U.S. v. Nealy, No. 99-15211
Decision Date | 07 November 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 99-15211,Docket No. 99-00045-CR-4-WS |
Parties | (11th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENARD MAURICE NEALY, Defendant-Appellant. D. C |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and MAGILL*, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Renard Maurice Nealy appeals his 32-year sentence for two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. 21 U.S.C. 841. Because any error in sentencing based on drug quantity was harmless, and because the government was not required to file a substantial assistance motion, we affirm.
The Leon County Sheriff's Department lawfully searched Defendant's residence and found 14.8 grams of cocaine base. Rather than immediately arrest him, the police sought Defendant's assistance in arresting Defendant's supplier, Alex Randal. Randal was arrested later that night when he delivered 3 ounces of cocaine base to Defendant's residence. In the subsequent months, Defendant cooperated in other controlled drug buys and testified in Randal's trial; Randal was convicted. Before Randal's trial, Defendant was told that, if he had committed other crimes, then he would "receive no consideration for [his] cooperation." Five days after testifying at Randal's trial, Defendant was arrested with 3.6 grams of cocaine base.
Before his trial, Defendant requested that the jury instructions include an instruction about drug quantity. Defendant argued that a footnote to a recent Supreme Court decision required the jury to determine sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt: Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1224 n.6 (1999). The judge did not include drug quantity in the jury instructions. Defendant was then convicted on two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. 21 U.S.C. 841.1
At the sentencing hearing, Defendant again argued, based on the Jones footnote, that the district judge must submit the issue of drug quantity to the jury. Relying on well established circuit precedent, the district judge rejected this contention and determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had more than 5 grams of cocaine base.
The pertinent statute, 21 U.S.C. 841(b), distinguishes sentencing maximums based on drug quantity. A person with an earlier felony drug conviction who is convicted with at least 5 grams of cocaine base may be sentenced from 10 years to life in prison. 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Acting within this statutory range, the district judge sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 32 years on Count II, 30 years on Count III.
Defendant asks us to consider his 32-year sentence in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000) (5-4 decision), which -- in the context of a state firearms case -- says that "any fact [other than prior conviction] that increases sentencing beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 2362-63.2
At his trial, Defendant argued that the issue of drug quantity should go to the jury. Therefore, we review Defendant's constitutional issue de novo, but we will reverse or remand only for harmful error. See United States v. Mills, 138 F. 3d 928, 937-39 (11th Cir. 1998).
This circuit applies Apprendi to sentencing under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) & (B), which determine sentencing ranges based on drug quantity. United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1381, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2000). Defendant was sentenced to 32-years for Count II for possession of 14.8 grams of cocaine base.3 With no finding of drug quantity, the statutory maximum is ordinarily 20 years for each count. 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). Where, as here, the defendant has prior drug felony convictions, the maximum sentence absent drug quantity is 30 years per count.
Apprendi requires the judge to submit to the jury an element of sentencing that would increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361 n.13. Because Defendant was sentenced under 841(b)(1)(A) and because his 32-year sentence exceeds the 30-year statutory maximum for each count, an error has occurred.
But failure to submit the issue of drug quantity to the jury is, in this case, harmless error that does not require reversal. Apprendi did not recognize or create a structural error that would require per se reversal.4 United States v. Swatzie, 228 F. 3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2000). And a constitutional error is harmless if "it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error." Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1838 (1999) ( ); see also Swatzie 228 F. 3d at 1283 ( ). Harmless error is appropriate because it "block[s] setting aside [sentences] for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial." Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1839 (quoting Chapman v. California, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967). We must affirm Defendant's sentence if the record does not contain evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to drug quantity. See Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1837.
When the police initially searched Defendant's residence, they found 14.8 grams of cocaine base located in Defendant's backpack, which also contained Defendant's identification card. This amount was uncontested at trial and sentencing. An officer testified at trial that Defendant at the scene admitted that the cocaine base was his. Defendant was convicted for this possession (count II); and, given the undisputed evidence about drug quantity, no reasonable jury could have rationally concluded that Defendant was guilty of the substantive offense -- possession, with intent to distribute of the cocaine base in his backpack -- but that the amount of cocaine possessed was less than 5 grams. See generally United States v. Rogers, 94 F.3d 1519, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996) ( ). Thus, we affirm Defendant's 32-year sentence for Count II under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), which carries a maximum life sentence for defendants with a prior felony drug conviction, because failure to submit drug quantity to the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant also argued for the first time in his supplemental brief that Apprendi requires the indictment to include the element of drug quantity. But because Defendant failed to raise this issue at trial or in his initial brief, he abandoned this issue; and we will not consider it here.5
Parties must submit all issues on appeal in their initial briefs. Fed. R. of App. Proc. 28(a)(5); 11th Cir. R. 28-1(h). When new authority arises after a brief is filed, this circuit permits parties to submit supplemental authority on "intervening decisions or new developments" regarding issues already properly raised in the initial briefs. 11th Cir. R. 28-1 I.O.P. 6 (emphasis in original). Also, parties can seek permission of the court to file supplemental briefs on this new authority. 11th Cir. R. 28-1 I.O.P. 5. But parties cannot properly raise new issues at supplemental briefing, even if the issues arise based on the intervening decisions or new developments cited in the supplemental authority. See McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 1491, 1495-96 (11th Cir. 1990) ( ).
Here, Defendant initially argued at trial and in his initial brief that the question of drug quantity should be submitted to the jury. When the Supreme Court handed down Apprendi, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on Apprendi. But in his supplemental brief, Defendant could not properly raise totally new issues even if those issues were also based on Apprendi.6 Thus, Defendant abandoned the indictment issue by not raising the issue in his initial brief. See United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1332 n.28 (11th Cir. 1983) ( ); see also United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1996) ( ); United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1318 n.12 (1st Cir. 1994) ( ); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 1994) ().
Defendant next argues that the government violated his due process rights in not filing a motion to depart based on substantial assistance. The government conceded that Defendant provided substantial assistance in participating in controlled drug buys and testifying against his supplier, who was ultimately convicted. But the government filed no substantial assistance motion because five days after testifying against his supplier, Defendant was arrested for again possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base.7 The decision to decline filing a motion to depart does not violate due process.
Under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. 5K1.1, the government has "a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially assisted." Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct....
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