U.S. v. Papakee
| Decision Date | 02 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-CR-162-LRR.,06-CR-162-LRR. |
| Citation | 485 F.Supp.2d 1032 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Lamont William PAPAKEE and Connie Frances Blackcloud, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Ian Thornhill, U.S. Attorney's Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................1034
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ............................................................1034
III. PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION .......................................................1035
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Indian Major Crimes Act) ...............................1035
B. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (Definition of "Indian Country") ........................1036
IV. JUDGE OR JURY ....................................................................1036
V. FACTUAL FINDINGS .................................................................1037
A. History of the Settlement to 1978 .............................................1038
B. History of the Settlement after 1978 ..........................................1039
VI. ANALYSIS .........................................................................1040
A. The Settlement ................................................................1040
1. Informal Reservation Status ................................................1040
2. Licklider ..................................................................1041
3. The Youngbear cases ........................................................1042
a. Youngbear I .............................................................1043
b. Youngbear II ............................................................1043
c. Youngbear III ...........................................................1043
d. The importance of the Youngbear cases ...................................1043
4. Conclusion .................................................................1044
B. 315 Red Earth Drive ...........................................................1044
VII. DISPOSITION ......................................................................1046
In this case, the court must decide whether the Meskwaki Settlement in Tama County, Iowa ("Settlement"), is "Indian country," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and as applied in the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. If the Settlement is not Indian country, the court lacks jurisdiction to try Defendants LaMont William Papakee and Connie Frances Blackcloud on various charges of sex, abuse. In what follows, the court holds that the Settlement is "Indian country."
Defendants are charged in a two-count Superseding Indictment (docket no. 39).1 Count 1 charges that, on or about September 6, 2006, Defendants committed the crime of Aggravated Sexual Abuse in Indian Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1151, 1153 and 2241(a)(1). Count 2 charges Defendants with Sexual Abuse in Indian Country, on the same date, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1151, 1153 and 2242(2).
On March 12, 2007, the court sua sponte directed the parties to brief whether the court has criminal jurisdiction over Defendants. On March 19, 2007, the government and Defendant Blackcloud jointly filed a Memorandum in Support of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction. On the same date, Defendant Papakee filed a Brief Regarding Jurisdiction. On March 21, 2007, the government filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction.
On March 22, 2007, the court held an evidentiary hearing ("Hearing"). Assistant United States Attorneys Ian K. Thornhill and Robert M. Butler represented the government. Attorney Renée V. Sneitzer represented Defendant Papakee, who was personally present. Attorney Eric K. Parrish represented Defendant Blackcloud, who was also personally present.
At the Hearing, the court requested additional briefing. On March 29, 2007, the government filed a Second Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction. On March 30, 2007, Defendant Papakee filed an Addendum Brief Regarding Jurisdiction ("Defendant's Addendum"). Defendant Blackcloud did not file a brief on these two issues.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the `threshold requirement in every federal case is jurisdiction.'" Bradley v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL — CIO, 962 F.2d 800, 802 n. 3 (8th Cir.1992) (quoting Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir.1987)). The court is "obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction." Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).
The government premises jurisdiction upon 18 U.S.C. § 1153, the Indian Major Crimes Act. Section 1153(a) provides:
Any Indian who commits ... any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with, intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Section 1153 "subject[s Defendants] to the same body of law as any other individual, Indian or non-Indian, charged with [crimes] committed in a federal enclave," United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 648, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977), provided that (1) Defendants are "Indians"; (2) the crimes charged are enumerated in § 1153; and (3) the alleged conduct occurred in "Indian country," 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
The parties agree that Defendants are "Indians" and are prepared to so stipulate at trial. Further, the parties agree that Counts 1 and 2 of the Superseding Indictment charge crimes, that are enumerated in § 1153. Count 1 charges Aggravated Sexual Abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241, and Count 2 charges Sexual Abuse, in violation of 18 US.C. § 2242(2). Each crime is "a felony under chapter 109A." See, e.g., United States v. Goodlow, 105 F.3d 1203, 1206 n. 5 (8th Cir.1997) (); Escalanti v. United States, No. 91-36163, 1992 WL 276977, *1 (Oct. 9, 1992) (). Therefore, the only disputed issue is whether the alleged conduct occurred in "Indian country."
"Indian country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151. With some exceptions not relevant here, § 1151 provides:
[T]he term "Indian country" ... means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151. Generally speaking, then, a crime occurs in "Indian country" if it occurs on (1) an Indian reservation, (2) a dependent Indian community or (3) an Indian allotment. Id.
The government contends that the Settlement is "Indian country," because it is a "de facto reservation." The government's theory of the case is that Defendants committed Aggravated Sexual Abuse and Sexual Abuse, or aided and abetted the same, at the Settlement address of "315 Red Earth Drive, Tama County, Iowa" ("315 Red Earth Drive"). See generally United States v. Papakee, No. 06-CR-162-1-LRR, 2007 WL 891717 (N.D.Iowa Mar.21, 2007) (). Defendant Papakee argues that 315 Red Earth Drive is not Indian country.
Before addressing the merits of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must decide whether the court or the jury determines whether 315 Red Earth Drive is "Indian country." The parties agree that the government bears the burden to prove any jurisdictional facts beyond a reasonable doubt.2
The government submits that the court may decide, as a matter of law, the limited issue of whether the location of the alleged assault is "Indian country." The government contends that the jury's role is simply to decide whether the assault, in fact, occurred at such location. Defendant Papakee, on the other hand, contends that the jury must decide this issue, because the jury must find that he committed all of the elements of the crimes charged and that "the offense occurred in Indian country" is an element of both crimes. The elements of Aggravated Sexual Abuse in Indian Country are:
(1) the defendant did knowingly cause and attempt to cause another to engage in a sexual act, (2) by the use of force or threat of force, (3) the defendant is an Indian, and (4) the offense occurred in Indian [c]ountry.
United States v. Youngman, No. 06-2333, 2007 WL 957540, *4 (8th Cir. Apr.2, 2007). The elements pf Sexual Abuse in Indian Country, as applied to the facts of this case, are: (1) the...
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