U.S. v. Moss, 89-1859

Citation887 F.2d 333
Decision Date05 October 1989
Docket NumberNo. 89-1859,89-1859
PartiesUNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Frank O. MOSS, Defendant, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Benicio Sanchez Rivera, San Juan, P.R., on Memorandum In Support of appeal.

Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, BOWNES and BREYER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Frank O. Moss, has appealed a district court order denying his request to vacate a magistrate's order of pretrial detention. We remand.

The defendant was charged in a criminal complaint 1 with aiding and abetting the importation of approximately 60 pounds of marihuana and aiding and abetting the bringing of that controlled substance on board a vessel arriving in the customs territory of the United States. 21 U.S.C. Secs. 952(a) and 955; 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. The government requested that the defendant be detained without bail pending trial. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e) and (f).

A detention hearing was held. We have, in the record before us, only a partial transcript of that detention hearing, manifesting the testimony of a Customs Investigator, Carlos Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez testified that the vessel, Sweet Pea, ran aground on a reef off the coast of Puerto Rico late Friday, July 14, 1989. William Hoercherl, a co-defendant, departed the Sweet Pea aboard a dinghy, early Saturday, July 15th, in search of assistance in removing the Sweet Pea from the reef. The defendant, the sole crew member, remained on board. Mr. Hoercherl approached the owner of another vessel and requested assistance. The owner of the second vessel notified the Puerto Rico Police Department Marine Unit that a vessel had run aground and that he was going to its aid. The Marine Unit then notified Customs.

Meanwhile, the defendant had decided to abandon the Sweet Pea and attempted to swim to shore. He was picked up by someone in a passing pleasure boat. A police officer interviewed the defendant who identified himself as the owner of the Sweet Pea.

On Sunday, the 16th, Customs personnel boarded the Sweet Pea and conducted a search after determining that the vessel had arrived from Aruba. Pursuant to the search, Customs personnel found a black plastic bag on the top of a bed in the cabin. Inside the bag was a carton. Inside the carton was a package weighing approximately 60 pounds. The package was opened. Its contents field-tested positive for marihuana.

At some point in time (it is unclear if before or after the search) Customs investigators interviewed Hoercherl who stated that he (Hoercherl) was the owner or, at least, the person in charge of the Sweet Pea. Documents found on board confirmed this. Hoercherl told Customs that he and the defendant had been in Aruba and that they had run aground while attempting to enter Puerto Rico through the Port of Mayaguez. Hoercherl said that he had purchased several ornamental rugs and other items while in Aruba, which he intended to later sell. Hoercherl also said that they were on a pleasure trip fishing for blue marlin. Officers conducting the search reported to Investigator Rodriguez that although the Sweet Pea had some fishing gear, it was not fitted for marlin fishing, i.e., it did not have the type of chair one sits in when hauling in marlin.

Pursuant to the Customs investigation, Rodriguez also determined that both the defendant and Hoercherl were United States citizens and residents of Florida, that the defendant has no prior criminal record, and that Hoercherl was convicted in 1981 of "conspiracy with intent to distribute marihuana" and had been sentenced to 48 months imprisonment. Based on statements by the defendant and Hoercherl to investigators, Rodriguez testified that he learned that both the defendant and Hoercherl are retired, that Hoercherl is a retired land developer and also a pilot, that they had arrived in Puerto Rico three months earlier from Miami, that they had left Puerto Rico for Aruba on May 10, 1989, and were returning to Puerto Rico when the Sweet Pea ran aground on July 14th.

At this point in the narrative, defendant's counsel stated that he had no questions for Inspector Rodriguez but requested that the magistrate direct Rodriguez to preserve his notes. That request was granted and Rodriguez was excused from the witness stand. We have no further transcript of the detention hearing. The record before us does contain, however, notes of the courtroom deputy which state:

DETENTION HEARING called. Government presented the testimony of Carlos Rodriguez. He was cross examined by defense counsel. 2 After cross examination the Government requested that defendant be detained without bond, that defendants committed the offense charged against them. That defendant Hoercherl has prior criminal record, they are a danger to the community and a risk of flight, so she requested detention without bond. Both defense counsel argued the presumption of a risk of flight, they told that both defts. are U.S. citizens, married who have lived in Florida all their lives. After hearing the parties, the Magistrate left the case UNDER ADVISEMENT.

On the following day, the magistrate issued an order of detention pending trial. That order stated as a finding of fact that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in "18 U.S.C. Sec. 2." We note that for purposes of detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (the Act), in particular 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e), the offenses relevant to this case and potentially triggering pretrial detention are those for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the "Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), section 1 of the Act of September 15, 1980 (21 U.S.C. 955a), or an offense under section 924(c) of title 18 of the United States Code." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e). Section 2 of Title 18 (the general statute treating aides and abettors as principals for purposes of punishment), cited by the magistrate in his pretrial detention order, is not among those listed in Sec. 3142(e). In addition to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2, the defendant was charged with the substantive offenses under 21 U.S.C. Secs. 952(a) and 955, both of which are offenses providing the basis for detention under the Act. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e). We will assume (and the defendant does not suggest otherwise) that the reference to only 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 was an unintentional error and that the magistrate's finding of probable cause to believe that the defendant was an aider and abettor was intended rather to reflect a finding of probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the substantive offenses with which he was charged.

A finding of probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed an offense as set out in Sec. 3142(e) establishes a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required (risk of flight) and the safety of the community (dangerousness). 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e). 3 The magistrate's order of pretrial detention also stated as a finding that the defendant has not rebutted this presumption. This conclusory finding was not elaborated upon despite the statutory requirement that the detention order include written findings of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the detention. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(i)(1); see also United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 384 (1st Cir.1985).

The defendant sought review of the magistrate's order of pretrial detention in the district court. The defendant argued that the presumption arising from Sec. 3142(e) is inapplicable because, although the defendant was charged with an offense which triggers such a presumption, (i.e., a drug-related offense with a maximum penalty of ten or more years of imprisonment), under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, 4 the maximum sentence which he, in fact, would be exposed to would be less than ten years. The defendant essentially also argued that even if the presumption applied, he presented sufficient evidence to rebut it. The defendant, therefore, requested that the order of detention be vacated and that bail be set. The district court thereafter entered an order which read:

The maximum term referred to in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e) is calculated according to the statutory maximum, not the sentencing guidelines. The presumption regarding the defendant's appearance is therefore established, and after full review the Court determines that the defendant has failed to rebut it. The motion is therefore DENIED.

The defendant now seeks review in this court. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3145(c); Fed.R.App.P. 9(a). He reiterates those arguments presented to the district court.

We are not persuaded by the defendant's unsupported underlying contention that the sentence one is likely to receive pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines is factored into the threshold determination of the applicability of the presumption concerning flight. For one thing, such a contention finds no support in the language of Sec. 3142(e) itself. Section 3142(e) clearly provides that the presumption is triggered solely by the statutory penalty prescribed in the relevant controlled substances statutes. It states that, subject to rebuttal by the defendant, it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed "an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the [relevant statutes]." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e) (emphasis added). Such language (speaking of a maximum term) quite naturally implies that one could expect that a defendant charged with an offense triggering the...

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