that the disposition of the criminal proceeding was likely affected." Id. at 907.
Defendant concedes that he cannot identify any specific witness or item of exculpatory evidence that has been lost as a result of the passage of the last five months. He argues, however, that the deprivations he has suffered as a result of being housed in administrative detention since the discovery of his alleged crime constitute prejudice. Further, he argues that the result of the Government's delay is that he has already served a harsher sentence than he would have had he been convicted for his alleged offense in more a timely fashion.3 The Court finds that the conditions and length of Defendant's administrative confinement do not constitute actual prejudice.
The Court is unaware of a single case in which an indictment has been dismissed based merely on the "prejudice" of preindictment incarceration. In fact, case law on this issue is nearly unequivocal that a defendant must be able to point to the dissipation of some sort of evidence, the presence of which would have aided in his defense. See, e.g., United States v. McMutuary, 217 F.3d 477, 482-83 (7th Cir.2000) (); United States v. Sturdy, 207 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir.2000) (); United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir.1997) (); United States v. Beszborn, 21 F.3d 62, 66-67 (5th Cir.1994) ().
Defendant urges this Court to dismiss the indictment by finding that confinement has caused him a detriment apart from his ability to defend himself at trial. Though the Court may question the fairness of the BOP's confinement of Mr. Moore,4 its actions have not "meaningfully impaired" his chances of success at trial, and Defendant is therefore unable to show prejudice.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." This right exists independently of and is not coextensive with the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. See, e.g., United States v. James, 164 F.Supp.2d 718, 732 (D.Md.2001). Generally, the speedy trial right afforded by the Sixth Amendment attaches only after a formal arrest or indictment. Jones, 94 F.3d at 906 n. 6. As the Supreme Court has explained, this right does not apply to the period prior to arrest or official accusation:
Passage of time, whether before or after arrest, may impair memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant of witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend himself. But this possibility of prejudice at trial is not itself sufficient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper context. Possible prejudice is inherent in any delay, however short; it may also weaken the Government's case.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). The Marion court also held that recognizing Id. at 322 n. 13, 92 S.Ct. 455 (emphasis added). Only after a court finds that a defendant's speedy trial right has been triggered, must it analyze any delay under the rubric set forth in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992).5
Any determination of what government action will trigger a defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial right must be guided by the purposes of the right, which are "to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966). None of these are affected by the transfer of an inmate from general population to administrative detention. As the Supreme Court has explained,
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is ... not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest...
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