U.S. v. Park

Decision Date11 August 2008
Docket NumberNo. 06-35886.,06-35886.
Citation536 F.3d 1058
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ron PARK; Mary Park, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Syrena Hargrove, Assistant United States Attorney (argued); Thomas E. Moss, United States Attorney; Alan G. Burrow, Assistant United States Attorney; Boise, ID, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Linda Louise Blackwelder Pall (argued), Law Office of Linda Pall, Moscow, ID, for the defendants-appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho; Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-05-00213-EJL.

Before: A. WALLACE TASHIMA, M. MARGARET McKEOWN, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

Ron and Mary Park own and operate a dog kennel, Wild River Kennels, on property along the Clearwater River in Idaho. Their property is subject to a scenic easement that was granted to the United States, which prohibits commercial activity but permits livestock farming. In this appeal, we are asked to determine the unusual question whether dogs are "livestock." Despite a gut inclination that the answer might be "no," resolution of the issue is not so clear, thus precluding summary judgment at this stage of the proceeding. As it turns out, the term "livestock" is ambiguous at best and much broader than the traditional categories of horses, cattle, sheep, and pigs.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1973, Earl and Iona Monroe, the owners of a plot of land along the Middle Fork of the Clearwater River in Idaho, including a two-acre tract known as Tract 160A, granted the United States a scenic easement in accordance with the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287.1 The stated purpose of the easement is to allow the U.S. Forest Service "to administer such land to protect the scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, and other similar values [of the region] and to prevent any developments that will tend to mar or detract from their scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values...." Toward that end, the easement provides, in relevant part, that:

2. RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE BY GRANTORS:

a. The lands within the easement area shall not be used for any professional or commercial activities except such as can be and are, in fact, conducted from a residential dwelling without outside alteration of the dwelling.

...

c. The Grantors, their heirs and assigns, retain the right to use the easement for general crop and livestock farming and for limited residential development consistent with applicable State and local regulations....

Ron and Mary Park purchased Tract 160A in 1989. At the time there was a chicken coop on the property. The Forest Service approved modifications that the Parks wished to make to some of the existing buildings and also approved the addition of horse stalls. In 1990, the Parks received approval to use a portion of their home as a craft and hobby shop. A year later, the Parks received approval to run a bed and breakfast from their home. In 1997, they began advertising that they were offering a dog training and kennel business, Wild River Kennels, on the property.

In early 1998, the Forest Service notified the Parks that their dog training and kennel business violated the terms of the easement. According to the Forest Service, the kennel was an unauthorized commercial activity and there were new structures associated with it that had been built without prior approval. The Parks met with the Forest Service to discuss the dog kennel, but did not resolve the issue. Several years later, the dispute remained unsettled. In 2003, the parties exchanged letters on the matter, but, again, did not come to a resolution.

The United States filed suit in 2005. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Parks argued that their dog kennel constituted "livestock farming," which is specifically permitted by the terms of the easement. The government contended that, under Idaho law, dogs are not livestock.

The district court held that the easement terms were "unambiguous," stating that "[r]egardless of how broadly one defines livestock farming, the Parks' activities do not fall within its terms." The court did not look to any particular source to define "livestock farming," but commented that the government's citations to Idaho law "further yield support for its interpretation." The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government and ordered the Parks to cease their commercial operation and remove any associated structures or convert them to non-commercial use.2 The court's order that the Parks remove or convert the structures was stayed pending this appeal.

We review de novo the district court's interpretation of a scenic easement. Racine v. United States, 858 F.2d 506, 508 (9th Cir.1988). We disagree with the district court and conclude that the term "livestock," as used in the easement, is ambiguous, and we reverse the grant of summary judgment.

II. ANALYSIS
A. LIVESTOCK FARMING

We generally follow state law to resolve property disputes, such as this issue of interpretation of an easement3 See Cortese v. United States, 782 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir.1986). Under Idaho law, courts construe a deed that conveys an interest in property to "give effect to the real intention of the parties." Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). Only if the language of the deed is ambiguous does the court look beyond the four corners of the deed to extrinsic evidence. Id. (internal citations omitted). "Interpretation of an unambiguous conveyance instrument is a question of law to be settled by its plain language." Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003). "Ambiguity exists only if language of the conveyance instrument is subject to conflicting interpretations." Id.

In a recent case, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the question of an ambiguous easement. Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 139 Idaho 770, 86 P.3d 484 (2004). The easement granted Mountainview Landowners Cooperative Association the right to access a beach area on the Cools' property for "swimming and boating." These terms were not defined in the easement. Id. at 487. The Idaho Supreme Court held that there was a "latent ambiguity over the term swimming."4 Id. It observed that applying the strict definition of swimming found in the dictionary — "to propel oneself through water""could lead to illogical results" because it would exclude dangling one's feet in the water as well as prevent parents from acting as a lifeguard for their children. Id. (quoting WEBSTER II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY (1984)). The court further noted that there was not a uniform definition of swimming across dictionaries and that some definitions included "diving." Id. Because "more than one definition and interpretation of swimming exists," the court held that the term was ambiguous. Id.

The Idaho Supreme Court's analysis guides our own. The scenic easement permits the Parks to engage in "livestock farming," but does not define this term. Still, we have no difficulty concluding that the district court erred in holding that "livestock," even broadly defined, could not include dogs.

The term "livestock" stems from the Middle Ages, when it was used as a measure of wealth or to refer to property that could be moved, particularly to a market for trade. Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com (last visited July 25, 2008). Later, the term began to be used in a more limited sense to describe cattle. Id. Today, the dictionary definition of "livestock" is sweeping, capturing every type of domesticated animal. For example, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines "livestock" as "animals kept or raised for use or pleasure; esp: farm animals kept for use and profit." MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 728 (11th ed.2003). The Oxford English Dictionary is in accord and defines "livestock" as "animals, esp. on a farm, regarded as an asset." THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 797 (9th ed.1995).5 Even Black's Law Dictionary defines "livestock" broadly as "domestic animals and fowls that (1) are kept for profit or pleasure, (2) can normally be confined within boundaries without seriously impairing their utility, and (3) do not normally intrude on others' land in such a way as to harm the land or growing crops." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 953 (8th ed.2004); see also Levine v. Conner, 540 F.Supp.2d 1113, 1116 (N.D.Cal.2008) (analyzing the dictionary definitions of the word "livestock" and observing that "the scope of domestic animals used or raised on a farm can potentially extend to guinea pigs, cats, dogs, fish, ants, and bees.").

Despite the broad definitions in the dictionaries, we recognize that "livestock" has been used to describe a more limited set of animals such as cattle, horses, and pigs. The government calls our attention to § 25-1101 of the Idaho Code, which limits "livestock" to a narrow set of animals, namely, "cattle, horses, mules, or asses." Idaho Code § 25-1101. That section, however, pertains to brands and identifications affixed to the hide of an animal. Not surprisingly, this provision is not the only one in the Idaho Code that defines "livestock:" § 25-3601 states that cassowary, ostrich, emu, and rhea are "livestock" and § 25-3701 adds fallow deer, elk, and reindeer to the list. Idaho Code §§ 25-3601, 25-3701.

Idaho is not alone in having a statutory definition of "livestock" that identifies certain specific animals as "livestock." A cursory survey of case law and federal and state statutes uncovers multiple definitions of "livestock" that include particular subsets of domestic animals. For example, federal regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act define "livestock" to include "cattle, sheep, horses, goats, and other domestic...

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