U.S. v. Padilla

• Decision Date: 09 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-1344,93-1344
• Citation: U.S. v. Padilla, 23 F.3d 1220 (7th Cir. 1994)
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Salvador PADILLA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1220

23 F.3d 1220

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Salvador PADILLA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 93-1344.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 11, 1994.

Decided May 9, 1994.

Andrew B. Baker, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of the U.S. Atty., Dyer, IN (argued), for plaintiff-appellee.

Carmen Fernandez, Szarmach & Fernandez, Hammond, IN (argued), for defendant-appellant.

Before CUMMINGS, CUDAHY and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Salvador Padilla was one of fourteen defendants named in a multi-count indictment targeting a cocaine distribution operation. Charged with participation in the drug conspiracy, see 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846, Padilla quickly agreed to plead guilty and cooperate with the government's prosecution of his codefendants in exchange for certain favorable treatment. Specifically, the government promised not to prosecute Padilla for any further offense that he might disclose in the course of his cooperation and agreed to recommend to the district court that it impose the minimum sentence available within the relevant sentencing guideline range determined to be applicable at the time of sentencing. The government also assured Padilla that it would seek to defer sentencing until he could complete his end of the bargain and then it would notify the sentencing court of the extent and quality of his cooperation.

The plea agreement, however, did a poor job of spelling out the likely consequences of Padilla's plea of guilty. It stated that he was subject to a maximum penalty of forty years imprisonment and a $2,000,000 fine and that if he was actually sentenced to one year or more of prison time he would face a subsequent period of supervised release lasting at least three years (and up to life). This characterization of his potential exposure was both misleading and incomplete. First of all, it was clear that the conspiracy and the scope of Padilla's participation in it probably involved enough cocaine mixture (at least five kilograms) to activate a potential maximum penalty of life imprisonment coupled with a $4,000,000 fine. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(A). (Eight kilograms of cocaine were eventually attributed to Padilla by the court at sentencing). Secondly, the plea agreement contained no mention of the mandatory minimum sentences Padilla would likely face--ten years under Sec. 841(b)(1)(A) for five or more kilograms of cocaine or five years under Sec. 841(b)(1)(B) for one-half kilogram or more.

Normally, such deficiencies are remedied at the plea hearing where the district court engages the defendant in a required colloquy designed in part to ascertain his awareness of the consequences of his plea. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c). ¹ In this case, however, the able and experienced district judge unfortunately repeated the errors of the plea agreement. While taking pains to ensure that Padilla understood the nature of the charge against him and the rights he would forego by pleading guilty, the district court did not advise Padilla accurately of the maximum penalties actually facing him and neglected to inform him at all about the mandatory minimums likely applicable to his case. The latter shortcoming is the focus of Padilla's appellate brief and the request to vacate his guilty plea contained within it.

This violation of Rule 11(c)(1)--that it is a violation is clear--is subject to harmless error review and should be disregarded if it "does not affect substantial rights." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h). In the context of a defendant's acceptance of a plea of guilty, the harmlessness inquiry naturally should focus on "whether the defendant's knowledge and comprehension of the full and correct information would have been likely to affect his willingness to plead guilty." United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir.1993) (en banc). If the oversight in the colloquy may be reasonably viewed, from a review of the limited record typically preserved in such cases, as having influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty, then it impaired his ability to evaluate with eyes open the direct attendant risks of accepting criminal responsibility--certainly a substantial right within the ambit of Rule 11 generally, and the substantial right protected by Rule 11(c). See id.; Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, 1974 advisory committee note.

Failure to inform a defendant about applicable mandatory minimums can be, but is not necessarily, a serious oversight. The inquiry is fact bound. If, for instance, the record discloses that a defendant was aware when pleading guilty that the sentencing guidelines would subject him to a sentence well in excess of any statutory mandatory minimum likely applicable to his case, the failure to advise him of such minimums during the plea hearing cannot reasonably be said to have affected his decision to accept the plea. See Johnson, 1 F.3d at 303. On the other hand, where it is not clear that a defendant was aware of the sentencing guideline range into which his relevant conduct would likely fall, the failure to inform him of the probable applicability of statutorily mandated minimums may well have impaired his ability to understand his situation fully. See id. n. 31. The relevant inquiry must center upon what the defendant actually knows when he pleads guilty--and without an affirmative indication in the record we cannot assume that he knows anything about the sentence restrictions he faces--, what information would have been added (or what corrections made) to his pool of knowledge by compliance with Rule 11 demands, and how the additional or corrected information would have likely affected his decisionmaking.

From the sparse record in this case, it is impossible to say that Padilla knew that a statutory minimum of ten years would likely be applicable to his situation, or that at the least a five year minimum would almost surely bind the sentencing court. ² And unlike a misapprehension about the minimum time of supervised release to which one is subject following completion of a known, lengthy prison term, see United States v. Saenz, 969 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.1992), ignorance about the necessity (or likelihood, see Johnson, supra) of serving many years in prison strikes us as an informational lack so serious that unless strong indications to the contrary are apparent from the record a court should presume it influenced a defendant's decision to plead guilty.

The government, however, points out that in Padilla's case the court, at sentencing, actually departed downward from the statutory minimum sentence of 10 years--as it may, see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(e)--on the government's motion noting Padilla's substantial assistance in the effort to prosecute his cohorts. The district court did in fact depart beneath the minimum sentence mandated by statute to be imposed for conspiratorial involvement with eight kilograms of cocaine (so attributed to Padilla by the presentence report and accepted by the court and all parties at sentencing). ³ The court chose as its ultimate sentence the low end of the range which it had initially determined to be applicable to Padilla's circumstance under the guidelines in the absence of the statutory ten-year minimum--87 months. For several, independent reasons this course, however, does not mitigate the harm of the plea hearing error. First, Padilla was never even informed, so far as we can tell, that he faced the lower mandatory minimum of five years, which his actual sentence did indeed exceed. The plea agreement merely provides that Padilla would be sentenced according to the guidelines and the government would recommend the low end of the applicable range. The government also notes that Padilla stated at his plea hearing that he had discussed with his counsel the application of the guidelines to his case. But we do not know whether counsel accurately calculated the sentencing ramifications of Padilla's situation or relayed that information to him, and we cannot find this out from the limited record generated in this case (and generally created in these types of cases, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, 1983 advisory note). In fact, Padilla was subject to a mandatory minimum of five years of which there is no firm basis to conclude he was aware. Although sentencing guideline ranges do not represent minimum and maximum statutory sentences to which a defendant's attention must be brought under Rule 11, see United States v. Salva, 902 F.2d 483 (7th Cir.1990), one reason that this position is justifiable in drug cases (where quantity really is almost everything for sentencing purposes) is that a defendant's knowledge of applicable mandatory minimums and maximums largely insures his cognizance of the order of the risk presented by acceptance of criminal responsibility. "[I]n drug cases, ... awareness of a statutory minimum will, in and of itself, inform a defendant as to the gross ranges of drug quantities which the government contends may be involved...." Herndon, 7 F.3d at 58. So far as we can ascertain, Padilla lacked any insight on this score.

Second, the failure to inform Padilla about the ten-year minimum term, although ultimately not imposed in full, likely also influenced his decision to plead guilty. Even if Padilla accurately calculated the guideline score at which the district court would eventually arrive, the promises of substantial cooperation contained within the plea agreement coupled with the reassuring nature of the agreement indicate--especially when considered in light of the fact that the government eventually did move for a downward departure at sentencing--that he likely pled guilty in anticipation of such a favorable motion. The failure to inform Padilla of the statutory mandatory term probably prevented him from appreciating what the relevant point of departure would be--that is, it is not unlikely that Padilla accepted the deal thinking that his cooperation could potentially decrease a guideline sentence of 87...