U.S. v. Owens, 95-10456

• Decision Date: 17 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-10456,95-10456
• Citation: 86 F.3d 1164
• Parties: NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alvin Pipkin OWENS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1164

86 F.3d 1164

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alvin Pipkin OWENS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-10456.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 17, 1996. ^*

Decided May 21, 1996.

Before: ALARCON, BEEZER, and RYMER, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM ^**

Alvin Pipkin Owens appeals his convictions on four counts of knowingly making false statements on loan applications submitted to four different federally insured financial institutions for the purpose of influencing the actions of the institutions on the loan applications in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014. We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I

Owens argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions because the government failed to introduce any evidence that Owens himself made the false statements on the four loan applications. We disagree.

Stefan Ammos identified Owens's signature on a deed of trust that Ammos had notarized in connection with Owens's purchase of a piece of property, and this same signature appeared on Owens's tax returns and Virginia driver's license. By comparing this signature with the signatures on the four loan applications, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Owens signed the loan applications. Moreover, Ammos testified that his company helped Owens prepare the home loan applications, and that it was his company's usual business practice for Owens to provide completed handwritten loan applications, and then to have the information contained on those applications typed onto printed loan applications that were then submitted to the banks. This evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find that Owens made the false statements on the loan applications.

II

Owens argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to permit a stipulation that Owens had paid off the two automobile loans. We disagree.

Loss to the financial institutions is not an element of the offenses charged against Owens, and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding as not relevant the stipulation that Owens repaid the loans. Nor can we say that the court abused its discretion by refusing to permit the stipulation under the so-called doctrine of "curative admissibility," inasmuch as Karen Muth's testimony that Owens had defaulted on one payment due on the car loans did not leave a misleading impression that he never paid off the balance due on the loans. United States v. Doe, 656 F.2d 411, 412 (9th Cir.1981).

III

Owens argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence certain loan documents in Guardian Savings and Loan's files, because they were hearsay not coming within the business records exception. We disagree.

Of the three documents to which Owens objected,...