U.S. v. Nagib

• Decision Date: 13 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-4018,93-4018
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kareem A. NAGIB, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 619

44 F.3d 619

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kareem A. NAGIB, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 93-4018.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 7, 1994.

Decided Jan. 13, 1995.

Matthew L. Jacobs, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Milwaukee, WI, for plaintiff-appellee.

Robert L. Graham, Stephen L. Wood (argued), Stephen A.K. Palmer, Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellant.

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and WELLFORD ^* and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge.

On October 1, 1990, the district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced defendant, Kareem Nagib ("Nagib"), on various drug charges. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), Nagib had ten days in which to perfect a timely appeal. See FED.R.APP.P. 4(b). On the last available day, October 11, 1990, Nagib's counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). As a previous panel of this court has already noted in this case, Rule 35(b) no longer allows such a motion after the adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See 936 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 950, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 349 (1991). It is undisputed that this motion did not toll the running of Rule 4(b)'s ten day time limit.

Realizing his error, Nagib's counsel filed a motion on October 29, 1990, to enlarge the time to appeal under Rule 4(b). Rule 4(b) allows the district court to enlarge the available time to file a notice of appeal if the moving party demonstrates "excusable neglect." FED.R.APP.P. 4(b). If the district court makes such a finding, Rule 4(b) authorizes the judge to enlarge the available time period to thirty days beyond the time originally allowed by the Rule. The district judge made a finding of "excusable neglect" and enlarged the period to file Nagib's appeal to thirty days from November 7, 1990. On November 15, 1990, Nagib filed a notice of appeal.

Because we concluded we were without jurisdiction, this court dismissed Nagib's appeal without reaching the merits. See 936 F.2d at 295. Judge Easterbrook, speaking for the court, explained that even if there was excusable neglect to justify enlargement under Rule 4(b), the district court improperly extended the time to file the appeal. Id. He noted that but for the improvident Rule 35(b) motion, Nagib would have been foreclosed from filing an appeal after October 11, 1990, and that Rule 4(b) allowed the district court to extend the period of filing for thirty days beyond that date. Thus, the last possible day Nagib could have perfected a timely appeal was November 10. Since Nagib did not file his notice of appeal until November 15, Judge Easterbrook concluded "[t]he appeal is therefore untimely, and as the limit established by Rule 4(b) is jurisdictional, Nagib's appeal must be dismissed." Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 288, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960)).

Sixteen months later, in November of 1992, Nagib filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, collaterally attacking the district court's judgment of conviction. Nagib asked the district court to set aside his conviction and enter a new judgment to enable him to take a direct appeal to this court. As grounds for his petition, Nagib argued that his former lawyer, subsequently replaced, had provided him ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. The district court agreed and vacated his sentence. The district judge resentenced Nagib, and he subsequently filed this timely direct appeal from the resentencing.

I. MUST NAGIB SHOW PREJUDICE?

Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show: 1) that his "counsel's performance was deficient," and 2) that the deficiency "prejudiced the defense." The Strickland standard, however, allows for a "presumption" of prejudice where there is an "[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether." Id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. Strickland noted that "[p]rejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify." Id. (citation omitted).

The district court agreed with Nagib's argument that his lawyer's error in pursuing an appeal constituted per se ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby relieving him of the heavy burden to show prejudice. At the time of the district court's opinion, this court had not spoken directly to this issue. In Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717 (7th Cir.1994), however, we held: "If the defendant told his lawyer to appeal, and the lawyer dropped the ball, then the defendant has been deprived, not of effective assistance of counsel, but of any assistance of counsel on appeal. Abandonment is a per se violation of the [S]ixth [A]mendment." Id. at 718 (emphasis in original).

In Castellanos, we joined every other circuit that has addressed the question in holding that a showing of prejudice is not required under Strickland when the defendant sought to appeal his conviction but his attorney, in effect, "abandoned" the appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Peak, 992 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir.1993); United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191, 195 (9th Cir.1993); Bonneau v. United States, 961 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 554, 557 (10th Cir.1991); Williams v. Lockhart, 849 F.2d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir.1988). In Castellanos, we focused on the possible reasons for failing to pursue a direct appeal. We explained that a " '[r]equest' is an important ingredient in this formula. A lawyer need not appeal unless the client wants to pursue that avenue." See Castellanos, 26 F.3d at 719. In Castellanos, the lawyer never filed a notice of appeal even though the defendant instructed him to do so. Id. at 718. Judge Easterbrook, speaking for the court, concluded that the "prejudice" prong was inappropriate under those circumstances because "the defendant never receive[d] the benefit of a lawyer's services in constructing potential appellate arguments." Id.

We do not believe the district judge characterized this case as one of abandonment. Nagib's counsel filed post-sentence motions in the district court and took an ineffectual appeal. The question, then, is whether, in the absence of such a specific finding, Nagib is required to show prejudice, and if so, whether he is able to do so. The circumstances of this case may indeed fall within the Castellanos ambit, since Nagib's counsel did "drop the ball" in assisting him in pursuing a timely appeal.

Nagib's counsel, however, did not refuse or neglect to file a notice of appeal. Rather, he filed an ill-advised motion and then an untimely notice of appeal. Castellanos held that "prejudice" must be shown by a defendant unless "the lawyer fails to show up for appeal--which can occur either if the lawyer fails to initiate an appeal or if the lawyer fails to prosecute the appeal." Id. at 719 (emphasis added).

In determining whether this case falls within Castellanos, a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit is instructive. In United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191 (9th Cir.1993), defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922. His attorney filed a notice of appeal, but it was untimely. Id. at 192. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Horodner's appeal as untimely in violation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b). Id. Defendant sought vacatur and resentencing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, arguing that his lawyer's failure to perfect a timely appeal in accord with his instructions constituted per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 194-95. The district court denied the petition and he appealed.

In ordering the case remanded to determine whether Horodner consented to the abandonment of his appeal, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected a distinction between filing an untimely appeal and failing to file at all. Id. at 195. The court explained that in Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir.1992), it held that prejudice need not be shown to establish ineffective assistance of counsel when the defendant's lawyer failed to file a notice of appeal despite his client's instructions. Id. The Horodner court stated that "[i]n Lozada, the defendant's counsel failed to file a notice of appeal. Here, the notice of appeal was filed but it was filed out of time. The legal effect is the same." Id. Accordingly, defendant was relieved of the prejudice requirement of Strickland. Id.

The Ninth Circuit apparently sees no meaningful distinction for the purposes of a Strickland analysis between attorney nonfeasance (i.e., where a defendant instructs his counsel to appeal and the lawyer never files a notice of appeal) and attorney misfeasance (i.e., where a defendant instructs his counsel to appeal but the notice of appeal is filed untimely due to attorney error). Cf. Williams, 849 F.2d at 1137 n. 3 (" '[C]ourts have found that a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel when the malfeasance or nonfeasance of his or her counsel effectively deprived the defendant of the right to appeal.' "). In Castellanos, however, we used the word "abandonment" to describe the type of circumstance under which a defendant might be relieved of the burden to show prejudice under Strickland. Though we cited Horodner in our Castellanos decision, we have never decided whether the no prejudice rule set forth in that case extends to instances of lawyer misfeasance such as in Horodner and the case at bar. On the record before us, we decline to do so today.

II. DID NAGIB CONSENT TO THE INITIAL TARDY APPEAL?

Horodner did not reach the merits of the defendant's appeal because there was nothing in the record indicating whether Horodner had instructed his counsel in a timely...