U.S. v. Oliver, 85-1190

• Decision Date: 04 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1190,85-1190
• Citation: 787 F.2d 124
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Aaron OLIVER, a/k/a Aron Oliver & "Ollie". Appeal of Aaron OLIVER. . Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit Rule 12(6)

Page 124

787 F.2d 124

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Aaron OLIVER, a/k/a Aron Oliver & "Ollie" Appeal of Aaron OLIVER.

No. 85-1190.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit Rule 12(6)

March 4, 1986.

Decided March 31, 1986.

Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., U.S. Atty., Walter S. Batty, Jr., Chief of Appeals, Sharie A. Brown, Asst. U.S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.

Stephen Robert LaCheen, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Before GIBBONS, BECKER and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECKER, Circuit Judge.

Aaron Oliver appeals from a judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, on a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. App. I Sec. 1202(a)(1). Oliver was sentenced as a dangerous special offender (DSO) under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575. Although 18 U.S.C. App. I Sec. 1202(a)(1) carries a maximum sentence of two years, Oliver was sentenced (as a DSO) to 12 years' imprisonment.

Oliver raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that he was denied due process of law and was the victim of prosecutorial vindictiveness when, as the result of his failure to cooperate with state authorities his pending state firearms charge became the subject of a federal indictment. Second, Oliver alleges that the imposition of a 12-year sentence under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575, upon his conviction under Sec. 1202(a)(1), was disproportionate to his conviction and excessive. We find both of Oliver's arguments to be without merit and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

On January 20, 1984, Philadelphia Police Department detectives took Oliver into custody as part of an investigation into the death of Ronald Luckett. When arrested, Oliver, a convicted felon, possessed a loaded .38 caliber revolver. On January 30, 1984, Oliver was charged with firearms violations.

Assistant District Attorney Arnold Gordon informed Oliver's attorney, Daniel-Paul Alva, that he wanted Oliver to cooperate with the Philadelphia Police in the investigation of the Luckett homicide. Gordon allegedly told Alva that, if Oliver failed to cooperate or flunked a lie detector test, Oliver's state firearms charge would be referred to federal authorities for prosecution. Alva advised his client to cooperate with the Philadelphia Police and expressed his belief that, in return for Oliver's cooperation, the state firearms charges would be withdrawn or subjected to an entry of nolle prosequi.

What transpired in state court is not entirely clear. It appears that Oliver cooperated with the state authorities to some degree and that they dropped the state charges against him, but that they ultimately deemed his cooperation to be insufficient and thus alerted the federal authorities to the fact that Oliver, a convicted felon, possessed a firearm. At all events, on October 19, 1984, the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a complaint and warrant charging Oliver with a violation of 18 U.S.C. App. I Sec. 1202(a)(1). An indictment soon followed. The government also filed a Notice of Request for Dangerous Special Offender Status pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575.

On January 30, 1985, a jury convicted Oliver of a violation of 18 U.S.C. App. I Sec. 1202(a)(1). The court denied Oliver's motion to dismiss the government's request for Dangerous Special Offender Status pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575 and sentenced Oliver on March 13, 1985, as a dangerous special offender, to 12 years in prison and a $10,000 fine.

II.

Oliver alleges that his due process rights, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, were violated because his pending state firearms case was referred to the federal authorities for prosecution as a direct result of his failure to cooperate in the Luckett homicide investigation. This deprivation of due process, he contends, is the result of prosecutorial vindictiveness as described in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974), and thus his conviction should be reversed.

The Supreme Court held in Blackledge that it is a due process violation for a prosecutor to bring a more serious charge against a defendant who exercises his statutory right of appeal or collaterally attacks his conviction on a lesser charge. Blackledge, supra, 417 U.S. at 27-29, 94 S.Ct. at 2102-2103. Actual retaliatory motivation need not exist; the Court's focus is on whether the possibility of increased punishment posed a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness. Blackledge, supra, 417 U.S. at 27, 94 S.Ct. at 2102.

The government argues that since the discussions between Assistant District Attorney Gordon and Oliver's attorney Alva amounted to plea bargaining, the proscriptions of Blackledge do not apply and Oliver's due process rights were not violated. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Blackledge decision applied to the plea bargaining process. The Court determined that no prosecutorial vindictiveness existed and no due process violation occurred in the context of a plea bargain where the defendant is informed of the terms of the deal and is free to accept or reject the offer. Bordenkircher, supra 434 U.S. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 667. The Court acknowledged that the guilty plea and the plea bargain "... are important components of this country's criminal justice system." Id. "While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a 'discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable'--and permissible--'attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas'." Id. at 364, 98 S.Ct. at 668, citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 1985, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973).

Since Oliver's theory of the case is that he was prosecuted by federal authorities solely because he failed to cooperate satisfactorily with the Philadelphia Police in the plea bargaining process, this case is governed by Bordenkircher. ¹ It is not disputed that defendant's attorney, Mr. Alva, discussed with Mr. Oliver the decision that confronted him and explained the ramifications of each of his choices. Oliver made an informed decision not to cooperate fully with the police in the Luckett homicide investigation, though he did succeed in getting his state charges dropped. Thus, under the reasoning of Bordenkircher, there was no prosecutorial vindictiveness, for Oliver was fully informed of the consequences of his choices; he freely decided not to cooperate to a greater extent with the local authorities and, as a result, was later indicted by federal authorities.

We need not, however, rest our decision on this analysis alone. Other circuits that have addressed this issue have found that separate sovereigns have the right to bring increased charges or simultaneous prosecutions for similar or identical offenses and that there is no prosecutorial vindictiveness where the prosecutor's decision to prosecute is based upon the usual determinative factors. See United States v. DeMichael, 692 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir.1982); United States v. Ballester, 763 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Robison, 644 F.2d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir.1981). According to the facts of this case, the federal government's decision to prosecute Oliver was a proper exercise of such prosecutorial discretion. Oliver, who had felony convictions for forcible rape, receipt of stolen goods, and firearms defenses, possessed a firearm that was manufactured in Miami, thus affecting interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. App. I Sec. 1202(a)(1). Oliver failed to establish that he was prosecuted because he failed to cooperate with the state authorities. Indeed there is no evidence that federal prosecutors participated in the plea bargain discussions between Mr. Alva and Assistant District Attorney Gordon. Further, the federal prosecutors had nothing to gain from Oliver's cooperation with the state authorities because the Luckett homicide was a matter of concern for the Philadelphia Police. Thus, we find no violation of Oliver's due process rights.

III.

Oliver argues that his 12-year sentence, which the district court imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575, ² is an excessive penalty for a violation of 18 U.S.C. App. I Sec. 1202(a)(1), which carries a two-year maximum sentence. Oliver buttresses his argument with the assertion that other defendants charged as DSO's with violation of 18 U.S.C. App. I Sec. 1202(a)(1) have fared better than he. ³ This court is permitted under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3576 to conduct broad reviews of dangerous special offender sentences. Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3576. ⁴

Oliver does not contest the district court's finding that he is a dangerous special offender under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575. He argues that the twelve-year sentence imposed violates that part of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575 that provides "the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for...