U.S. v. Patrick, 90-3451

• Decision Date: 18 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-3451,90-3451
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George Franklin PATRICK, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 950

960 F.2d 950

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George Franklin PATRICK, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 90-3451.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 18, 1992.

Sheryl Lowenthal, Coral Gables, Fla., for defendant-appellant.

Bruce Hinshelwood, Asst. U.S. Atty., Orlando, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before HATCHETT and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

After a four-day jury trial, the appellant, George F. Patrick ("Patrick"), was convicted of the offense alleged in count two of his indictment, which charged that he, "willfully and knowingly conspired, combined, confederated, and agreed with other persons ... to manufacture and distribute, and to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute 100 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers, ...," in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court sentenced Patrick to 151 months imprisonment, $2,000.00 costs of imprisonment, and a $50.00 assessment fee.

For the reasons which follow, we affirm.

I.

Patrick raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether at sentencing the controlled substance was properly scored as methamphetamine; (2) whether the district court properly scored the amount of the controlled substance attributable to Patrick as 3.6 kilograms; (3) whether the district court properly denied his motion for a new trial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct; (4) whether the district court properly denied his motion for a new trial on grounds of the government's withholding of his business records; (5) whether the district court's deliberate ignorance instruction was proper; (6) whether the district court properly denied Patrick's request to represent himself; (7) whether Patrick's rights against self-incrimination were violated by his having to testify after an immunity agreement was entered into; and (8) whether the government's warrantless seizure of Patrick's business records violated his rights against illegal search and seizure.

After thoroughly reviewing the record, we find no merit to any of Patrick's arguments concerning issues two through eight and affirm Patrick's sentence and conviction as to those issues without opinion. ¹ However, we feel compelled to address the first issue presented on appeal which deals with the type of methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy.

II.

The issue as to the type of methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy arises because the experts at trial testified only that the controlled substance seized was methamphetamine. Patrick contends on appeal that since there are two types of methamphetamine, "Methamphetamine" (D- or Dextro-methamphetamine) and "L-methamphetamine/Levo-methamphetamine," defined by the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G."), and since the expert testimony did not directly establish which type was seized, the base offense level should have been determined based on the less serious form of methamphetamine, i.e., L-methamphetamine. ² A conviction involving the more potent form, D-methamphetamine, carries a greater sentence under the guidelines than a conviction involving L-methamphetamine.

In United States v. Koonce, 884 F.2d 349 (8th Cir.1989), ³ the Eighth Circuit considered the same issue we must decide in a similar factual setting. Although the chemists in Koonce testified that methamphetamine was involved, the chemists never testified as to the type of methamphetamine. ⁴ As in the present case, the defendant in Koonce failed to raise the issue of the type of methamphetamine until the sentencing hearing. The district court found that the government adequately carried its burden of proof that the illegal substance was that which is commonly understood by the term, not a lesser derivative of the same. 884 F.2d at 353. The Eighth Circuit permitted the district court to rely on its belief that the controlled substance was more likely D-methamphetamine than L-methamphetamine. ⁵

The government does not have to prove that a term used in its commonly-understood sense has no other meaning--at least until the possibility of another meaning is raised by the defense. United States v. Francesco, 725 F.2d 817 (1st Cir.1984). Since Patrick did not raise the issue of the type of methamphetamine until sentencing, the government was not required to offer evidence on the matter at trial. ⁶ Id.; see also United States v. Puglisi, 790 F.2d 240, 242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827, 107 S.Ct. 106, 93 L.Ed.2d 55 (1986).

After conducting the sentencing hearing in this case, the district court found that the harsher form of methamphetamine, D-methamphetamine, was involved. Since Patrick did not raise the issue until sentencing, the district court had to find only by a preponderance of the evidence that the controlled substance was Dextro-methamphetamine. ⁷ United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 662 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1633, 113 L.Ed.2d 728 (1991) ("District...