U.S. v. Le
Decision Date | 27 July 2004 |
Docket Number | No. CRIM. 1:03CR48.,CRIM. 1:03CR48. |
Citation | 327 F.Supp.2d 601 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Cuong Gia LE |
James Trump, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.
Frank Salvato, Alexandria, James Goodman Connell, III, Devine & Connell PLC, Fairfax, VA, for Defendant.
Defendant, Cuong Gia Le, in this capital murder prosecution challenges the Federal Death Penalty Act ("FDPA")1 on a variety of constitutional grounds. In addition, he also mounts a constitutional challenge to various aggravating factors set forth in the government's Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty ("Death Notice"). For the reasons that follow, these challenges fail; the FDPA passes constitutional muster, as do the various aggravating factors.
A history and summary of the allegations in this case may be found in previous memorandum opinions. See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, 311 F.Supp.2d 527, 528-31 (E.D.Va.2004) ( ); United States v. Cuong Gia Le, et al., 310 F.Supp.2d 763 (E.D.Va.2004) ( ). It suffices here to note that Le stands charged with numerous racketeering-related and firearms offenses, including two counts of murder in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) and two counts of murder in the course of a firearms offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). These charges relate to a shooting at the Majestic Restaurant in Falls Church, Virginia on May 13, 2001 that resulted in the death of two individuals: Binh Anh Luu and Long Phi Nguyen.
There have been two death notices in this case. The original Death Notice set forth two statutory aggravating factors and one nonstatutory aggravating factor. The Amended Death Notice added four nonstatutory aggravating factors and under a category entitled "history of violence" identified nine violent incidents in which Le was allegedly involved, including a murder. Le's attack on the original Death Notice failed. See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, 311 F.Supp.2d. 527, 535 (E.D.Va.2004) ( )(interlocutory appeal pending). His attack on the Amended Death Notice, however, succeeded and, as a result, the Amended Death Notice was stricken. See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, 316 F.Supp.2d 343 (E.D.Va.2004) ( ).2 At issue here, given that the Amended Death Notice has been stricken, are two motions: (i) Le's Motion to Strike Aggravating Factors Alleged in Government's Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty; and (ii) Le's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Strike Aggravating Factors Alleged in, Government's Amended Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. The second motion, inter alia, reiterates the arguments made in the first motion and applies those arguments to the Amended Death Notice. Because the memorandum opinion striking the Amended Death Notice dealt with one of the arguments advanced in the second motion — that the government failed to show good cause to amend the original Death Notice — that argument will not be addressed again here. The remaining arguments made by Le in the second motion relating to the constitutionality of the FDPA, now that the Amended Death Notice has been stricken, will be construed to apply to the original Death Notice. To the extent that any arguments in the second motion relate to aggravating factors alleged solely in the Amended Death Notice and not in the original Death Notice, those arguments are now moot and need not be addressed here.
Le challenges the constitutionality of the FDPA on six grounds, each of which will be addressed in turn. First, Le argues that the relaxed evidentiary standard for the capital sentencing phase proscribed by the FDPA violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and his confrontation clause rights under the Sixth Amendment. The FDPA provides that during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, the defendant may present any information relevant to a mitigating factor, while the government may present any information relevant to an aggravating factor for which notice has been provided. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). Significantly, during this phase of the proceedings,
Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
Id. Thus, this statutory provision makes clear that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not govern the admissibility of evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors in a capital sentencing hearing. Given this, Le essentially argues that the admission of evidence during the sentencing phase that is not constrained by the Federal Rules of Evidence will necessarily render a jury's recommendation of a death sentence inherently unreliable and hence constitutionally infirm.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has sensibly made clear that heightened reliability is required in capital cases. See, e.g., Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998) ( ); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) () (internal citation omitted); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238-39, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988) ( ). At the same time, however, "the Supreme Court has also made clear that, in order to achieve such `heightened reliability,' more evidence, not less, should be admitted on the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors." United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2004). Indeed, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court noted that
[T]he Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered at [a death penalty] hearing.... So long as the evidence introduced ... at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions. We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when making the sentencing decision.
428 U.S. 153, 203-04, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (internal citations omitted). Maximizing the information about a defendant is important because in "determin[ing] whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence[, w]hat is important ... is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime." Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fell, 360 F.3d at 143 (). Simply put, because capital sentencing demands an individualized determination on the basis of a defendant's character and the circumstances of the crime, this goal is more reliably accomplished through the admissibility of more information, not less, constrained only by the Constitution and the need to exclude any unfairly prejudicial information. In this respect, it is important to note, as the Second Circuit has, that Fell, 360 F.3d at 143. By contrast, sentencing must be informed by the greatest amount of relevant information to ensure individualized punishment that is just and fitting in the circumstances.
The FDPA evidentiary standard, like the Georgia standard approved in Gregg, satisfies the Supreme Court's mandate for heightened reliability. Indeed, it excludes a greater amount of prejudicial information than the Federal Rules of Evidence by permitting the judge to exclude information where the "probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice" rather than "substantially outweighed." See Rule 403, Fed.R.Evid. While it is true that the FDPA standard may permit the admission of evidence that might be excludable under the Federal Rules, it Fell, 360 F.3d at 144 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976)).
Moreover, it is clear that Congress has the authority to prescribe rules of evidence in federal trials "subject only to the requirement that the rules comport with the Constitution, and it may `modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and...
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