U.S. v. Pelley, 76-1981

• Decision Date: 15 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 76-1981,76-1981
• Citation: 572 F.2d 264
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Janie Kay PELLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 264

572 F.2d 264

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Janie Kay PELLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 76-1981.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Submitted on Briefs Jan. 25, 1978.

Decided Feb. 15, 1978.

David L. Russell, U. S. Atty. and William S. Price, Asst. U. S. Atty., Oklahoma City, Okl., submitted on brief, for plaintiff-appellee.

James W. Merz, Oklahoma City, Okl., submitted on briefs, for defendant-appellant.

Before McWILLIAMS, BREITENSTEIN and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant was found guilty of the interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. She appeals from the judgment imposing sentence. We affirm.

After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly illegal search and seizure. Defendant waived a jury trial. The case was presented to the court on a stipulation of facts which incorporated the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing.

Detective Scott of the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Police Department received a tip from an informant whom he had known for approximately five years and who had given him reliable information 40-50 times resulting in 20-30 convictions. The tip was that an escapee was attempting to purchase drugs at Delroy Victory's house, and was driving a '76 Camaro automobile which was parked at a described location near the house. Scott was familiar with Victory's house and drug activities there conducted.

Scott and his partner Terhune drove to the house and observed a Camaro parked at the location given by the informant. A person was in the driver's seat. Soon another person left the house and entered the Camaro. The officers followed the Camaro and stopped it in a well-lighted location. Scott went to the driver's side and asked that the driver, defendant Pelley, produce her driver's license. He was suspicious of the license and asked defendant her birthdate. Her answer did not correspond with the date shown on the license. Scott then asked defendant about the car and defendant said it belonged to Viki Bell who was in Hawaii. Scott knew Viki Bell and had seen her the day before. He doubted that Bell owned a new Camaro and arrested the defendant for giving false information.

Officer Terhune went to the other side of the car and ordered the occupants to get out. He saw on the car's floor a bag containing a leafy green substance which appeared to be marijuana. The three occupants of the car were taken to police headquarters. A routine check disclosed that the car had been stolen in Simi Valley, California.

Defendant does not deny that she gave false information to Detective Scott. She argues that the officers did not have probable cause to stop the car and, hence, the evidence received after the stop was inadmissible. Probable cause for arrest differs from reasonable suspicion for a routine police investigation. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134, is not in point. There the government conceded that the arrest took place when the car was stopped and the Court held there was not probable cause for an arrest. Ibid. at 103, 80 S.Ct. 168. In Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688, the question was whether the stop was for a routine interrogation or for an arrest and the Court remanded for a factual determination. Ibid. at 262, 80 S.Ct. 1431.

A stop for a routine police investigation does not require that the officers have probable cause for their action. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, recognizes the right of a police officer to make an investigatory stop. Our decisions are to the same effect. See e. g. Stone v. Patterson, 10 Cir., 468 F.2d 558 559, and United States v. Self, 10 Cir., 410 F.2d 984, 986. This is not a case like United States v. McDevitt, 10 Cir., 508 F.2d 8, 10, where the stopping resulted from an officer's impulse.

In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, an officer, acting on an informant's tip that an individual in a nearby parked car was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waistband, went to the car and asked the defendant to open the door. Instead, the defendant rolled down the window and the officer seized a revolver from defendant's waistband. The Court held that the officer had reasonable ground for a forcible investigatory stop. Ibid. at 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921. In the instant case the officers had at least as strong a basis for their suspicion as did the officer in Adams v. Williams. Detective Scott's experience showed the reliability of the...