U.S. v. Mubayyid

Decision Date24 July 2008
Docket NumberCriminal No. 05-40026-FDS.
Citation567 F.Supp.2d 223
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Muhamed MUBAYYID, Emadeddin Z. Muntasser, and Samir Al-Mohla, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Michael C. Andrews, Law Offices of Michael C. Andrews, David Duncan, Elizabeth A. Lunt, Zalkind, Rodriguez, Lunt & Duncan, LLP, Boston, MA, Susan Estrich, Los Angeles, CA, Faith E. Gay, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

Donald L. Cabell, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL UNDER RULE 29 AND GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

SAYLOR, District Judge.

This is a criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements), and 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (false statements on tax returns). In essence, the indictment charged that defendants Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Z. Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla fraudulently obtained a charitable exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code for an entity known as Care International, Inc. According to the indictment, defendants concealed the fact that Care International solicited and distributed funds for, and issued publications supporting and promoting, Islamic holy war ("jihad") and holy warriors ("mujahideen").

After a jury trial that began on November 13, 2007, and concluded on January 11, 2008, defendants were convicted on multiple counts. All three defendants moved for judgment of acquittal as to all counts at the close of the government's evidence, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, which the Court granted as to part of Count Eight and otherwise denied. All three defendants renewed those motions after the trial. The Court issued its ruling from the bench as to those motions on June 3, 2008, granting those motions in part and denying them in part. This memorandum and order sets forth the reasons for that decision in greater detail. The government also filed a motion for reconsideration, which will be denied for the reasons set forth below.

I. Introduction

This case was indicted, and tried, on the theory that the defendants committed various tax and false statement offenses. The government has consistently taken the position, however, that this is "more than just an ordinary tax case," and that the defendants are guilty of "solicitation and expenditure of tax-exempt money to engage in violent jihad over an extensive and crucial period in history." Thus, it argues, the defendants' "promotion of violence, ... affiliation with terrorist-related individuals and organizations, and promotion of other terrorist organizations cannot be ignored."1

From the standpoint of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in selecting criminal charges to prosecute, that assertion is undeniably true. The United States Attorney's Office is free to select its targets, and to select charges for prosecution, as it sees fit, subject only to the limits imposed by the Constitution.

From the standpoint of the proof at trial, however, the situation is entirely different. If the government is to convict a defendant of a particular offense, the government must prove him guilty of that offense, and not some other. The fact that he may have committed other criminal or undesirable acts is not generally relevant to prove that he committed the charged crime. And it certainly does not change the standard of proof: if insufficient evidence of a charged crime is presented at the trial, he is entitled to a verdict of acquittal, no matter what his other conduct might be.

Similarly, the fact that the government was apparently forced to charge this case in a less-than-straightforward way does not entitle it to any additional latitude from the Court. This case was complicated by the fact that the principal acts of the defendants that lie at the core of the indictment occurred well outside any applicable statute of limitations period. The original indictment was not returned until 2005; defendant Muntasser signed and filed the application to obtain charitable status for Care in June 1993, nearly twelve years earlier, and the bulk of Care's noncharitable activities occurred before 1997. Again, those facts do not change the standard of proof; the charges must be considered as they exist, not as they might have been under different circumstances.

In short, the Court has evaluated the evidence and the arguments according to exactly the same standard as it would in any other prosecution. The nature and character of the defendants, and the nature and character of their activities, do not change the relevant legal standard or the quantum of proof required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.

A further point should be emphasized. The struggle against religious and political extremism in general, and terrorism in particular, is likely to be the principal challenge facing this nation, and the rest of the world, for many years to come. At its core, that struggle is to protect and defend the most basic values of our society—indeed, of civilization itself. The difficulty and magnitude of that conflict can hardly be understated. But it is nonetheless important to bear in mind the proper place of the trial court in the American constitutional system. The role of this court, at least in this context, is necessarily narrow. It is not to help—or, for that matter, to hinder—American foreign policy. It is not to help or hinder American law enforcement priorities. It is not to make broad "statements," send "messages," or bestow symbolic "victories" or "defeats." Instead, the role of the court is to make a relatively narrow and focused inquiry: whether the evidence presented at the trial, taken in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to support a conviction as to each defendant and as to each count. And it is to examine that evidence with a cold eye, not with inflamed passion —and without regard to any greater cause that this case may be deemed to represent, no matter how worthy that cause may be.

II. Procedural Background

On May 11, 2005, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendants Muhamed Mubayyid and Emadeddin Muntasser with one count of scheming to conceal material facts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) and one count of conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The indictment also charged Mubayyid with three counts of filing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) and Muntasser with one count of making a false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).

On March 8, 2007, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging defendants Mubayyid, Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla with one count of scheming to conceal material facts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1), one count of conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one count of obstructing and impeding the Internal Revenue Service in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). The indictment also charged Mubayyid with three counts of filing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), and charged Muntasser and Al-Monla with one count each of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).

The trial of this matter began on November 13, 2007. At the close of the government's evidence, all defendants moved for directed verdicts of acquittal as to all counts. The Court denied those motions except as to Count Eight, which charged all three defendants with obstructing and impeding the IRS in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a); it granted the motion as to that count as to defendants Muntasser and Al-Monla only. At the time, the Court expressed certain reservations about the sufficiency of the evidence, but permitted the case to go to the jury nonetheless. On January 11, 2008, after nine days of deliberation, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty as to all defendants on all counts but one. The jury acquitted defendant Al-Monla on Count Seven, which charged him with making a false statement to the FBI in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).

All defendants renewed their motions after the conclusion of the trial. Although Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)(1) normally requires that such a motion be brought within seven days of the verdict, in light of the complexity and importance of the matters raised, the Court granted defendants substantially additional time in which to file their memoranda, and granted the government substantially additional time in which to respond. The briefing was completed on May 9, 2008, and oral argument occurred over two days on May 15 and 16, 2008. The Court rendered its decision from the bench on June 3, 2008. The government moved for reconsideration of that opinion on July 2, 2008.

III. Factual Background

The evidence at the trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was as follows.

A. The Al-Kifah Refugee Center

Emadeddin Muntasser is a citizen of Libya who has lived in the United States since 1981 and as a permanent resident alien since 1992. In the early 1990's, Muntasser operated the Boston branch office of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center, an organization that supported jihad and mujahideen.2 The Boston office of Al-Kifah published a pro-jihad newsletter entitled "Al-Hussam," which is an Arabic term meaning "the Sword."

Al-Kifah also engaged in other activities to promote and support jihad and mujahideen. Among other things, it solicited and collected donations for Muslim widows and orphans, including widows and orphans of those who had died in the course of jihad. It distributed a "Zakat Calculation Guide" that was intended to assist devout Muslims in complying with their religious obligations to devote money to charity, which Al-Kifah interpreted to include support for Muslim fighters. Al-Kifah distributed and sold audiotapes, books, and other...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • U.S. v. Prosperi, Criminal No. 06-10116-RGS.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • August 29, 2008
    ...115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970); United States v. Walsh, 928 F.2d 7, 11 (1 st Cir.1991); United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F.Supp.2d 223, 2008 WL 2856415 (D.Mass. July 24, 2008). For false statements under § 1020, the offense is complete when a defendant presents the false statement t......
  • United States v. Michel
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • November 6, 2019
    ...of reading and clarity purposes. 5. Two of the cases cited by Mr. Michel do address the scheme argument. In United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223, 239-42 (D. Mass. 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 658 F.3d 35 (1 st Cir. 2011), the district court considered whether Section 1001 ......
  • United States v. Menendez
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • August 8, 2015
    ...foreclosed by controlling precedent"); Dunne, 324 F.3d at 1164 (§ 1001 scheme is not a continuing offense); United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F.Supp.2d 223, 240–241 (D.Mass.2008), aff'd in part, rejected in part on other grounds, 685 F.3d 35 (rejecting the argument that "scheme" in § 1001(a)(1......
  • United States v. Rivera-Ortiz
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • August 23, 2018
    ...1158, 1164 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493, 1506 (10th Cir. 1996) ); see also United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F.Supp.2d 223, 241 (D. Mass. 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 658 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[C]ourts have concluded that the mail ......
3 books & journal articles
  • False Statements and False Claims
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review No. 59-3, July 2022
    • July 1, 2022
    ...period began to run when statement was submitted to the government rather than when statement was made); United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223, 242 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding a § 1001 offense is not a “continuing offense,” but that each new aff‌irmative act of concealment is a new cr......
  • FALSE STATEMENTS AND FALSE CLAIMS
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review No. 58-3, July 2021
    • July 1, 2021
    ...period began to run when statement was submitted to government rather than when statement was made); United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223, 242 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding a § 1001 offense is not a “continuing offense,” but that each new aff‌irmative act of concealment is a new crimin......
  • False statements and false claims
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review No. 60-3, July 2023
    • July 1, 2023
    ...period began to run when statement was submitted to the government rather than when statement was made); United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223, 242 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding a § 1001 offense is not a “continuing offense,” but that each new aff‌irmative act of concealment is a new cr......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT