U.S. v. Munoz-Flores

Decision Date12 December 1988
Docket NumberNo. 86-5236,MUNOZ-FLORE,D,86-5236
Citation863 F.2d 654
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Germanefendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Judy Clarke and Verna J. Wefald, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

Roger W. Haines, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

Before WRIGHT, FERGUSON and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal of the denial of a motion to set aside a sentence imposing two twenty-five dollar special assessments for immigration law violations, German Munoz-Flores ("Munoz") contends that passage of the Special Assessment on Convicted Persons (18 U.S.C. Sec. 3013 (1984)) did not comply with the requirements of the origination clause of the Constitution.

We find that the constitutionality of the Special Assessment on Convicted Persons is squarely presented in this appeal. An analysis of the legislative history of the statute persuades us that the enactment of the special assessment failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated procedure. We therefore vacate that portion of the court's sentencing order imposing special assessments.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

After pleading guilty to two counts of aiding and abetting an alien to elude examination and inspection in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 and 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1325, Munoz was sentenced to two years unsupervised probation and ordered to pay special assessments of $25 for each count, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3013.

Munoz moved to correct this sentence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a), asserting that the special assessments were invalid because the legislation authorizing these assessments originated in the Senate contrary to article I, Sec. 7 of the Constitution. The magistrate denied the motion, finding the assessment constitutional, and the district court affirmed. Munoz timely appeals.

ANALYSIS
I JUSTICIABILITY

Before turning to the merits of Munoz's constitutional claim, we must consider whether an origination clause challenge to a statute implicates the political question doctrine, rendering the issue inappropriate for judicial determination. The Supreme Court has indicated that an issue is nonjusticiable when one of the following circumstances is present: (1) "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department"; (2) "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"; (3) "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"; (4) "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government"; (5) "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made"; or (6) "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2779, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)).

The instant case presents none of these factors. The text of the origination clause does not commit its interpretation to the political branches. The standards of the clause are clear, and its application requires no policy determinations. The determination of which house a bill originated in and whether it raises revenue are questions the courts are functionally well-equipped to answer. Finally, this case does not implicate prudential considerations of deference to the decisions of another governmental branch. Although mechanisms allowing Congress itself to question the constitutionality of a bill under the origination clause exist 1, the failure of Congress to inquire whether a statute violates the origination clause should not preclude the courts from doing so. Certainly, this court should not interpret Congress' silence on an origination clause issue to preclude judicial examination, when it has refused to draw such a conclusion from Congress' explicit finding that a bill did not violate the origination clause. See Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir.1985) ("Although Congress has an obligation to enact legislation that it deems to be constitutional, its determination that a particular statute is constitutional does not foreclose or relieve this court from conducting its own analysis of that issue"). But cf. Texas Assoc. of Concerned Taxpayers v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 166-67 (5th Cir.1985) (refusing to analyze a statute under the origination clause on the grounds that Congress had itself previously determined that the statute in question did not violate the origination clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1151, 106 S.Ct. 2265, 90 L.Ed.2d 710 (1986). Holding the origination clause justiciable also comports with a number of Supreme Court decisions in which the Court adjudicated origination clause challenges to statutes. See, e.g., Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. Therefore, we consider the merits of Munoz's claim.

220 U.S. 107, 142-43, 31 S.Ct. 342, 345-46, 55 L.Ed. 389 (1911).

II THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE

The origination clause provides that "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 7. The origination requirement was intended to grant primary power over taxation to the house more closely tied to the popular will. See 2 P. Kurland & R. Lerner, The Founders' Constitution 376 (1987). Although diminished concern about the Senate's lack of accountability has largely undermined the clause's rationale 2, the requirement of origination in the House persists and in recent years has been the basis of a number of statutory challenges. See, e.g., Sperry Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl.Ct. 736 (1987) (rejecting an origination clause challenge to the Iran Claims Act), reversed on other grounds, 853 F.2d 904 (Fed.Cir.1988); Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 1378 (upholding the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 against an origination clause challenge). 3 Indeed, one decision struck down a statute on the grounds that it violated article I, Sec. 7. Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y.1915), appeal dismissed, 242 U.S. 654, 37 S.Ct. 12, 61 L.Ed. 547 (1916).

Munoz asserts that the adoption of section 3013 violated article I, Sec. 7. The analysis of an origination clause issue is straightforward and tracks the language of the clause. First, we must gauge whether the statute falls within the class of revenue raising bills covered by the clause. If the bill is one that raises revenue within the meaning of art. I, Sec. 7, the court must next determine if the bill originated in the House, as required by the clause. Finally, the court must examine whether the Senate's participation in the legislative process can be construed as an amendment permissible under the clause. With these guidelines in mind, we turn to an examination of the challenged statute.

A. Is the Special Assessment a Revenue Bill? 4

By its terms, the origination clause applies only to bills that raise revenue. However, the fact that a statute produces governmental income is not dispositive. Supreme Court decisions hold that origination clause constraints do not extend to bills that incidentally create revenue if those bills were enacted for purposes other than These precedents mandate an inquiry into the purposes of the special assessment legislation to determine if the challenged statute is a "Bill[ ] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the origination clause. The relevant question is: was the special assessment statute enacted "for the direct and avowed purpose of creating revenue or public funds for the service of the government"? Norton, 91 U.S. at 569 (quoting United States v. Mayo, 26 F.Cas. 1230 (C.C.D.Mass.1813) (No. 15,755) (interpreting the term "revenue law" in the context of an 1804 federal crimes act)).

revenue raising. See, e.g., Millard, 202 U.S. at 436, 26 S.Ct. at 675; Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 202, 17 S.Ct. at 768-69; Norton, 91 U.S. at 569.

To determine the purpose of the special assessment we first turn to the language of the statute. Section 3013 provides:

(a) The court shall assess on any person convicted of an offense against the United States

(1) in the case of a misdemeanor

(A) the amount of $25 if the defendant is an individual; and

(B) the amount of $100 if the defendant is a person other than an individual; and

(2) in the case of a felony

(A) the amount of $50 if the defendant is an individual; and

(B) the amount of $200 if the defendant is a person other than an individual.

(b) Such amount so assessed shall be collected in the manner that fines are collected in criminal cases

(c) The obligation to pay an assessment ceases five years after the date of the judgment.

(d) For the purposes of this section, an offense under section 13 of this title is an offense against the United States.

On its face, the statute offers little insight into its underlying purpose. The subsection requiring that the assessments be collected in the same manner as criminal fines might be read to suggest that the assessment is analogous to a criminal fine, and thus is punitive. However, the wording does not indicate explicitly that the special assessment is meant to punish, and the subsection addressing collection may be interpreted as a purely procedural requirement. Most important, the language fails to limit or even to describe the use of the collected funds. This lack of restriction suggests that the revenue raising aspect of the bill is not subsidiary to any enunciated function.

Because the statutory language is ambiguous, we examine legislative...

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