U.S. v. Neville

• Decision Date: 11 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-1708,74-1708
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Clarence Edward NEVILLE, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1302

516 F.2d 1302

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Clarence Edward NEVILLE, Appellant.

No. 74-1708.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 31, 1975.

Decided May 20, 1975.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 11, 1975.

Edward M. Genson, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Terry Adelman, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.

Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, and LAY and ROSS, Circuit Judges.

GIBSON, Chief Judge.

Defendant Clarence Edward Neville appeals his jury convictions on seven counts for violations of the Dyer Act. ¹ He was sentenced by the District Court ² to concurrent terms of five years in prison on counts 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 and to five years imprisonment on counts 2 and 4, consecutive to the other counts but concurrent with each other, for an aggregate of ten years, and fined $35,000.

On appeal the defendant challenges (1) the court's instruction permitting the jury to convict him for knowingly transporting rebuilt trucks containing undefined "major parts" of stolen vehicles; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to identify the stolen trucks, to prove they were "motor vehicles," or to prove defendant's knowledge that they were stolen; (3) the court's instruction permitting the jury to infer guilty knowledge from defendant's unexplained possession of recently stolen property; (4) the admission of evidence of other crimes; and (5) the admission of evidence allegedly obtained unconstitutionally. We affirm.

Neville is an experienced automobile and truck salvage dealer and rebuilder who has operated for fifteen years in the Springfield, Illinois, area. He concentrates on late model trucks and carries a large inventory of new and used parts and used trucks. In March and April of 1973 he attempted to sell through a St. Louis auto auction seven stolen pickup trucks disguised to appear as used vehicles legitimately titled. A total of fourteen trucks were involved in the scheme. Seven "clean" trucks were legally obtained by Neville one purchased new through an accomplice, the other six in wrecked condition. He removed their factory marked frames and all other identification markings and transferred them to seven stolen trucks whose frames and identification markings he had removed and destroyed. He and his employees then drove four of the trucks from Illinois to St. Louis, Missouri, and consigned them to the Floyd Hauhe Auto Auction for sale.

The auction company guarantees title to all trucks sold by it and reserves the right to inspect the vehicles before they are sold. Suspicious of the legitimacy of the titles to the trucks, the manager of the auction contacted the Missouri State Highway Patrol. On April 20, 1973, Sergeant Mudd of the Missouri State Highway Patrol received the keys and titles to the four late model trucks and proceeded to inspect them.

Inspection revealed that the frames (which contain confidential or hidden identification numbers) had all been changed. Also, the federal warranty sticker was missing on each truck, even though one truck showed only 594 miles on its odometer. The trucks were seized and subsequent investigation revealed them to be stolen trucks disguised with lawfully obtained frames and markings. Three other stolen trucks previously sold by Neville through the auction in March, 1973, were similarly traced.

Neville claimed to have purchased six of the seven trucks in wrecked condition and rebuilt them for sale. The seventh he claimed to have received in trade. All seven appeared to be lawfully registered in Neville's name but none showed any signs of repair or body work; none was properly identified with all factory and registration markings; none matched the description of the original truck registered with the same identification numbers; and two of the seven carried no identification numbers at all. At trial the owners of six of the seven stolen trucks positively identified them as their own, and government witness Harold Stewart, Neville's accomplice, admitted stealing the remaining truck and delivering it to Neville in 1972.

I. The defendant's primary challenge is to the court's instruction permitting the jury to convict as to each count if it found that the defendant transported rebuilt trucks in interstate commerce knowing that they had been reconstituted by combining the "major parts" of stolen vehicles with parts of other vehicles. ³ Relying on United States v. Bishop, 434 F.2d 1284 (6th Cir. 1970), and United States v. Wallace, 361 F.2d 494 (6th Cir. 1966), defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the court's failure to define "major parts" to guide the jury in determining whether the trucks Neville was accused of transporting contained the requisite stolen parts to constitute them stolen "motor vehicles" within the meaning of the Act.

18 U.S.C. § 2311 (1970) provides that " 'motor vehicle' includes an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle designed for running on land but not on rails." "Major parts," however, are not independently defined in the Act. The District Court's charge to the jury tracked the statutory definition of "motor vehicles," but did not independently define or list their "major parts." The Government submits, and we agree, that no further definition of the term "major parts" is required. It is sufficient to show under the statute "that only some of the major parts of the vehicle in question were stolen." United States v. Stettmeier, 465 F.2d 436, 437 (9th Cir. 1972) (major parts of stolen aircraft). Once the trial judge delivers a legally accurate jury charge, as here, "the extent of its amplification must rest largely in his discretion." United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 536, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 1396, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947). We find no evidence that the jury misunderstood the charge and no abuse of discretion in this case.

"Major parts" is a commonly used conversational term without a technical meaning in this statutory context; it is not a word of art. Its meaning is within the jury's knowledge and experience and need not be explained. Indeed, as we have recognized in other contexts, to indulge in variations of statement in order to define otherwise understandable language might well confuse as much as help the jury. Guon v. United States, 285 F.2d 140, 142 (8th Cir. 1960). Moreover, excessive definitions of secondary, nonstatutory concepts might often because of imprecise language contain technical deficiencies that for lack of completeness would enable criminals to argue compliance with the definition, though in actuality violating the statute and its spirit. ⁴

On the contrary, the Dyer Act is not to be construed so narrowly as to disregard the paramount congressional purpose of curbing commercial interstate traffic in stolen motor vehicles. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 413-14, 77 S.Ct. 397, 400-401, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957). Without "major parts" of a vehicle being encompassed within the definition of "motor vehicles," enforcement of the Act might be foreclosed simply whenever a thief swaps stolen parts before being caught. We believe Congress intended no such impediment to enforcement. United States v. Stettmeier, supra, at 437.

In this case we are far from a marginal situation in which only one major part, i.e., a set of wheels, is proved to be stolen. Here, the subject vehicles themselves were all proved stolen and identified. The basic changes made by the defendant on the stolen vehicles were some repainting and substitution of the frames and clean identification plates and numbers of totally wrecked vehicles. Titles from the wrecked vehicles were then used to merchandise the stolen vehicles. Such an obvious loophole need not be provided for fences and dealers in stolen vehicles. The authorities cited by the defendant do not hold to the contrary. ⁵

II. Neville also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to identify the stolen trucks, to prove they were "motor vehicles," and to prove his knowledge that they were stolen. However, after a careful review of the record in a light most favorable to the Government, granting it the benefit of all factual inferences, Whiteside v. United States, 346 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023, 86 S.Ct. 1946, 16 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1965), we conclude that there was not only substantial, but overwhelming, evidence to support the verdict. Moody v. United States, 477 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1973).

The first count of the indictment concerned a red 1973 Chevrolet pickup containing a V-8 engine and most available options. Its coded identification number and warranty card, however, indicated that it should have contained only a six cylinder engine and very few optional features. A truck of that description, orange in color, bearing the same identification number, had in fact been purchased from a St. Louis dealer by one Evans in December, 1972. Neville claimed he obtained it from Evans in a trade.

Harold Stewart, however, testified that Neville admitted he and Evans stole the fully equipped red truck and replaced its frame and identifiable parts with those from the less expensive orange truck purchased by Evans. Thus, Neville boasted, they "owned" a fully equipped stolen truck with a legitimate identification number and bill of sale. At trial the true owner of the red truck positively identified his custom camper modifications and wiring installed on the truck before it was stolen. Thus, as to the first count in the indictment, there was adequate evidence for the jury to identify the truck as stolen, to find that even rebuilt it retained enough original major parts to remain a statutory "motor vehicle," and to conclude that Neville knew it was stolen.

The second count of the indictment identified a maroon 1972 Ford pickup containing a V-8 engine. Its coded serial number, however, also represented a different truck a green 1971 Ford pickup with a smaller engine salvaged to...