U.S. v. Patel, Criminal No. 04-10230-JLT.
| Decision Date | 27 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 04-10230-JLT. |
| Citation | 524 F.Supp.2d 107 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Charles PATEL, Jr. a/k/a Chandrakant Patel, Jr. a/k/a Chandu Patel a/k/a Chando Patel, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Adam J. Bookbinder, John Joseph Moakley, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Robert L. Peabody, Nystrom, Beckman & Paris, Boston, MA, for Defendant.
The United States charges Defendant Charles Patel Jr. with two counts of bank fraud in connection with the operation of Defendant's restaurant businesses. Presently at issue is Defendant's mental competency to stand trial.1
In dealing with the competency motions, the court has reviewed the Parties' submissions and medical reports, and reports from the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. As well, a Competency Hearing was held on September 20, 2007. On the basis of this review, the court finds Defendant COMPETENT to stand trial for the following reasons.
Defendant Charles Patel Jr. was the Chief Executive Officer of Guacamole's Cantina, Inc. and the President of B.N.J. Restaurants, Inc., both California corporations.2 In connection with these restaurant businesses, Defendant had a number of commercial bank accounts.3 According to the Indictment, from January to February of 1999, Defendant executed a "check-kiting" scheme by writing and depositing sixty-seven checks between his Bank Boston and Wells Fargo accounts resulting in inflated balances at both banks.4 During this period, Defendant allegedly transferred money out of these two accounts that he later withdrew as cash or used to pay business expenses.5 Bank Boston lost $171,273 before it uncovered Defendant's alleged scheme.6
Defendant agreed to repay Bank Boston and paid Bank Boston $90,759 of the $171,273 he owed.7 At this point, Defendant allegedly employed a second, more elaborate "check-kiting" scheme that involved his bank accounts with Pan American, Citizen and Carolina First.8
The indictment charges Defendant with two counts of bank fraud.9
On August 4, 2004, Defendant was indicted.10 On August 11, 2004, Defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.11 Defendant was released pending trial.12 On September 7, 2004, however, after discovering that Defendant was operating a restaurant and had a $900,000 bank loan under a different name, the Government requested the revocation of Defendant's release or revision of his release conditions.13 On September 22, 2004, Magistrate Judge Collings denied the Government's request to revoke the release, but revised Defendant's conditions of release to include home detention with electronic monitoring.14 Before the monitoring could be implemented, Defendant fled and became a fugitive until the time of his arrest on April 10, 2006, in Youngstown, Ohio.15 According to the Government, Defendant operated restaurants and engaged in fraudulent activities during his release and subsequent flight.
On September 28, 2006, Defendant filed a Motion Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a),(b), and Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.2(c)(1)(A) for a Hearing to Determine the Mental Capacity/Competency of Defendant, accompanied by a report from defense expert Dr. Jerome Rogoff, M.D., and a letter from Dr. William T. Riley, M.D., a physician who treated Defendant in California.16 On November 3, 2006, the Government requested that the court appoint an independent psychiatric expert to examine Defendant's competence to stand trial.17 The court granted that motion and appointed Dr. Russell George Vasile, M.D., as the expert.18 In addition to his own assessment, Dr. Vasile asked Dr. Mark S. Greenberg, Ph.D., to undertake a neuropsychological evaluation of Defendant.19 On June 8, 2007, Dr. Vasile submitted his report, and on June 19, 2007, Dr. Greenberg submitted his neuropsychological report.20 On August 27, 2007, the Government filed a Request that Court Find Patel Competent to Stand Trial.21 Also on August 27, 2007, Defendant filed defense expert Dr. Jerome Rogoff's supplemental report that responded to the findings of Dr. Vasile and Dr. Greenberg.22 On September 4, 2007, Defendant filed the affidavit of Robert Peabody, counsel for Defendant, in support of Defendant's motion.23
On September 6, 2007, prior to the Competency Hearing later that day, the Parties jointly informed the court that in lieu of live testimony at the hearing, they wished to proceed on the written medical reports of the doctors, affidavits submitted to the court and supporting legal memoranda. The court allowed the Competency Hearing to proceed in accordance with this agreement.24 At the Competency Hearing, both Defendant and the Government presented oral arguments to the court and were questioned by the court.25 Defendant did not testify, although he had the opportunity to do. The court took the competency determination under advisement.26
On September 13, 2006, the Court Reporter completed the transcript of the Competency Hearing and made it available to counsel. The Government and Defendant each filed proposed Findings of Fact and supporting legal memoranda on October 16, 2007, and October 18, 2007, respectively.27
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) outlines a two-prong legal standard for determination of a defendant's mental competency to stand trial:
If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable
[1] to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him
or
[2] to assist properly in his defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General [for hospitalization]....28
Section 4241 adopts the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States.29 There, the Court held that a defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and ... ha[ve] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."30 Although a district court may issue findings with respect to each prong, the First Circuit has noted that a district court "need not parse the definition of `competency' nor arrive at specific findings as to each component."31
Surprisingly, a question arises regarding whether the Government bears the burden of establishing competency, or the defendant bears the burden of establishing incompetency. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 is silent on this point, noting only that the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.32 The legislative history is also silent.33 Lastly, the First Circuit does not appear to have considered the burden of proof issue.
The Supreme Court, however, briefly commented on this issue in dicta in Cooper v. Oklahoma.34 In Cooper, the Court held that an Oklahoma statute requiring defendants to prove incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence violated a defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.35 In the context of a discussion on the varying burdens of proof required in the fifty states, the Court noted:
Indeed, a number of States place no burden on the defendant at all, but rather require the prosecutor to prove the defendant's competence to stand trial once a question about competency has been credibly raised. The situation is no different in federal court. Congress has directed that the accused in a federal prosecution must prove incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 4241.36
As noted, the Court's comment that the "accused in a federal prosecution must prove incompetence" is dictum. Obiter dictum is a "remark made or opinion, expressed by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, `by the way' — that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court; or it is any statement of law enunciated by the judge or court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy, or suggestion."37 Dictum is "unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential."38 In Cooper, the reference to the federal system was incidental and unnecessary to the outcome of the case. The case is about burdens of proof in state statutes, not in the federal system. The Court's reference to the federal system, therefore, is only for the purpose of comparison, with the Court noting that the standard of proof is lower in the federal system. Moreover, the point of the Court's comparison is that the federal system has a lower standard of proof, not the fact that the "accused" has the burden of proof. Additionally, the Court does not engage in any analysis of Section 4241 when it makes the statement. Lastly, other federal courts have recognized this statement as dictum.39
The First Circuit has indicated that Supreme Court dicta may be authoritative under certain circumstances. In McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, the First Circuit adopted Professor Wright's view 40 The First Circuit concluded, "federal appellate courts are bound by the Supreme Court's considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court's outright holdings, particularly when, as here, a dictum is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement."41 In a later case, the First Circuit reaffirmed its position, "Carefully considered statements of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, must be accorded great weight and should be treated as...
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United States v. Merriweather
...did so in dictum while referring to the various burdens of proof required among the states. 34 See generally, United States v. Patel, 524 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding that statement in Cooper assigning burden of proof was not binding as the Court has not referred to it agai......
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...but did so in dictum while referring to the various burdens of proof required among the states.34 See generally, United States v. Patel, 524 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding that statement in Cooper assigning burden of proof was not binding as the Court has not referred to it a......
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...but did so in dictum while referring to the various burdens of proof required among the states.6 See generally, United States v. Patel, 524 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding that statement in Cooper assigning burden of proof was not binding as the Court has not referred to it ag......
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