U.S. v. One 1988 Chevrolet Half-Ton Pickup Truck, CIV. 04-0227-WSC.

• Decision Date: 21 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 04-0227-WSC.,CIV. 04-0227-WSC.
• Citation: 357 F.Supp.2d 1321
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. ONE 1988 CHEVROLET CHEYENNE HALF-TON PICKUP TRUCK, et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

357 F.Supp.2d 1321

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. ONE 1988 CHEVROLET CHEYENNE HALF-TON PICKUP TRUCK, et al., Defendant.

No. CIV. 04-0227-WSC.

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama Southern Division.

February 21, 2005.

Alex F. Lankford, IV, U.S. Attorney's Office, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff.

Robert Troy Teague, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.

ORDER

STEELE, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff United States of America's Motion to Strike Claim, or Alternatively Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 26). The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition at this time.¹

I. Background.

On April 13, 2004, the United States filed a Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem (doc. 1) pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (forfeiture provision of the Controlled Substance Act) and 31 U.S.C. § 5332(c) (forfeiture provision of the Bulk Cash Smuggling Act).² According to the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint, on November 19, 2003, an Alabama State Trooper stopped claimant Jose Luis Verdin Aguila ("Aguila") for following too closely and improper tag display. After noting that Aguila appeared nervous and that he admitted having $1,200 on his person, the trooper requested and received consent to search the 1988 Chevrolet Cheyenne Half-Ton Pickup Truck (the "Truck") being driven by Aguila. During the search, the trooper spotted after-market modifications on the Truck in the form of two trapdoors under the bedliner on each side of the bed, near the wheel wells. Removal of those doors revealed a compartment containing $313,030 in United States currency in vacuum-sealed packages wrapped in foil. Aguila was found to be in possession of an additional $5,900 on his person, not just the $1,200 he had identified. These funds totaling $318,930 (the "Currency") were seized, as was the Truck. At the time of the seizure, Aguila allegedly gave a statement to law enforcement officers in which he acknowledged that he was being paid $4,000 to transport a duffle bag to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, and that he believed the bag contained illegal drugs or other contraband.³ The United States initiated this action to effectuate forfeiture of the seized Currency and Truck.⁴

On June 14, 2004, Aguila, by and through counsel of record, filed a Verified Statement of Interest (doc. 13) in this action, in which he asserted that the Truck and the Currency were "his personal property, acquired through his hard work," and that they were neither proceeds of illegal activity nor acquired in any manner involving controlled substances. (Id. at 1.)⁵ No other person or entity has come forward with a statement of claim to either the Truck or the Currency. In the ensuing months, plaintiff and claimant commenced discovery pursuant to the operative Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order. In October 2004, Aguila served interrogatories and requests for production on the United States; meanwhile, the United States announced its intent to take Aguila's deposition. Correspondence records reflect that on October 26, 2004, Aguila's attorney informed plaintiff's counsel that he "had attempted to contact Mr. Aguila [regarding deposition scheduling] but had been told that he would be out of town until October 27th or 28th." (United States Brief (doc. 27), at Exh. E-2.) On November 11, 2004, Aguila's attorney wrote that "frankly, there is no time that is convenient" for Aguila to appear for a deposition, and that he intended to object to the proposed deposition on the basis of undue hardship and other unspecified grounds. (Id. at Exh. E-3.) The United States ultimately noticed his deposition for November 23, 2004. At no time did claimant ever file objections to the Notice of Deposition or otherwise seek protection from the Court.

Plaintiff's efforts to depose Aguila in November 2004 occurred contemporaneously with other significant events. Specifically, on November 19, 2004, a criminal indictment against Aguila was unsealed in this judicial district, bearing the caption United States of America v. Jose Luis Aguila Verdin, Criminal No. 04-00052. The indictment charged Aguila with two counts of violating the Bulk Cash Smuggling Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5332(a)(1), in connection with the November 19, 2003 seizure of the Currency and the Truck, and one count of providing a false statement to a federal agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), when he allegedly informed Special Agent Lopez that he was unaware that money was hidden in the Truck until such funds were discovered by law enforcement officers. The indictment also included a forfeiture count which tracks generally the forfeiture allegations of the instant civil action, albeit through a criminal law mechanism.⁶

Upon the unsealing of the criminal case, the United States provided Aguila's counsel with copies of the indictment and the outstanding warrant for Aguila's arrest. Having furnished this documentation, plaintiff's counsel inquired as to (a) whether and when Aguila intended to return to the United States to face the criminal charges, and (b) whether Aguila intended to return for his deposition in the civil case as scheduled on November 23. (Plaintiff Brief, at Exh. E-6.) On November 21, 2004, Aguila's counsel responded with a letter indicating that Aguila would not appear for his November 23 deposition, that counsel had spoken with him about "the most recent developments in this cause of action" (which could only refer to the unsealing of the indictment), and that "all the events have affected him very strongly and that he has been under the doctor's care." (Id. at Exh. E-7.) Aguila's counsel emphasized that while Aguila had not informed him "of a firm decision as to whether he will come back voluntarily to confront the criminal charges," Aguila wished "to clear all matters" if his health permitted. (Id.) The November 21 letter does not elaborate on the nature of Aguila's health problems, nor does it identify any doctor-imposed restrictions on his activities. Aguila did not appear for his scheduled deposition, and never sought leave of court to modify or be excused from compliance with the applicable Notice of Deposition.⁷

II. Analysis.

On December 13, 2004, the United States moved to strike Aguila's claim pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine or, alternatively, for an order granting summary judgment in plaintiff's favor as to Aguila's claim. Aguila received a full opportunity to respond and to place supplemental materials in the record. After careful consideration of the arguments and authorities presented by the parties, the Court is of the opinion that the United States' Motion is due to be granted on principles of fugitive disentitlement.

A. Evolution of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine.

Federal courts have recognized various permutations of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine for well over a century. In the 1876 case of Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 4 Otto 97, 24 L.Ed. 32 (1876), the Supreme Court declined to entertain an appeal by a criminal defendant who had escaped and was not in custody when his petition reached the Court. The Smith Court reasoned that, regardless of whether it affirmed his sentence or reversed it and ordered a new trial, the petitioner would not likely respond or appear. Over time, the doctrine has been refined by both trial and appellate courts into an equitable measure to limit access to the courts by fugitives from justice. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Pharaon, 178 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir.1999); United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1183-84 (11th Cir.1997).⁸ Although a party's fugitive status does not strip a case of its classification as an adjudicable case or controversy (i.e., it does not deprive a court of jurisdiction), it may disentitle that party from availing himself of the court's resources to adjudicate his claims. See Pharaon, 178 F.3d at 1161; Barnette, 129 F.3d at 1184. This doctrine has traditionally been employed by appellate courts to dismiss fugitives' appeals of their criminal convictions, but it has also been utilized by district courts in civil actions to "sanction or enter judgment against parties on the basis of their fugitive status." Magluta v. Samples, 162 F.3d 662, 664 (11th Cir.1998) (explaining that dismissal of civil action on fugitive disentitlement grounds requires showing that plaintiff is a fugitive, that fugitive status is connected to civil action, and that dismissal promotes equitable considerations underlying the doctrine); see generally Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1240 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that where its authority has been questioned by the defendant's flight in a criminal case before it, district court is empowered to use fugitive disentitlement doctrine to protect integrity of the judicial system).

Despite this flourishing body of common law, application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in civil forfeiture cases when the claimant is a fugitive from parallel criminal proceedings encountered a major stumbling block in Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996), wherein the unanimous Supreme Court recoiled at the prospect of unilateral judicial action dismissing civil forfeiture claims of claimants who were fugitives from justice. The Degen Court's holding was predicated on separation of powers concerns with a branch of the government undertaking to define its own authority, without cooperation or input from other branches. Ultimately, that Court ruled as follows:

"[W]e acknowledge disquiet at the spectacle of a criminal defendant reposing in Switzerland, beyond the reach of our criminal courts, while at the same time mailing papers to the court in a related civil action and expecting them to be honored.... A court-made rule striking Degen's claims and entering summary judgment against him as a sanction, however, would be an arbitrary response to the conduct it is supposed to redress or discourage."

517 U.S....