U.S. v. Olson

Decision Date08 November 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-759.,04-759.
Citation126 S. Ct. 510,163 L. Ed. 2d 306,546 U.S. 43
PartiesUNITED STATES <I>v.</I> OLSON ET AL.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Claiming that federal mine inspectors' negligence helped cause a mine accident, two injured workers (and a spouse) sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (Act), which authorizes private tort actions against the Government "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred," 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The District Court dismissed in part on the ground that the allegations did not show that Arizona law would impose liability upon a private person in similar circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning from two premises: (1) Where unique governmental functions are at issue, the Act waives sovereign immunity if a state or municipal entity would be held liable under the law where the activity occurred, and (2) federal mine inspections are such unique governmental functions since there is no private-sector analogue for mine inspections. Because Arizona law would make a state or municipal entity liable in the circumstances alleged, the Circuit concluded that the United States' sovereign immunity was waived.

Held: Under § 1346(b)(1), the United States waives sovereign immunity only where local law would make a "private person" liable in tort, not where local law would make "a state or municipal entity" liable. Pp. 45-48.

(a) The Ninth Circuit's first premise is too broad, reading into the Act something that is not there. Section 1346(b)(1) says that it waives sovereign immunity "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person," not "the United States, if a state or municipal entity," would be liable. (Emphasis added.) This Court has consistently adhered to this "private person" standard, even when uniquely governmental functions are at issue. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64; Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318. Even though both these cases involved Government efforts to escape liability by pointing to the absence of municipal entity liability, there is no reason for treating differently a plaintiff's effort to base liability solely upon the fact that a State would impose liability upon a state governmental entity. Nothing in the Act's context, history, or objectives or in this Court's opinions suggests otherwise. Pp. 45-46.

(b) The Ninth Circuit's second premise reads the Act too narrowly. Section 2674 makes the United States liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." (Emphasis added.) The words "like circumstances" do not restrict a court's inquiry to the same circumstances, but require it to look further afield. See, e. g., Indian Towing, supra, at 64. The Government in effect concedes, and other Courts of Appeals' decisions applying Indian Towing's logic suggest, that private person analogies exist for the federal mine inspectors' conduct at issue. The Ninth Circuit should have looked for such an analogy. Pp. 46-47.

(c) The lower courts should decide in the first instance precisely which Arizona tort law doctrine applies here. P. 48.

362 F.3d 1236, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

Deanne E. Maynard argued the cause for the United States. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Mark B. Stern, and Dana J. Martin.

Thomas G. Cotter argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or Act) authorizes private tort actions against the United States "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). We here interpret these words to mean what they say, namely, that the United States waives sovereign immunity "under circumstances" where local law would make a "private person" liable in tort. (Emphasis added.) And we reverse a line of Ninth Circuit precedent permitting courts in certain circumstances to base a waiver simply upon a finding that local law would make a "state or municipal entit[y]" liable. See, e. g., Hines v. United States, 60 F.3d 1442, 1448 (1995); Cimo v. INS, 16 F.3d 1039, 1041 (1994); Cameron v. Janssen Bros. Nurseries, Ltd., 7 F.3d 821, 825 (1993); Aguilar v. United States, 920 F. 2d 1475, 1477 (1990); Doggett v. United States, 875 F. 2d 684, 689 (1989).

I

In this case, two injured mine workers (and a spouse) have sued the United States claiming that the negligence of federal mine inspectors helped bring about a serious accident at an Arizona mine. The Federal District Court dismissed the lawsuit in part upon the ground that their allegations were insufficient to show that Arizona law would impose liability upon a private person in similar circumstances. The Ninth Circuit, in a brief per curiam opinion, reversed this determination. It reasoned from two premises. First, where "`unique governmental functions'" are at issue, the Act waives sovereign immunity if "`a state or municipal entity would be [subject to liability] under the law [. . .] where the activity occurred.'" 362 F.3d 1236, 1240 (2004) (citing Hines, supra, at 1448, and quoting Doggett, supra, at 689, and Concrete Tie of San Diego, Inc. v. Liberty Constr., Inc., 107 F.3d 1368, 1371 (CA9 1997)). Second, federal mine inspections being regulatory in nature are such "`unique governmental functions,'" since "there is no private-sector analogue for mine inspections." 362 F.3d, at 1240 (quoting in part Doggett, supra, at 689). The Circuit then held that Arizona law would make "state and municipal entities" liable in the circumstances alleged; hence the FTCA waives the United States' sovereign immunity. 362 F.3d, at 1240.

II

We disagree with both of the Ninth Circuit's legal premises.

A

The first premise is too broad, for it reads into the Act something that is not there. The Act says that it waives sovereign immunity "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person," not "the United States, if a state or municipal entity," would be liable. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). Our cases have consistently adhered to this "private person" standard. In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955), this Court rejected the Government's contention that there was "no liability for negligent performance of `uniquely governmental functions.'" It held that the Act requires a court to look to the state-law liability of private entities, not to that of public entities, when assessing the Government's liability under the FTCA "in the performance of activities which private persons do not perform." Ibid. In Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318-319 (1957), the Court rejected a claim that the scope of FTCA liability for "`uniquely governmental'" functions depends on whether state law "imposes liability on municipal or other local governments for the negligence of their agents acting in" similar circumstances. And even though both these cases involved Government efforts to escape liability by pointing to the absence of municipal entity liability, we are unaware of any reason for treating differently a plaintiff's effort to base liability solely upon the fact that a State would impose liability upon a municipal (or other state governmental) entity. Indeed, we have found nothing in the Act's context, history, or objectives or in the opinions of this Court suggesting a waiver of sovereign immunity solely upon that basis.

B

The Ninth Circuit's second premise rests upon a reading of the Act that is too narrow. The Act makes the United States liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (emphasis added). As this Court said in Indian Towing, the words "`like circumstances'" do not restrict a court's inquiry to the same circumstances, but require it to look further afield. 350 U.S., at 64; see also S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 32 (1946) (purpose of...

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